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Abstract 
 
InternetNZ has responsibility for management of the .nz domain name space.  
This dissertation examines InternetNZ’s development and implementation of the 
Dispute Resolution Service Policy (the DRS).  The DRS, which is being reviewed 
in 2010, provides a substantive legal test for unfair registration of a domain name 
and a dispute resolution process.  This dissertation asks whether the DRS is 
working effectively and, if so, what this reveals about the operation of the Internet 
in New Zealand.  The dissertation shows that the DRS is a low cost, high quality 
alternative to litigation and is being run in a pragmatic but principled way by 
InternetNZ.  Implications are discussed and recommendations are made for minor 
improvements.  The dissertation concludes with a call for more participation in, 
and critique of, Internet policy developments given the important human rights 
issues that can arise and the significance of the Internet in New Zealand today.   
 
 
Word length 
 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, 
bibliography and appendices) comprises approximately 34,978 words. 
 
 
Subjects/Topics 
 
Internet-Domain Names-Dispute Resolution. 
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Glossary 
 
Domain name: A domain name is the alphabetical representation of a string of 
numbers assigned to each computer on the Internet.  Domain names have several 
levels and is read from right to left with each level separated by a full stop 
(commonly referred to as a dot).  The furthest right hand level is known as the top 
level and may be a country code (such as .nz) or a generic code (such as .org). 
Domain name server: A computer that accepts requests from other programs or 
servers to convert domain names into numerical addresses (typically known as IP 
or TCP addresses).   
The Domain Name System: The world wide system of domain name services 
that process and contain data about domain names and numbers.  The Domain 
Name System is often known simply as “the DNS” and is sometimes referred to 
as the Domain Name Service or domain name space. 
.nz: the suffix for domain names registered in the New Zealand part of the 
DNS. 
Root servers: The computers that store lists of domain names and associated IP 
address and other data, about a subset of the name space (those subsets are called 
zones). 
The Internet: The Internet is a global system of thousands of interconnected 
computer networks. 
The world wide web: The software application that allows users to use 
programmes such as electronic mail and other file transfer protocols (which move 
files between computers) thereby enabling users to use browsers such as Internet 
Explorer, Safari and FireFox.  The world wide web is not the same as the Internet, 
although the two terms are often used interchangeably. 
The WHOIS service: The resource record which enables a facility to query the 
details of a specific domain name, in other words, to ask “who is” the registrant of 
a domain name. 
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List of Acronyms 
 
ADR  Alternative dispute resolution 
AMINZ  The Arbitrators’ and Mediators’ Institute of New Zealand  
ccTLD(s) country code Top Level Domain(s) 
DNC  Domain Name Commissioner 
DNCL  Domain Name Commission Limited 
DNS  Domain Name System 
DRS  The Domain Name Dispute Resolution Service Policy 
gTLD(s) generic Top Level Domain(s) 
IANA  Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
InternetNZ Internet New Zealand Incorporated 
IP  Internet Protocol address 
ISOCNZ Internet Society of New Zealand  
ISP  Internet Service Provider 
ODR  On-line dispute resolution  
NZOC  .nz Oversight Committee  
NZRS  New Zealand Domain Registry Services 
RFCs  Requests For Comments 
TCP  Transfer Computer Protocol address 
UDRP  Universal Dispute Resolution Policy 
WIPO  World Intellectual Property Organisation 
 7
 
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION∗ 
 
What do Julia Roberts, Jeanette Winterson, and New Zealand Post have in 
common? They all have famous names that have been registered as domain names 
by someone else.1  As the Internet2 becomes more important in every day life, 
certainty about rights in domain names has also become more important.3  Legal 
disputes about domain names and questions about the efficacy of dispute 
resolution systems are increasing.  These developments place increased pressure 
on dispute resolution systems, public and private, to operate effectively.   
 
Disputes about .nz domain names must be dealt with under New Zealand 
law, which includes the option of resolving disputes using the Dispute Resolution 
Service (the DRS).4  The DRS is operated by the Domain Name Commission 
Limited (DNCL), which is reviewing the DRS in 2010. 
 
This dissertation takes a closer look at the organisation responsible for 
operating the DRS and related policies on which the Internet in New Zealand 
operates.  As the Internet becomes more important in everyday life so does the 
need to be assured of the integrity of those responsible for its administration 
(including management of .nz domain names).  This dissertation examines one 
aspect of this, the DRS, and considers the implications for other Internet 
developments. In a broad sense these developments may point to the need for a 
more coherent response to related legal issues or formal recognition of those 
responsible for Internet administration.  
                                                 
∗ I am very grateful for the assistance of Debbie Monahan, Domain Name Commissioner, Andy 
Linton and Dr Judy McGregor for comments on draft material.  Errors or omissions are my own. 
1 Diane Rowland and Elizabeth McDonald Information Technology Law (3rd ed, Cavendish 
Publishing, London, 2005) at 533 – 534 and 539.  
2 “Internet” (2010) Wikipedia <www.wikipedia.org>.  This dissertation uses the upper case “I” 
when referring the Internet. This is considered more appropriate in this context because the term is 
being used to refer to the proper name of the network of thousands of computers on which the 
“world wide web” functions.  Parliamentary law drafting practice in New Zealand varies: see Joy 
Liddicoat, “The Copyright (New Technologies) Amendment Act 2008 Internet Service Provider 
Liability” (LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2009). 
3 Rowland and McDonald, above n 1, at 525. 
4 Domain Name Commission Limited “Dispute Resolution Service Policy” (2008) Domain Name 
Commission <www.dnc.org.nz>. 
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A Personal Statement  
 
My interest in this research flows from three sources.  Firstly, I am a 
lawyer specialising in public law who is interested in legal theory and public and 
international law.  Secondly, I am a Human Rights Commissioner with the New 
Zealand Human Rights Commission and I have a strong interest in human rights 
and dispute resolution.  Thirdly, I am a member of InternetNZ and a Director and 
Chair of the Board of Directors of DNCL.  I became interested in the Internet in 
2007 when I was challenged by another human rights advocate to understand how 
the Internet functioned globally and to get involved in advocating for democratic, 
fair and inclusive processes in its administration.5   
 
Until that challenge I had never turned my mind to the infrastructure of the 
Internet, despite being an early adopter of the technology for my own law practice 
and despite having an interest in human rights and public law.  I joined 
InternetNZ and applied to be a member of the .nz Oversight Committee.  I was 
appointed and subsequently became a Director of DNCL when the company was 
formed in 2008.  I was appointed Chair of the Board in 2010. 
 
In 2010, Dr Judy McGregor, Equal Opportunities Commissioner with the 
New Zealand Human Rights Commission, asked me to prepare a section on the 
Internet in a draft Chapter on Freedom of Expression, which forms part of the 
Commission’s status report on human rights in New Zealand.  This further roused 
my interest in Internet administration and human rights and caused me to think 
about what, if any, priorities for action there might be to enhance and protect 
human rights, including the right to freedom of expression. 
 
This research provides an opportunity for me to reflect on and examine in 
more detail the integrity of InternetNZ’s oversight of the .nz domain name space.  
My experience in all three areas (law, human rights and the administration of the 
Internet infrastructure in New Zealand) provides a strong and unique basis from 
which I can examine and critique why the DRS was established and its 
                                                 
5 Conversation between author and Jac sm Kee, Women’s Rights and ICT Project Coordinator, 
Association for Progressive Communications, (Pune, India, 14 March 2007). 
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subsequent operation.  It also provides an opportunity to reflect on whether this 
dissertation has any wider implications for discussion about human rights and 
Internet administration. 
 
B The Internet  
1 Transformation and Ubiquity 
 
The Internet has transformed life as we know it.  A 2009 survey of New 
Zealanders showed that 83 per cent use the Internet. 6   Many users conduct 
everyday business online.  More than half of those who use the Internet use their 
bank's online services at least weekly.  The Internet is ubiquitous.  All users rely 
on the Internet to be available all day, every day, most without ever considering 
how the Internet actually works and who is responsible for it.   
 
The technical developments that formed the basis for what we now call 
“the Internet” began in the 1960s and involved diverse actors including 
government, academic, technical and other non-government agencies and 
individuals in different parts of the world.7  Leiner helpfully summarises that: 8 
 
The Internet is as much a collection of communities as a collection of 
technologies, and its success is largely attributable to both satisfying basic 
community needs as well as utilizing the community in an effective way to push 
the infrastructure forward. 
 
In New Zealand this “collection of communities” is anchored in Internet 
New Zealand Incorporated, trading as InternetNZ (InternetNZ).  InternetNZ is a 
membership based organisation with three operational parts.  Firstly, InternetNZ 
has a Council, which is elected by InternetNZ members, and an office with a 
public advocacy function.  Secondly, InternetNZ has a wholly owned subsidiary 
                                                 
6 Philippa Smith and others World Internet Project New Zealand: The Internet in New Zealand 
2009 (World Internet Project New Zealand, Institute of Culture, Discourse and Communication, 
Auckland University of Technology, Auckland, 2010) at 2.  
7 Vint Cerf “Histories of the Internet: A brief history of the Internet and related works” (2010) 
Internet Society <www.isoc.org>. 
8 Barry M. Leiner and others “Histories of the Internet: A brief history of the Internet” (2010) 
Internet Society <www.isoc.org>. 
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company, the DNCL, which has charitable status.  This company oversees the 
policies for .nz domain names, including the DRS.  Thirdly, InternetNZ has 
another wholly owned subsidiary company the New Zealand Domain Name 
Registry Limited, trading as .nz Registry Services (NZRS), which also has 
charitable status.  NZRS operates the register of .nz domain names and is 
responsible for ensuring that the .nz domain name system (including root servers) 
operates all day, every day.  Without this system, the Internet as we know it in 
New Zealand would cease to function. 
 
InternetNZ has responsibility for the .nz domain name space, a role 
recognised by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN).  ICANN has agreements with a variety of individuals and organisations 
around the world who are responsible for their respective country code top level 
domains (ccTLDs) such as .nz.9  InternetNZ’s specific responsibility is to oversee 
the management of the .nz domain name space. 10   InternetNZ, through its 
subsidiary companies, is able to charge a fee for the provision of this service.  
This fee is $1.50 per domain name per month and will become $1.25 per month 
from 1 July 2010.  The fee generates annual revenue of approximately $6 million 
for InternetNZ.11  
2 What is a Domain Name? 
 
A domain name is a means of identifying computers and networks by 
name, rather than number.  Each computer connected to the Internet by a server 
has a unique string of numbers attached to it.  In practice it is the user friendly 
allocation of unique literary equivalents of these numbers, known as domain 
names, which take an Internet user to a specific address, 12  for 
example, www.victoria.ac.nz.  For this system (known as the Domain Name 
System, the DNS) to work it is vital that no two domain names are identical and, 
                                                 
9 David Harvey internet.law.nz (2 ed LexisNexis NZ Limited, New Zealand, 2005) at 114. 
10 Internet New Zealand Incorporated, “About InternetNZ” 2010 <www.internetnz.net.nz>. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Chris Reed and John Angel Computer Law: The Law and Regulation of Information Technology 
(6th ed, Oxford University Press, London, 2007) at 437. 
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to ensure this, most domain name registries operate name registration on a “first 
come first served” basis.13   
 
Domain names are hierarchical, with the hierarchy divided into levels.  
Top level domains (TLDs) are in two categories: country specific (ccTLDS, for 
example, the New Zealand country specific code is “.nz”) and generic (gTLDS, 
which are non-country specific, ending, for example in “.com”).  Subsequent 
levels in the hierarchy are further categorised, for example, second level domains 
such as ac.nz (for universities) and third level domains such as victoria.ac.nz (for 
specific universities).14 
 
There are more than 390,000 registered .nz domain names: 15  website 
addresses that end in .nz.  With the growth in Internet use, domain names are 
featuring in a wider variety of cases.  Contests for rights in domain names have 
become routine in contracts for sale of businesses, relationship property disputes 
and employment disputes.  Domain names are valuable and can be bought and 
sold, sometimes for significant sums of money.16   
3 The Critical Nature of the Domain Name System 
 
The technical operation of the DNS is fundamental to the Internet.  In a 
broad, dispute resolution sense, domain name disputes are not unique.  But the 
policies on which the operation of the DNS is founded (including registration 
based on the principle of “first come first served”) do affect the nature of disputes 
and provide a unique context for dispute resolution.  The DNS therefore affects 
how domain name disputes can arise and their various forms.   
 
                                                 
13 Rowland and McDonald, above n 1, at 524-528. 
14 Domain Name Commission Limited “Common Terms” 2003 <www.dnc.org.nz>. 
15 The Domain Name Commission Limited “Monthly .nz Statistics – Domain Names by 2LD” 
(2010) Domain Name Commission <www.dnc.org.nz>. 
16 For example, in Kremen v Cohen 2001 F. 2d 1502 (9th Cir 1991) the Court upheld a jury verdict 
ordering USD$65 million in damages where the respondent had fraudulently obtained the domain 
name sex.com by deceiving a registrar into transferring it to him from the registered owner. 
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The Internet is increasingly seen as part of the critical infrastructure of 
New Zealand, along with water, electricity and roads. 17   Yet little is widely 
known about the organisation which administers that infrastructure, how it 
operates the DNS or oversees the domain name registration system. 
4 Domain Name Disputes 
 
Domain names disputes fall into two categories: legitimate dispute and 
cybersquatting.18  The first are those in which both parties have some legitimate 
interest or claim in the name (such as where a company is wound up or sold).19  
The motivation in these cases may be a genuine dispute (where one party has 
simply registered a name earlier in time, unbeknown to the other) or anti-
competitive actions (such as where a business attempts to register the domain 
name of a competitor).   
 
The second category, cybersquatting, are disputes in which a person (who 
does not have rights in a domain name) acquires a domain name in which another 
person has rights and then attempts to sell the name to the rights holder or to 
otherwise deal with it contrary to the rights of the rights holder.20  Cybersquatting 
can take different forms, such as typosquatting (where many common 
typographical errors of a domain name are registered)21 or domain name hijacking 
(where a person, in bad faith, attempts to deprive a registered domain name holder 
of a domain name by using a domain name dispute resolution policy).22  The 
motivation for cybersquatting is usually either monetary or punitive.  The 
categories of disputes are not exclusive since the nature of a dispute may change, 
beginning as one kind and ending up another. 
 
                                                 
17 See, for example, Cabinet Paper “Infrastructure Stocktake Report” 17 May 2004 Ministry of 
Economic Development, at para 70 and Appendix 6 at para 3. 
18 Rowland and McDonald, above n 1, at 526-528. 
19 Keith Newman Connecting the Clouds: The Internet in New Zealand (The Internet Society of 
New Zealand and Activity Press, New Zealand, 2008) at 291 and also available at 
<www.nethistory.co.nz>. 
20 Rowland and McDonald, above n 1, at 526. 
21 Christopher G Clark “The Truth in Domain Names Act of 2003 and a Preventative Measure to 
Combat Typosquatting” (2004) 89 Cornell Law Review at 1476. 
22 Domain Name Commission Limited, above n 4, at cl 3. 
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Disputes over.nz domain names were initially taken to public dispute 
resolution processes (the courts).  Litigation, primarily seeking injunctive relief 
and court orders as to domain name use, was based on common law rights (such 
as passing off), statutory rights (such as trade marks or copyright) and statutory 
consumer law (such fair trading).23   
 
While case law developed promptly, there were concerns about the need 
for accessible, speedy, low cost and remedy appropriate processes.  Questions 
arose about the scope of legal tests to be applied to domain name use.24  Specific 
domain name dispute resolution processes developed in response.  In New 
Zealand, this took the form of the DRS.  
5 Overview of the Dispute Resolution Service 
 
The DRS may be used where a person (the respondent) has registered a 
domain name in which another person (the complainant) has rights and where it is 
asserted by the complainant that registration in the hands of the respondent is 
unfair. The policy lists various factors which may be taken into account in 
assessing whether registration is unfair and provides for how a respondent might 
show that the registration is a fair one.  The process can not be used merely to 
enforce an existing contractual right. 
 
The DRS has three steps. The first is informal mediation, which is 
mandatory if a response to the complaint is filed.  The second, if mediation fails 
or if there is no response to the complaint, is for the complaint to be referred to an 
independent Expert.  The third step is an appeal to a panel of three Experts.  Once 
a valid complaint is received proceedings are deemed to have commenced and the 
domain name is locked by the Domain Name Commissioner.  The effect is to 
suspend any dealings (such as transfer) in the domain name by any person.  Once 
the proceedings have been determined (whether by settlement or orders of the 
Expert or appeal panel) the name is unlocked and will either remain with the 
respondent, be transferred to the complainant or otherwise dealt with in 
                                                 
23 Harvey, above n 9, at 161. 
24 Susy Frankel and Geoff McLay, Intellectual Property in New Zealand (Wellington Lexis Nexis 
Butterworths 2002) at 712. 
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accordance with the outcome of the dispute.  Each of these steps is time limited, 
including the time within which mediation must be completed and Expert 
decisions rendered.   
 
The DRS is administered by the DNCL, with day to day operations 
overseen by the Domain Name Commissioner.  Complaints (and responses) are be 
lodged electronically, but must also be lodged by mail.  Mediators and Experts are 
appointed by the DNCL.  Decisions of Experts are published and information 
about the operation of the DRS is published in the annual report of the DNCL.  
There is no fee to file a complaint or for mediation.  The fee for an Expert 
decision is $1800 plus GST and for an appeal is $6600 plus GST.  All fees are 
paid in full directly to the Experts.  The jurisdiction of the courts is not excluded 
and the process will yield to proceedings before a court or arbitral tribunal. 
 
A full copy of the DRS is attached as an Appendix. 
6 Has the Internet Outstripped the Law? 
 
While there is no single international legal or other instrument regulating 
the Internet, the operation of the Internet is subject to law in a variety of ways.25  
Laws govern the contracts between Internet Service Providers and individual 
Internet users.  An Internet Service Provider (ISP) is an organisation which 
provides access to the world wide web and related services such as storage of data 
and publication of content. “One could say that ISPs establish the connection 
between people and content”26 on the Internet.   
 
Contract law also governs relationships between registrants of domain 
names and registrars, between software manufacturers and consumers. Laws 
govern issues of jurisdiction and conflict of laws which inevitably arise in 
electronic transactions. 27   A significant area of disputes has been the laws 
governing who may register domain names, who has rights in names and how 
                                                 
25 Harvey, above n 9, at 491. 
26 Judit Bayer “Liability of Internet Service Providers for Third Party Content” (2006) VUWLR 
Working Paper Series, Volume 1, at 1. 
27 Ibid, at 54. 
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those rights can be contested.  National laws and international agreements govern 
intellectual property rights and disputes about those rights.   
 
The DNS, however, is one area where the legal system has engaged 
directly with the technical operation of the Internet, as opposed to legal debates 
about substantive content (such debates about censorship and freedom of 
expression).  This engagement has been by way of litigation seeking protection of 
rights in domain names and appropriate remedies.  As in other countries, in New 
Zealand no single law regulates the Internet, but the operation of the Internet in 
New Zealand is subject to New Zealand law.  The establishment of the DRS as an 
alternative to litigation moved domain name disputes away from the Courts, 
distancing this aspect of Internet administration from legal scrutiny.   
 
Legal debates about the Internet in New Zealand have largely focused on 
what is on the Internet rather than who runs it.28  There are signs that this is 
changing and that concerns about what is on the Internet, how the Internet 
operates and who exercises policy control over its administration are converging.  
This convergence can be seen, for example, in proposals to filter Internet content 
in order to prevent access to child pornography which are to be implemented in 
2010.29  Proposals to terminate user accounts for copyright violation have also 
been developed and will be implemented in new legislation.30   
 
These proposals have not been without controversy, but the breadth and 
depth of public participation in these processes has, perhaps surprisingly, been 
variable.  So, too, have the public policy results as there appears to be an ad hoc 
or issue specific approach.  In a broad sense these developments may point to the 
need for a more coherent public law response to Internet related legal issues or a 
more formal recognition of the roles of this “collection” of actors (government 
and non-government) in Internet infrastructure administration and security 
(including management of .nz domain names).   
                                                 
28 Ibid, at 27-29. 
29 Department of Internal Affairs Digital Child Exploitation Filtering System Code of Practice 
(2010). 
30 The Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) Bill was introduced to Parliament on 23 February 2010. 
 16
C Original Contribution of Dissertation  
 
Little has been written by legal commentators about domain name disputes 
in New Zealand.  Two major New Zealand legal texts are out of date, even though 
published within the last ten years.31  A recent article analysing the jurisprudence 
in published DRS decisions highlighted the paucity of legal commentary in New 
Zealand and concluded the DRS is operating well.32  However, there has been no 
detailed critique of the development of the DRS, nor any detailed analysis of all 
complaints since the DRS was established in 2006.   
 
The result is that a private organisation operates an asset (the ability to 
manage .nz domain names) on which the operation of the Internet in New Zealand 
is founded, including the related dispute resolution system.  A closer look is 
needed at this “collection” of actors which control the operation of the Internet in 
New Zealand.  The original contribution of this dissertation is to examine the 
detailed operation of the DRS and draw conclusions about the efficacy of the 
administration of the Internet in New Zealand. 
1 The Primary Research Questions 
 
The two primary research questions are: (a) is the DRS operating 
effectively? and (b) is InternetNZ is acting responsibly in the exercise of its DRS 
functions?   
 
This dissertation answers these in three steps: by determining the criteria 
for assessing effectiveness, applying these criteria to the development and 
operation of the DRS, and by analysing the findings and drawing appropriate 
conclusions.  
 
The dissertation develops criteria for assessing effectiveness by answering 
two secondary research questions.  First, do any special considerations apply to 
domain name system evaluation or to ccTLD domain name disputes?  Second, 
                                                 
31 Frankel and McLay, above n 24 and Harvey, above n 9. 
32 Kevin Glover “Domain name dispute resolution” (2009) February NZLJ 35.  
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what kind of dispute resolution system is the DRS?  The dissertation applies the 
criteria to both the development and operation of the DRS.  The dissertation 
examines the rationale for developing the DRS, the sorts of disputes it was 
designed for, and the integrity of its processes.  Finally, the dissertation will 
examine whether the DRS is dispute specific and clear, whether it is working 
effectively and, if so, for whom, and how the system is administered.   
 
Conclusions will be drawn about whether the DRS: (a) is appropriate for 
the nature of disputes falling within its scope; (b) has process quality and rigour; 
and (c) is low cost and timely.  Conclusions will also be drawn about how 
InternetNZ has exercised its dispute resolution functions and any wider 
implications.  
2 New Legal Processes 
 
The Internet is subject to law.  Many laws regulate Internet transactions, 
including banking and finance laws.  But the Internet is a network of computers 
operated by a collection of individuals and organisations spread around the world.  
From a lay perspective, it is not governed by laws in the traditional sense.  Yet 
battles for control of the technical operation of the Internet (including who makes 
or determines the policies by which it operates) form the backdrop to many legal 
disputes about Internet use.  The underlying values of those participating in these 
battles also influences, and is in turn influenced by, a variety of geo-political and 
other factors.33   
 
While those matters are outside the scope of this dissertation, the technical 
operation of the Internet has resulted in the development of new rights and new 
legal processes in which rights are contested.  Domain name disputes, for 
example, involve rights which are not adequately provided for under common law 
or statute in New Zealand.  The result is that new legal processes have been 
developed to accommodate these rights, provide for remedies, and protect the 
DNS.   
 
                                                 
33 For a useful introduction see Harvey, above n 9, Chapters 1 and 3. 
 18
There is no single global system for resolution of domain name disputes 
for TLDs.  Systems vary by type of domain name (generic or country specific), 
domain name space administration (by individual or organisation, moderated or 
unmoderated), and by jurisdiction (national, regional and international).34  Within 
each system the scope of protected rights also varies.  In some cases rights are 
prescribed under general law (common law and statute), in others new rights are 
created under specific law (such as domain name rights legislation), in others 
under specific policies. 35  Neither is there consensus about which dispute 
resolution system is best or most appropriate.  In fact the need for new systems or 
new legal tests is highly contested, even as these new systems are developed or 
adopted in an increasing number of jurisdictions and new gTLDs are created.36  
The result is that despite the global operation of the DNS it is not possible to 
compare all domain name dispute resolution services. 
 
ICANN developed a new and separate process, the Universal Dispute 
Resolution Policy (UDRP), for domain name disputes involving gTLDs such as 
.com., .edu, or .org.37  The UDRP has been criticised because of delays in dealing 
with disputes.  For example, the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) 
has dealt with 27,000 domain name disputes under the UDRP over 10 years:  75% 
of these have been undefended. 38   Complaints about the effectiveness of the 
UDRP, itself designed as a fast track dispute resolution process, have led to calls 
for a faster “fast track” dispute resolution process. 39   But ccTLD dispute 
resolution systems, such as that operating for .nz, have attracted less attention. 
There appears to be little analysis of ccTLD domain name dispute resolution 
systems in general commentary on alternative dispute resolution.40 
 
                                                 
34 Ibid, for an overview of international and domestic regulation of domain names, at 130. 
35 For example the DRS in New Zealand. 
36 Milton L. Mueller Ruling the Root: internet governance and the taming of cyberspace 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States of America, 2002) at 201-202.  
37 Internet Corporation for Assigned of Names and Numbers Universal Dispute Resolution Policy, 
(ICANN, United States of America, 1999). 
38 Eun Joo, “ICANN’S new gTLD procedure – Trademark-related concerns” World Intellectual 
Property Organisation, (paper presented to ICANN Conference Sydney, June 2009), at 20. 
39 Ibid, at 19. 
40 See, for example, Peter Spiller (ed) Dispute Resolution in New Zealand (2 ed, Oxford University 
Press, Melbourne, 2007) which contains no discussion of the DRS. 
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In addition, the concept of the rights of registrants is widely used in 
advocacy and referred to by Internet commentators and in a way that echoes how 
public law commentators and advocates might refer to human rights.  Given the 
public good involved in the operation of the Internet infrastructure and the 
Internet’s increasing importance to diverse New Zealanders, there have been new 
questions about whether access to the Internet should be a human right.41  The 
dissertation will conclude with any wider implications from analysis of this new 
legal process, the DRS.  
D Structure of Dissertation 
 
Chapter II outlines the technical aspects of how the DNS works and why 
that matters in relation to domain name disputes.  The general policy of 
registration on a first come first served basis and the significance of no two 
domain names being the same are explained.  The Chapter outlines the Internet 
infrastructure in New Zealand, the .nz domain name space, the shared register 
system for registrars, and policies governing registrants.  There is a brief 
description of domain name dispute resolution process in relation to gTLDs and 
other ccTLD processes in order to better understand where New Zealand fits in 
the models available.  The secondary question of whether special considerations 
apply to domain name system evaluation is answered. 
 
Chapter III places domain name dispute resolution systems within the 
broader landscape of dispute resolution theory and sets out six criteria by which 
effectiveness may be assessed.  The chapters answer the secondary research 
question about what kind of system the DRS is. 
 
Chapter IV outlines the development of the DRS and assesses this in light 
of three criteria: system design, policy context, and process integrity.  Chapter V 
is a detailed assessment of the operation of the DRS since it commenced in 2006 
in light of three other criteria: standards, cost, and complaints.  Together, these 
chapters provide the findings on which the primary research can be answered and 
                                                 
41 For example, Michael L. Best “Can the Internet Be A Human Right?” in Steven Hick and others 
(eds) Human Rights and the Internet (Palgrave MacMillian, New York, 2000) 23, at 23. 
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answer secondary questions about the rationale for the DRS, the disputes it was 
designed for and the integrity of its processes. 
 
Chapter VI returns to the primary research questions.  Conclusions are 
drawn on whether the DRS is operating effectively and whether any 
improvements and further research would be desirable.  Finally, wider 
implications for new legal processes are briefly considered. 
E Limitation on Scope 
 
All research is necessarily selective and must have limited scope.  The 
Internet is a very wide topic and this dissertation overcomes the possible risks of 
lack of focus by looking at the operation of the Internet through one particular 
window: dispute resolution for .nz domain names.  Internet governance or the 
notion of “government of the internet”, 42  while interesting, is ultimately not 
relevant for this purpose.  Nor is the current coordination of the DNS by 
international bodies such as ICANN.  The wider geo-political issues and other 
politics of the collection of communities and individuals that are responsible for 
the operation of the Internet would also be a distraction.  Instead, these 
developments and wider issues are taken as a given. 
 
The relevant jurisprudence, including intellectual property law, is also 
developing and highly contested.  Detailed consideration of these developments is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation.  Instead, where relevant, this dissertation 
considers the nature of disputes and the application of domain name policy.  For 
example, to whether the DRS is effective for all or only some domain name 
disputes.  Conclusions will be drawn on whether the DRS protects a wider range 
of disputes than previous jurisprudence, including intellectual property law. 
 
For ease of reference, a glossary and list of acronyms have been included 
in the front of the paper.   
                                                 
42 Mueller, above n 36, at 7. 
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CHAPTER II THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM IN NEW ZEALAND 
A Introduction 
 
The chapter outlines the technical, day-to-day operation of the Internet in 
New Zealand.  While this chapter has some technically complex material, the area 
is not, in principle, more complex than any other area of law and understanding it 
does not require special technical expertise.  As noted in Chapter I, it is a 
collection of individuals and organisations operate technical and policy guidelines 
which, operating together, allow the Internet to function. 
 
This sense of community and the notion of satisfying community needs by 
means of a collection, if not a collective, of technologies and people, are 
important aspects of both the history of the Internet and the manner of its 
operation.  Understanding how the collection of technologies operates to form the 
infrastructure of the Internet assists with understanding how disputes about 
domain names arise, why dispute resolution systems were created, the values 
which underpin them, and the criteria by which such systems are best evaluated.   
B The Domain Name System 
1 The Root Zone File and the Root Name Servers 
 
 The rules by which the Internet operates are not statute or common law.  
Put simply, the Internet operates through a system of mutual recognition of and 
adherence to various technical guidelines and policies by a collection of 
organisations and individuals.  For practical purposes, that system of collective 
mutual recognition takes place by means of a network of computers which share 
information having agreed on the rules for how this will happen.  The unifying 
feature of this system is the fact that it operates to allow a single Internet to 
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operate.  Without this system of mutual recognition and adherence to guidelines, 
the Internet would not function.43 
 
The technical day-to-day operation of the Internet is guided by a set of 
rules including those known as Requests For Comments (RFCs), technical and 
policy guidelines and protocols on data transfer.  These rules have developed 
through a continual process of seeking comments on proposals for protocols, 
testing of ideas and decisions to implement a protocol where there was a “rough 
consensus” amongst technical experts about the best approach. 44   RFCs, 
guidelines and policies might never be formalised in the sense that a final version 
is necessarily promulgated.  Instead, the RFC or policy or guideline may simply 
adopted and put into practice.45 
 
This system of requesting comments on draft proposals and developing 
“rough consensus” became, and remains, a very important way in which the 
collection of organisations which operate the Internet carry out policy 
development and other functions.  The politics of this process remain highly 
contentious and are not directly relevant for the purposes of this research.  The 
key points are, first, that consultative processes are part of the values of the 
technical operation of the Internet and, second, the rules which form the basis of 
operation are not dependent on formal processes of promulgation to be 
implemented.   
 
One of the most fundamental set of RFCs and policy guidelines relates to 
the protocols on which the DNS is based and which were designed in the 1960s 
                                                 
43 InternetNZ “Internet Overview” (2009) InternetNZ <www.old.internetnz.net.nz>. In this 
research a number of references are sourced to the Uniform Resource Locator 
<www.old.internetnz.net.nz>.  This refers to the Uniform Resource Locator on which the cited 
documents are currently hosted. In 2010 InternetNZ created a new website 
<www.internetnz.net.nz> which does not host all of the documents cited in this research.  The 
InternetNZ website was previously <www.internetnz.org.nz>. All materials cited in this research 
were publicly available at the previous Uniform Resource Locator and remain available at 
<www.old.internetnz.net.nz>.  To assist with verifying the research trail, reference is made to the 
Uniform Resource Locator at which all of the referenced material can be located. 
44 Mueller, above n 36, at 32. 
45 Ibid. 
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and 1970s as a way for computers to communicate with each other.46   The RFCs 
developed an agreement on the use of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, which 
have a set numbers represented in an hierarchical decimal form, for example, 
123.45.06.7.47  It is these addresses and numbers which form the backbone of 
Internet operations to distribute data across the network via routers. 48   
Technically, domain names are not needed in order for the Internet to function49 
because such names are not used by the routers through which packets of 
information travel to and from computers on the network.  The routers use packets 
of information and exchange these packets of data, not names. But domain names 
developed to replace this numbering system when a system to resolve numbers to 
names was developed. 
 
The original name resolution system was operated by the Network 
Information Center (NIC) which entered domain names in a file called host.txt, a 
list that served as a world wide root zone file for resolving domain names and IP 
addresses.  This system was replaced with the Domain Name System which 
divided the single name space of host.txt into a multi-level hierarchy of names.50  
The hierarchy divides domain names into levels: top level domain names, second 
level, third level and so on up to a possible 127 levels.  In practice there are few 
domain names which contain more than four levels.51  
 
If a domain name is to be used instead of a set of numbers, there must be a 
process for the name and its correlating number to be matched to each other.  This 
matching is done by a system for “resolving” names and their corresponding 
numbers, which uses “resolvers” and “resource records”.  Resolvers are software 
programs that “ask the question” about the domain name generating queries about 
a domain name and extracting information from a name server.52  Resolvers are in 
                                                 
46 Walt Howe “A Brief History of the Internet” (2009) <www.walthowe.com> and “The Domain 
Name System” (2010) Wikipedia <www.wikipedia.org>. 
47 Patricia Bellia (ed) Cyberlaw Problems of Policy and Jurisprudence in the Information Age (3rd 
ed, ThomsonWest, St Paul, 2007) at 167. 
48 A router connects networks together, determining logical routing for data packets across 
networks until appropriate destinations are reached.  
49 Mueller, above n 36, at 39. 
50 Ibid, at 41. 
51 Bellia above n 47, at 167.  
52 Ibid. 
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the end-user’s computer and operate when a domain name is typed into an 
Internet web browser. 
 
For example, when a student types in the domain name victoria.ac.nz to 
their computer, their computer converts the name into a number and sends a query 
to the local domain name server, which then searches its stored numbers to see if 
there is a match for the numbers for victoria.ac.nz.  If there is, the request is 
resolved and the website page is displayed.  If not, the request is sent to other 
name servers until the query is resolved or a message returned that it is not 
resolved.   
 
Resource records are data or content stored in the root name servers, 
which “answer the question” from the resolver when a person types this into their 
computer.  For example, “who is the registrant of x or y domain name?”  The 
most complete and authoritative resource records for a domain such as .nz are the 
otherwise unnamed “root zone files”.  Those records include information about 
the address as well as who is the authoritative source of information for a domain, 
who the domain name registrant is, how the current root zone file is being used, 
and administrative information.  For this reason, these databases are sometimes 
called “who is” services.53   
 
The operation of the Internet is therefore founded on a network of 
computers which, through root name servers, share information about root zone 
files.  This entire system operates via a series of just thirteen root name servers 
situated in different parts of the world.54  These servers are in turn supported by a 
vast network of domain name servers, many operating in different parts of the 
world, including New Zealand, which contain stored (cached) information about 
domain names and addresses. 
 
                                                 
53 Meuller, above n 36, at 43-45. 
54 Ibid, at 47. The 13 servers are located in four countries: ten in the United States of America (four 
in California, four in Virginia, and two in Maryland) and one each in the United Kingdom 
(London), Sweden (Stockholm), and Japan (Keio). 
 25
Domain names developed for several reasons.55  The first was “simply 
mnemonics”: 56  the use of names recognisable to humans makes those names 
easier to remember and can provide a structure to a numbering system.  For 
example, naming systems can be based on geographic regions 
(wellington.govt.nz) or other categorisations. 57   These advantages are not 
available with numbers.  Second, names provided a “single, more stable 
identifier”. 58   Changing IP numbered addresses is quite complicated whereas 
changing a name is much simpler requiring only that numbers be re-directed to a 
single name. 
 
The development of the DNS greatly increased the available domain name 
space, meaning that more domain names were possible.  There are more than 257 
top-level domain names listed in the root directory of the DNS: over 240 are 
ccTLDs with the codes drawn from an international standard.59  Originally there 
were seven gTLD with the generic three-letter suffixes defined to serve as a rough 
taxonomy of the types of users (.com, .net, .org, .mil, .edu, .int, and .gov).  There 
are now twenty gTLDs.  Guidelines and policies have been developed about who 
can register names in which domain and these rules must be implemented by the 
person or organisation responsible for managing the domain, or the domain name 
system in which their top level domain name operates.  The official list of all top 
level domains is maintained by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority which is 
the global co-ordinator of the root zone files.60   
 
Generic top level domain names are not, as is often thought, used 
exclusively by organisations or individuals in the United States of America.  
There is a country code for the United States ( .us), but this is less frequently used 
by United States registrants than the generic TLDs.  In addition, many people and 
organisations outside the United States use gTLDs such as .mobi, .asia, and 
.museum which are not country specific. 
                                                 
55 Chris Reed and John Angel Computer Law: The Law and Regulation of Information Technology 
(6th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) at 437. 
56 Mueller, above n 36, at 39. 
57 Ibid, at 40. 
58 Ibid. 
59 International Organisation for Standardization “ISO 3166-1” (2010) <www.iso.org>.  
60 Internet Assigned Numbers Authority “Introducing IANA” (2010) <www.iana.org>. 
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Each organisation that manages a domain name space (including ccTLDs 
such as .nz) must provide name server computers to support the domain.  These 
are computers that store lists of domain names and associated IP address and 
other data (such as the names and address of people who register domain names) 
about a subset (or zone) of the name space.61 
 
In New Zealand, both the policy and technical operation of the DNS are 
under the control of InternetNZ.  On a day to day basis, all of the root zone files, 
the root zone servers and local name servers are under the management of 
InternetNZ’s wholly owned subsidiary charitable companies, the DNCL and 
NZRS.   
2 Administration of the Domain Name System 
 
For the DNS to work all domain names must be registered and details 
entered into the root zone file so that all names can be resolved to their correct 
number.  This registration system requires administration and an infrastructure to 
support that administration.  Administrative arrangements are guided by the 
system of mutual recognition mentioned above, predominantly in the form of 
exchange of letters or by contract.  A person or organisation which operates a 
subset of the DNS (such as a ccTLD or gTLD) will generally have some mutually 
recognised delegated responsibility for that space and will operate a single 
registry of public databases (the resource records for the root zone file for that 
domain).  The administration requires a registry database containing information 
about persons that have registered domain names.   
 
Administration of a domain name system is assigned to a manager who 
may or may not also operate the registry database.  A ccTLD manager is 
responsible for ensuring appropriate policies are in place for that domain name 
                                                 
61 Meuller, above n 36, at 43. 
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space.62  In particular, such managers must operate a dispute resolution policy of 
some kind.  This can be a public or private system or a mixture of both.63 
 
There are important distinctions between the manager responsible for 
these policies, the “registry” that operates the computer system which operates the 
DNS and the various “registrars” who operate, usually commercially, to register, 
with the registry, domain names for individuals and organisations.  The registry 
will typically be responsible for the technical operation of the network of 
computers that is resolving queries about domain names.  Registration policy for 
assigning names may be set by the registry or it may be set by another entity with 
responsibility for managing the local root zone file.  Registrars are often private 
companies, charging fees to register domain names and offer related services to 
the public such as hosting websites.  An ISP typically provides access to the 
Internet via a subscription based service allowing clients to download content into 
their computers.  An ISP may be, but does not have to be, a registrar offering 
domain name services.64 
 
In the early years of the Internet the task of administering the DNS (and 
making sure all names were unique) could be performed by a single computer 
programmer.  By 1990, as the potential value of a recognisable domain name 
became increasingly understood, pressure increased to create trademark rights in 
domain names and to develop more structure to the administration system.65 At 
the same time, Internet use grew and the number of domain names expanded, and 
increased demands were placed on the administration of the root zone file and 
responsibility for ensuring the system operated as a single network. 
 
Delegation of the responsibility for this administration across the top level 
domains soon began and with it came controversy.  This controversy centred on 
                                                 
62 Governmental Advisory Committee “Principles and guidelines for the delegation and 
administration of country code top level domains” (2000) ICANN ,www.icann.org>. 
63 Ibid, at 9.1.6. 
64 Bayer, above n 26, at 1. 
65 Bellia, above n 47, at 166. 
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the individuals and organisations that asserted or wanted the power to operate the 
unnamed root zone file.  As Mueller notes:66 
 
The DNS was designed on the basis that there is only one authoritative zone file.  
That method of ensuring technical consistency creates an institutional problem.  
If there can be only one zone file, who controls its contents?  Who decides what 
top-level domain names are assigned, and to whom? 
 
Put simply:67 
 
A price must be paid for the advantages of names. Their use creates the need for 
another assignment process; someone (or some process) must co-ordinate the 
names used on the network to ensure that each one is unique. 
 
The importance of assigning names and the power associated with doing 
so began to raise significant issues.  Once it was clear that the limits on domain 
names were not technical and could be determined by policy, it become inevitable 
that there would be disputes not only about the policy but also who sets the policy 
and how they do so.  The centre for this coordination of policy and the operation 
of the DNS is ICANN. 
 
Oversight of the DNS is maintained by ICANN which has developed 
policies on the registrations related to gTLDs.  ICANN provides a forum for 
ccTLD managers to consider policy developments, but individual countries are 
not bound by those developments if, for example, these conflict with their local 
domain name policies or contexts.  There are many tensions over the role of 
ICANN.  For example, Mueller notes that:68 
 
ICANN is not primarily concerned with technical coordination, nor is it a 
standards setting organization.  Rather, it is an institution that ties the need for 
technical coordination to regulation of the industry built around the resources it 
manages …. In ICANN’s case, regulation of conduct and market structure is 
imposed on registries and registrars via contracts with the root administrator.  
ICANN’s control of the root is used to make and enforce policy in three broad 
areas: defining and enforcing rights to names; regulation of the domain name 
supply industry; and the linkage of online identity to law enforcement. 
                                                 
66 Mueller, above n 36, at 50. 
67 Ibid, at 40. 
68 Mueller, above n 36, at 218. 
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ICANN’s relationship with ccTLD managers has been particularly fraught 
at times, as Froomkin notes:69  
 
ICANN’s difficulties in legitimating its decisions are exemplified by its 
relationship with the managers of country-code domains (ccTLDs) such as .uk 
and .fr.  ICANN sought to have the ccTLDs tie into contracts in which they 
would acknowledge ICANN’s authority and would agree to pay ICANN annual 
fees based on how many second-level domains they registered.  Many ccTLD 
managers balked, denying ICANN’s authority and questioning the process by 
which ICANN purported to charge them fees or make policy affecting them.  
 
ICANN and its operations have many critics and generate significant 
controversy.70  Analysis of these would be a major distraction from the primary 
research question.  But these controversies about power and how it is exercised in 
relation to rights of domain name registrants may be relevant if these affect, for 
example, the administration of the .nz domain name space by InternetNZ.  
Assessing this requires some understanding of how domain names are registered. 
3 Domain Name Registration 
 
A person wishing to register a domain name typically goes to a registrar 
who will liaise with the registry for them, much the same as a would be company 
director might liaise with their lawyer for registration of a company.  Registrars 
collect information about which addresses are assigned and to whom and which 
domain names might be available.71  Registrars are typically bound by contract 
with the organisation responsible for the registry and must, amongst other things, 
abide by domain name policies and dispute resolution processes (where these 
exist).72 
 
An important registration concept is that a registrant does not own a 
domain name.  Instead, a registrant is assigned a licence to use the domain name, 
                                                 
69 A. Michael Froomkin “Habermas@discourse.net: towards a critical theory of cyberspace” (2003) 
116 Harvard Law Review 749 at 849. 
70 See Harvey above n 9, at 113-115. 
71 Mueller, above n 36, at 35-36. 
72 Ibid. 
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subject to terms and conditions which include abiding by the policies which 
govern the operation of the .nz domain name space.  A registrant is authorised to 
use the domain name and, typically, pays a fee to do so.  That fee (usually 
monthly or annual) is not the same as, and will not usually include, any purchase 
or resale value that might attach to the domain name itself.73 
 
Top level domains operate on a first come first served basis: registration 
will be granted to the first person to register the domain name, who is then 
entitled to use it.74  In order to know whether the domain name has been already 
been assigned, a registrar will check with the registry.  If the name is not 
registered, it will automatically be allocated to the person requesting it.  There is 
generally no pre-registration vetting process.75   
 
The first come first served policy developed as a practical, 
administratively simple and fast way to allow name registration without the need 
for a substantive vetting process.  While a first come first served policy provides 
for administrative simplicity, it also immediately raises legal issues where there 
may be pre-existing rights in a name outside the context of the Internet rules on 
registration.  Domain name disputes were inevitable. 
4 The Domain Name System in New Zealand  
 
The DNS is not subject to any specific New Zealand legislation, but it 
must operate within the framework of New Zealand law.  Initial responsibility for 
the .nz DNS rested with the University of Waikato Information Services 
Department.  The Department had responsibility for managing the domain and 
dealing with domain name registration.76  Initially there was no fee for domain 
name registration and the administrative costs associated with running the DNS 
were borne by the University.  However, the administrative task eventually 
became too large and in 1995 the University gave this responsibility to the 
                                                 
73 Domain Name Commission Limited, above n 14. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Newman, above n 19 at 294 notes that some countries do have pre-registration vetting. 
76 Ibid, at 287. 
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Internet Society of New Zealand (ISOCNZ). 77   The decision to give this 
responsibility to ISOCNZ was an interesting one, since this could have been given 
to another university, a private company or to government.  The decision was 
presumably to keep government out of Internet administration. 
 
ISOCNZ subsequently set up a subsidiary company, the New Zealand 
Internet Registry Limited (trading as Domainz) which had responsibility for 
operating the DNS.  A fee paying service was introduced to cover the cost of 
operating and managing the domain name space, which eventually included 
operating its own root zone server system.78  A first-come first-served domain 
name registration policy was adopted allowing registration of any domain name 
provided no other person already had it and it was not objectionable.  The “not 
objectionable” component was later removed.79  These policy developments were 
guided by working groups and commmittees.80 
 
Criticisms of the ICANN model for DNS administration were echoed in 
critique of the New Zealand arrangements.  InternetNZ was criticised for 
operating both the registry of domain names (Domainz), setting policy for the 
level of domain name fees, and, as sole registrar of domain names, collecting 
those fees through a profit-making business.  ISOCNZ was soon criticised for 
having both the power to control root zone file policy and the root zone servers, 
when it was considered these powers should not reside in a single entity.81   
 
ISOCNZ responded to these criticisms and, in 2001, rebranded itself as 
InternetNZ.  The new organisation subsequently established a .nz Oversight 
Committee (NZOC) which was given responsibility for policies in relation to the 
.nz domain name space, separating regulatory policy from the technical operation 
of the registry.  In 2002, a new registry company was established that did not 
operate as a Registrar.  The NZRS provided the single register for all registered 
domain names and the registry was shared by all Registrars, establishing a 
                                                 
77 Ibid, at 288. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid, at 289. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid, at 290 and 294. 
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competitive market.  Domainz moved to become one of a number of Registrars in 
that market.   
 
NZRS took over operation of the servers through which requests for 
domain name and address resolution are routed.  The NZRS resource record is 
known as the WHOIS service which is the data available on the public database 
about registrants of .nz domain names.  In 2002, completing the overall separation 
of the registry and policy functions, the Domain Name Commissioner was 
established, the first of its kind in the world.82   
 
Subsequently. ICANN and InternetNZ had an exchange of letters in 
relation to the .nz delegation in which ICANN acknowledged that responsibility 
for management of the .nz domain resides with InternetNZ.83   
 
In 2007 InternetNZ further separated its policy and technical functions by 
making the NZOC and the NZRS two wholly owned subsidiary companies.  The 
NZOC became the Domain Name Commission Limited, a registered company 
with charitable status headed by the Domain Name Commissioner. 84    The 
Commissioner is now the regulator of the .nz domain name space and is 
responsible for authorising registrars (and removing them in the case of 
misconduct) and for setting related policies, including dispute resolution.  The 
NZRS, trading as .nz Registry services, is also a wholly owned subsidiary 
company of InternetNZ and has charitable status.   
 
The DNCL has a service level agreement with NZRS on technical aspects 
of the zone file and zone server operations.  DNCL has established policies for 
both the information stored on the WHOIS service, who may access it, and in 
what circumstances access can be denied or restricted.85  
                                                 
82 See ibid, at Chapter 14 “Battle of the Names” for an overview of these developments  
83 See ibid, at 292-295. 
84 InternetNZ “About InternetNZ” (2010) < www.internetnz.org.nz >. 
85 The Domain Name Commission Limited “Second Level Domains Policy” (2009) 
<www.dnc.org.nz>. 
 33
5 .nz Domain Name Service Policies 
 
There are sixteen policies relation to the .nz domain name space including 
a Policy Development Process Policy and an Outline Document Policy which 
provide the basic framework within which all policies are developed.  The Second 
Level Domains Policy deals with what second level domains are offered in the .nz 
DNS and how these are established and moderated.86  There are fourteen second 
level domains including .ac.nz. .co.nz, .geek.nz, .maori.nz, .net.nz, .org.nz, 
and.school.nz.87  A full list of these policies, standard agreements and forms is 
attached as an appendix.   
 
While policies may be developed and implemented by DNCL, InternetNZ 
has ultimate decision-making power in relation to strategic decisions. 88   The 
Second Level Domains Policy, makes it clear that it is InternetNZ which will 
“make a final decision as to whether the application will be accepted.”89  
 
Two policies relate to disputes and complaints.  The first, The Disputes 
and Complaints Policy deals with complaints that .nz policies have not been 
complied with. 90  The Policy principles provide that “The DNC will become 
involved in disputes and complaints where a party believes that an agreement, or 
any of the .nz policies, has been breached.”91  The investigation “will be restricted 
to issues addressed in defined and published agreements and .nz policies”.92  The 
second is the Dispute Resolution Service Policy93 which applies to disputes about 
.nz domain names.   
 
There are more than 390,000 registered .nz domain names.94  Of these, 
more than 330,000 are .co.nz domain names, followed by .org.nz and .net.nz 
                                                 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid, at Schedule 1. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid, at Clause B2.8 and see also clause B5.4 in relation to moderation of existing 2LDs.  
90 The Domain Name Commission Limited “Disputes and Complaints Policy” (2008) 
<www.dnc.org.nz>. 
91 Ibid, at clause 3.2. 
92 Ibid, at clause 3.6. 
93 The Domain Name Commission Limited, above n 4. 
94 The Domain Name Commission Limited, above n 15. 
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(approximately 21,000 each).  This means that 95 per cent of domain names are 
registered in just three domains.  There are 73 registrars, with the top four 
registrars having 45.6 per cent of the market share of registrants, the next four 
having 20.2 per cent and the remaining 60 registrars having 34.2 per cent.95 
6 Commentary 
It is remarkable that the entire system of the Internet operations in New 
Zealand is, as it is in many other parts of the world, carried out on the basis of a 
largely informal system of mutual recognition and cooperation amongst 
predominantly private actors.  This system is supported by a web of contractual 
relationships: between InternetNZ, the DNCL and the NZRS; between the DNCL 
and authorised registrars; between the shared registry and registrars; between 
registrars and registrants; and between registrants and their ISPs.  The system also 
has tacit government approval as there appear to be no government policy 
statements on Internet administration.   
 
The Courts have also supported these administrative arrangements by 
noting them with approval.  The most important decision to recognise the role of 
InternetNZ is Oggi Advertising Limited v McKenzie96 (Oggi).  In this case the 
Court found the contractual arrangements and the rules of Domainz conferred no 
rights to the applicant regarding the legitimacy the name of the applicant, nor 
conferred any ownership rights in the name.  Baragwanath J broadly outlined the 
technical operation of the Internet and Domainz’s role (now InternetNZ’s) in New 
Zealand.  His Honour stated:97 
 
While the eventuality of a registration in breach of some legal duty is not dealt 
with explicitly [in the domainz contracts], it is to be inferred that domainz, which 
is serving a major public interest and acting in the public good, will facilitate any 
Court ordered rectification that is consistent with the first come first served 
policy. The letter from its solicitors to which I have referred, makes that position 
quite plain.  Given the responsible attitude taken by domainz it is, in my view, 
the responsibility of the Court to devise procedures for any necessary 
                                                 
95 Ibid. 
96 Oggi Advertising Limited v McKenzie [1999] 1 NZLR 631. 
97 Ibid, at 636. 
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rectification as may most efficiently permit correction without imposing cost or 
unnecessary burden on domainz. 
 
The Court clearly defers to the first come first served registration policy, 
which has no formal status as law in the traditional sense.  In doing so, the Judge 
considers it important that the registry made clear it would facilitate an order of 
the Court “that is consistent with the first come first served policy” and that 
Domainz has a “responsible attitude”.  It is important, too, that the Court 
considers the registry is “serving a major public interest and acting in the public 
good”.  For this reason, it appears the Court is willing to take the “responsibility” 
for imposing orders that would allow the registry to correct registration details 
efficiently. 
 
The implication is that if the registry (Domainz, referred to in Oggi is now 
NZRS and related organisations) was not acting responsibly or otherwise “in the 
public good” the Court might respond differently.  It is not clear what would 
happen if a Court made orders that the registry considered were not consistent 
with its policy.  The case highlights that the Courts have become one of the 
institutions in the system of mutual recognition by a collection of organisations 
which allows the Internet to function.  The case highlights the tensions which 
were to emerge in the development of the DRS: the operation of the DNS was of 
significant public interest yet was being done by a small, relatively unknown, 
private sector group.   
 
Returning to the primary research question of whether the DRS is 
operating effectively, the matters outlined in this Chapter provide a much clearer 
landscape against which that question can be answered.  The assertion that 
InternetNZ is acting responsibly in the exercise of its dispute resolution functions 
must be tested in the light of its much larger responsibility to develop and 
implement policies that affect the rights of domain name registrants.   
 
That larger responsibility has been carried out for more than ten years and 
has not been without controversy and challenges, particularly in relation to policy 
and operational matters.  Those controversies have in part reflected wider debates 
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on the international stage, including at ICANN.  InternetNZ was initially 
responsive rather than proactive in answering those challenges, for example, by 
separating the regulator (DNCL) from the registry (NZRS).  This step will have 
also reduced some of InternetNZ’s exposure to perceived risks, including of 
regulatory intervention by government or adverse litigation, in the carrying out of 
its functions. 
 
Such risks appear to be low in light of the tacit approval of InternetNZ’s 
activities by successive governments and the express judicial endorsement of 
InternetNZ’s public good role.  More importantly, the risks will remain low so 
long as the .nz domain name space remains functional and New Zealand Internet 
users are able to access the Internet all day, every day.  There remain two areas of 
possible risk, however.  The first is that a dispute about a .nz domain name or the 
way that dispute is managed gives rise to concerns.  This will be examined in 
more detail in the next part of this Chapter and in Chapters IV and V.  The second 
risk, as noted in the Introduction, is that responsibility for the DNS oversight will 
clash with government’s responsibility for wider policy and regulatory oversight 
in relation to Internet content.  This will be considered in Chapter VI. 
C Domain Name Disputes 
1 Categories of domain name disputes 
 
Domain names disputes fall into two categories.  The first involves those 
in which both parties have some legitimate interest or claim in the name.  These 
include as simple case of first come first served where a party attempts to register 
a name unaware that another person has already registered it), where the parties 
have a prior business relationship (such as where a company is wound up or sold) 
or are business competitors where one party attempts a blocking registration to 
prevent the other party from having the name.98  The motivation in these cases 
may be a genuine dispute or anti-competitive actions (such as where a business 
attempts to register the domain name of a competitor). 
 
                                                 
98 Newman, above n 19, at 291. 
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The second, known as cybersquatting, involves those in which a person 
(who does not have a legitimate interest or rights in a domain name) acquires the 
domain name in which another person has rights and then attempts to sell the 
name to the rights holder or to otherwise deal with it contrary to the rights of the 
rights holder.99  Cybersquatting can take different forms, such as typosquatting 
(where many common typographical errors of a domain name are registered),100 
or domain name hijacking (where a person, in bad faith, attempts to deprive a 
registered domain name holder of a domain name by using a domain name 
dispute resolution policy). 101   More famous examples relating to individuals 
include Julia Roberts and Jeanette Winterson, but New Zealand Post has also been 
the subject of cybersquatting.102  The motivation in the second category is usually 
either monetary or punitive. 
2 Scope of protected rights 
 
Domain name disputes not only challenge public dispute resolution 
systems, they challenge substantive legal tests.  New questions were raised, for 
example, is the tort of passing off applicable? Can copyright exist in a name? 
How far into a cyberspace with no geographical boundaries does the legal 
protection of a trade mark under national law extend?  Should it extend at all? 
What if none of these substantive legal tests is directly applicable?  What if the 
registration is lawful under these tests, but is still abusive or otherwise unfair?  
These areas of expertise are the traditional domain of the Courts.   
 
Answers to these questions have varied across jurisdictions with the result 
that substantive rights in domain names vary.  In some jurisdictions, notably the 
United States of America, specific legislation relating to domain names has been 
enacted in an attempt to protect certain types of rights or prevent particular 
activities.  For example, the AntiCybersquatting Consumer Protection Act and the 
                                                 
99 Rowland and McDonald, above n 1 at 533-534 and 539. 
100 Christopher G Clark “The Truth in Domain Names Act of 2003 and a Preventative Measure to 
Combat Typosquatting” (2004) Cornell Law Review, Vol. 89, No. 6, 1476. 
101 The Domain Name Commission Limited, above n 4, at clause 3. 
102 See Rowland and McDonald, above n 1, at 526-528. 
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Truth in Domain Names Act.103  The first of these, which provides a remedy for 
cybersquatting, was intended to address cases such as Panavision International v 
Toepenn,104 where non-trademark holders register trademarks as domain names 
and attempt to sell these to the trademark owners. 
 
This creation or allocation of substantive rights in domain names has been 
controversial. Commentators disagree about whether the creation of substantive 
rights has been necessary because of legal issues such as the proper jurisdiction 
for hearing disputes.  Goldsmith, for example, argues that the issues are “no more 
complex than the same issues in real space” and while resolution is challenging 
“sceptics overstate the challenge.”105  In contrast, Post argues that “scale matters” 
so that doing the same thing (such as illegal copying) can have different 
consequences and “rules and principles that may be quite reasonable at one scale 
may be incoherent and unreasonable at another.”106 
 
Controversy has also arisen in jurisdictions where disputes fall to be dealt 
with under general, rather than domain name specific, law.  For example, 
concerns have been raised about why the law relating to trade marks has been 
applied to domain names at all.  Some argued that trade mark law was never 
intended to create global rights and that the extension of trade mark law into the 
area of domain names was unreasonable.  There have been allegations of 
unscrupulous actions both by rights holders in one country attempting to stop 
legitimate businesses operating in another country and of unscrupulous businesses 
attempting to exploit trade mark rights.  The extension of intellectual property 
rights into the scope of private dispute resolution processes has also been 
criticised.107 
 
Controversies and criticisms aside, there is no single body of law 
applicable to domain name disputes nor consensus about whether this is required.  
                                                 
103 The AntiCybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 106 Pub. L. 113 USC § 1125 and Truth in 
Domain Names Act 18 USC § 2252B (Supp 2003).   
104 Panavision International v Toepenn 141 F 3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). 
105 Jack L. Goldsmith “Against Cyberanarchy” in Patricia Bellia (ed) Cyberlaw Problems of Policy 
and Jurisprudence in the Information Age (3rd ed, Thomson/West, St Paul, 2007) at 77. 
106 David G. Post “Against “Against Cyberanarchy” ” in Bellia, above n 50, at 80. 
107 Mueller, above n 36, at 232-233. 
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While the substantive law is not the direct focus of this research, the nature of 
disputes may be relevant to the dispute resolution system which might be used to 
resolve it and the effectiveness of that system.  It is necessary therefore to 
understand the broad range of domain name dispute resolution systems. 
3 Categories of domain name dispute resolution systems 
 
Domain name dispute resolution systems fall into two categories: public 
and private.  Public dispute resolution system refers to a court or tribunal.  Until 
2006 this was the primary means of resolving domain name disputes in New 
Zealand.  Private dispute resolution system refers to a system outside the Courts, 
such as arbitration, expert determination or some other alternative dispute 
resolution system.  The DRS is a private dispute resolution system.  The systems 
may overlap in particular cases, for example, the DRS yields to litigation or an 
arbitral tribunal in certain circumstances. 
 
Perhaps the most well known private dispute resolution system is the 
Universal Dispute Resolution Policy (the UDRP) that was developed by 
ICANN.108  The UDRP is a policy under which disputes about domain names 
may be referred to arbitration.  ICANN approves organisations to provide 
arbitration services under the UDRP, with the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) handling the most cases. 
 
The UDRP is perhaps misleadingly named.  The UDRP is not “universal” 
in that it deals with all domain name disputes.  The UDRP is restricted to disputes 
about trade and service marks and is primarily an exception to the first-come first-
served registration policy.109  Nor is the UDRP “universal” in the sense that it all 
applies to all disputes, everywhere.  The UDRP is “universal” in the sense that it 
applies to disputes wherever these arise or, perhaps more correctly, regardless of 
national boundaries. The UDRP is applicable to all generic domain names.  
Country code managers may also opt to use this policy for domain name disputes.   
 
                                                 
108 ICANN, above n 37. 
109 Ibid, at article 3(b)(ix). 
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New Zealand persons who are registrants of gTLD domain names or those 
who have complaints about gTLD domain name registrations, must use the UDRP 
process for their disputes. 
4 New Zealand until 2006 
 
New Zealand has no legislation regulating the technical operation of the 
Internet or related services such as ISPs.110  Domain name disputes are dealt with 
under general law. Statute and common law causes of action are available.  The 
Trade Marks Act provides a system for registration of a unique mark for use in 
trade.  Registration secures rights to exclusive use, violation of which is 
actionable in civil and criminal law. In relation to a domain name dispute, 
registration of a domain name which is the subject of a registered trade mark may 
be grounds for infringement action under the Act.  Trade mark registration can 
also support a domain name complaint.   
 
Until 2006, the main recourse for .nz domain name disputes was High 
Court litigation.111  The early cases sought injunctive relief in the High Court.  
Case law developed reasonably quickly through a series of cases between 1999 
and 2001 and legal principles were established.   
 
The first principle, established in Oggi,112 was that a registrant could be 
liable for trade mark infringement and that a Court could order transfer of a 
domain name.  A New Zealand registrant had registered Oggi.co.nz and then 
attempted to sell the name back to Oggi Advertising Limited which has rights in 
the name.  The case, the first trade mark case in the world involving a ccTLD, 
also established that the registry itself should not be sued for infringement in such 
cases. 
 
The second principle was that cybersquatting was not permitted in relation 
to registered trade marks.  In Qantas Airways Limited v Domain Name Company 
                                                 
110 Bayer, above n 26, at 14. 
111 Newman, above n 19, at 113-114. 
112 Above n 96. 
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Limited113 the defendants had registered domain names using the words Cadbury, 
Sanyo, Xerox and Qantas and then attempted to sell these back to the relevant 
companies which had registered trade marks. The Court ordered name transfer 
and issued a strongly worded judgment requiring the defendants to take no action 
which would further dilute the value of the plaintiffs’ trade names or trade marks 
in relation to any Internet site in New Zealand.  
 
In New Zealand Post v Leng 114  an interim injunction was granted 
requiring the defendant to stop using nzpost in any domain name and to change it 
insofar as it related to New Zealand.  The Court held that the defendant’s use of 
nzpost.com was likely to confuse and mislead people searching the Internet for 
the plaintiff’s goods and services.  The use was also contrary to the Fair Trading 
Act 1986, which provides for consumer protection measures in trade. 
 
Injunctive relief would also be granted.  In Dominion Breweries v The 
Domain Name Company Limited 115  the Court followed British 
Telecommunications plc v One in a Million Ltd116 holding that, in a claim based 
on the tort of passing off and trade mark infringement, registration of a domain 
name by the defendant amounted to an instrument of fraud.  The Court held that it 
may grant an injunction where there is evidence that a domain name matching 
another person’s trade mark will infringe that mark if it is used in relation to 
goods and services for which the mark is registered. 
 
Other decisions strengthened the position of a Registrar acting in good 
faith.  For example, the Privacy Commissioner, in Case Note 18511,117 concluded 
that publication of personal information about a domain name registrant by a 
Registrar which has been collected from the registrant by consent and used only 
for the purpose for which it was gathered (publication on the Internet) is not a 
breach of the Privacy Principles.  The decision ensures that a person challenging a 
                                                 
113 Qantas Airways Limited v Domain Name Company Limited (2000) 1 NZECC 70-005 (HC). 
114 New Zealand Post Ltd v Leng [1999] 3 NZLR 667 (CA). 
115 Dominion Breweries Ltd v The Domain Name Company Limited (2000) 1 NZECC 70-009 (HC). 
116 British Telecommunications plc v One in a Million Ltd [1998] 4 All ER 476 (CA). 
117 Case Note 18511 [2001] NZPrivCmr 9. 
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domain name registration can access identifying information about the person 
who has registered the name in question. 
 
By 2001 clear lines of authority were established and there were no 
apparent difficulties with particular cases or particular types of disputes.  
However, some commentators were questioning the scope of rights protected 
under general law and whether this was suitable for the full range of domain name 
disputes.  The focus was on the first category of case where both parties had 
rights. For example, when considering the case law in relation to marketing law 
and Internet domain names, Frankel and McLay noted that:118 
 
In New Zealand, Courts have struggled to manipulate the boundaries of 
registered trade mark law, passing off and the Fair Trading Act 1986 to come to 
what the Court perceives as a “just” result in favour of the “legitimate” domain 
name user. 
 
InternetNZ was also undergoing considerable structural change.  During 
this process the question arose whether an alternative dispute resolution system 
might be needed for .nz domain name disputes.   
D Conclusions 
 
Three special considerations to apply to assessment of whether the DRS is 
operating effectively.  
 
First, account must be taken of how the DNS operates.  The Internet is 
based on the DNS which operates through a system of mutual recognition, co-
operation and adherence by a collection of organisations and individuals to 
technical guidelines and policies.  These guidelines and policies are developed 
through consultation and are implemented once there is a rough consensus that 
implementation can proceed.  For practical purposes, that system of mutual 
recognition takes place via a network of computers which share information.  The 
unifying feature of this system is the fact that it operates to allow a single Internet 
to operate.  Without this system of mutual co-operation, recognition and 
adherence to guidelines and policies the Internet would not function.  The values 
                                                 
118 Frankel and McLay, above n 24, at 712.  
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underlying this system of co-operation give rise to tensions about policy making 
and the registration system for domain names and dispute resolution policy.  
These matters need to be taken into account in assessing the DRS. 
 
Second, the operation of the .nz domain name space is a public good.  
New Zealand courts recognise the role of InternetNZ and have found that 
InternetNZ is operating responsibly.  While there was no apparent doctrinal crisis 
in the case law, there were questions about the scope of existing rights and 
whether these were adequate for the full range of cases.  At the same time, there 
were questions about the way in which InternetNZ was exercising its role over the 
.nz domain name space as it went through a separation of its policy and registry 
functions.  The result is that InternetNZ is not free to operate the .nz domain name 
space however it chooses.  Assessment of the DRS needs to take into this public 
good function and the manner in which must be exercised by InternetNZ. 
 
Third, there are tensions between the public good function and the private 
nature of the way it is carried out.  This dissertation will assess how these tension 
affected, positively or negatively, the way which InternetNZ designed the DRS or 
the policy context in which decisions about the DRS were made, how InternetNZ 
managed these tensions, and how it managed the wider risks, for example, of 
government intervention or judicial scrutiny.  In particular, the manner of 
decision-making, including underlying values, will be considered. 
 
Before doing so, Chapter III answers the secondary research question: 
what kind of dispute resolution system is the DRS?  
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CHAPTER III DISPUTE RESOLUTION THEORY 
A Introduction 
 
The advent of the Internet has brought new elements to both public and 
private dispute resolution.  In relation to public dispute resolution, the Internet has 
added new dimensions to existing law, for example, when, where and how 
contracts are formed, where and how crimes are committed, and the types of 
communications that are within the scope of legal professional privilege and are 
subject to discovery in litigation.  The Internet has also created new public places 
where existing law may apply, for example, laws relating to defamation, privacy, 
intellectual property, contract and commerce.119 
 
The Internet has had at least three implications for dispute resolution.  
First, disputes about what is on the Internet have developed (such as publication 
of material subject to court suppression orders).  Second, the Internet may be used 
as a technological aid to resolve disputes that are being litigated in the courts (for 
example communication by use of email or Internet video conferencing).  Third, 
disputes about the Internet may be resolved by a mix of both public dispute 
resolution (such as online arbitration where the parties never meet each other or 
the arbitrator in person) and private dispute resolution (such as private companies 
offering online dispute resolution services about consumer disputes).120   
 
The DRS is a private contractual dispute resolution system offering both 
mediation and Expert determination. This Chapter outlines public and alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR), considers a new form of dispute resolution, online 
dispute resolution (ODR), and summarises what kind of dispute resolution system 
the DRS is.  Conclusions are drawn about how the DRS can be evaluated and six 
criteria are proposed.  
                                                 
119 See, for example, Harvey, above n 9, for an overview of Internet related aspects of criminal law, 
evidence and technology, and online business relationships in New Zealand. 
120 Tania Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution (2nd ed, Thomson Law Book Co, Sydney, 2005) 
at 197-208. 
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B Dispute Resolution Theory  
1 Dispute Resolution and the Rule of Law 
 
The New Zealand legal system operates on the foundations of a 
Westminster style unwritten constitution based on the rule of law.  Within this 
constitution, the functions of government are distributed across the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary.121   Parliament is the supreme law maker. Courts 
uphold the rule of law when applying legislation and the common law.  The 
Courts provide public dispute resolution, which can be contrasted to private and 
to alternative dispute resolution.  The DRS sits within this legal system as an 
alternative to public dispute resolution. 
2 Alternative Dispute Resolution 
 
The term “alternative dispute resolution” was originally used to refer to 
dispute resolution that was an alternative to the traditional adversarial litigation 
process.122  The concept of resolving disputes without recourse to the courts was 
not, of course, a new one.  Diverse private dispute resolution systems have existed 
for many centuries.  In the 1970s, however, a new form of legal theory and 
practice was articulated using the processes of mediation, negotiation and 
conciliation which were developed and formalised as an alternative to 
litigation.123 
 
Over time, many of these processes came to be used by the very legal 
systems to which they were originally offered as alternatives.  Indeed, while the 
term is still in widespread use, the extent to which various courts have themselves 
adopted and integrated “alternative” dispute resolution processes has lead to some 
commentators preferring the term “assisted” or “appropriate” dispute resolution, 
rather than “alternative”.124   
                                                 
121 See The Laws of New Zealand Constitutional Law (online ed) at [4] and [13]. 
122 Sourdin, above n 125 at 17. 
123 Carrie Menkel Meadow and others Dispute Resolution Beyond the Adversarial Model (Aspen 
Publishers, New York, 2005) at xxxv. 
124 K Saville-Smith and R. Fraser Alternative Dispute Resolution: General Civil Cases, (Ministry of 
Justice, Wellington 2004) at 39 and Australian Law Reform Commission Alternative or Assisted 
Dispute Resolution (Background Paper 2, Sydney, 1996) at 12. 
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Ware helpfully cautions against generalisations about ADR since “few 
traits are common to all ADR processes. The only thing all ADR processes have 
in common is that they are not litigation.”125  Other ADR proponents favour the 
“multi-door courthouse” 126   Sanders and Goldberg favour dispute resolution 
systems that make sure the “forum fits the fuss” rather than assuming that ADR 
will be appropriate in all cases.127  This notion of ensuring the forum fits the fuss 
is helpful in assessing the decisions made by InternetNZ when it developed the 
DRS.  In the meantime, this dissertation will use the term “alternative dispute 
resolution” to refer to forms of dispute resolution outside litigation.128   
 
(a) Categories of dispute resolution 
 
Categorisation can be done in a variety of ways.  For example, Sourdin 
notes the Australian National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council 
has categorised dispute resolution systems into three groups based on the nature 
of the process by which a dispute is resolved:129 
 
(i) Facilitative processes: a third party assists with managing the dispute 
resolution process frequently with “no advisory or determinative role”. 
Facilitative processes include negotiation, facilitation, partnering, 
conferencing, and mediation. 
(ii) Advisory processes: a third party “investigates the dispute and provides 
advice on the facts and possible outcomes”. Advisory processes can 
include conciliation, evaluative processes, case appraisal, and dispute 
counselling. 
(iii) Determinative processes: a third party investigates the dispute and makes 
a determination which is “potentially enforceable”. Determinative 
processes include adjudication and arbitration and may be binding or 
non-binding and may be conducted by subject matter or by dispute 
resolution experts. 
 
Despite this broad categorisation wide variation in ADR exists both within 
and outside the Courts.  Variation may depend upon the length of the process and 
                                                 
125 Stephen J. Ware Alternative Dispute Resolution (2nd ed Thomsen West, St Paul, 2007) at 11. 
126 Frank E.A. Sander “Varieties of Dispute Processing” (1976) 70 FRD 111. 
127 Frank E.A. Sander and Stephen B. Goldberg “Fitting the forum to the fuss: a user friendly guide 
to selecting and ADR procedure” (1994) 10 Neg.J 49. 
128 Laws of New Zealand Arbitration (online ed) at [1]. 
129 Australian National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council “What is ADR” (2007) 
<www.nadrac.gov.au> and Sourdin, above n 120, at 21-37. 
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the degree of its formality; the extent to which different elements are 
incorporated; the role of the parties; the subject of the dispute; the reporting and 
referral requirements (where linked to a court process); and the objectives of the 
process (whether it is case management, settlement, or improved relationships).130  
These variations may make categorisation of dispute resolution systems more 
difficult.131 
 
Categorisation may also be based on who decides the dispute, namely: the 
parties themselves; a neutral third party who assists the parties to achieve their 
own outcomes; or a neutral third party who adjudicates or imposes a decision.132  
This categorisation has been further reduced by those who consider there are just 
two kinds of dispute resolution: adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory.   
 
Spiller helpfully states that the “essential distinction … is between the 
consensual processes and those in which a third party has the ability to impose a 
decision on the other parties.”133  Ware simplifies dispute resolution as either 
adjudicatory (arbitration and litigation) or non-adjudicatory (negotiation and 
processes in aid of negotiation).134  Ware defines adjudication as: “the process by 
which somebody (the adjudicator) decides the result of a dispute.”135  Ware notes 
that “litigation is the default process of dispute resolution …. Litigation produces 
legally binding results even on parties who have never agreed to have their 
disputes resolved by litigation.” 136  Ware argues that “the basic division within 
ADR” is “Arbitration vs. Everything Else.”137   
 
This two fold categorisation is very useful, although not straightforward.  
For example, both Moffitt and Schneider138 go further on the differences between 
adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory dispute resolution processes.  They consider 
                                                 
130 Ibid at 19-20. 
131 Sourdin, above n 120, at 18. 
132 The Laws of New Zealand, above n 131, at [1]. 
133 Spiller, above n 40, at 71. 
134 Ware, above n 125, at 9. 
135 Ibid, at 10. 
136 Ibid, at 5. 
137 Ibid, at 7. 
138 Michael L. Moffit and Andrea Kupfer Schneider Dispute Resolution: examples and 
explanations (Aspen Publishers, New York, 2008) at 111. 
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that “the important difference is that mediation is explicitly designed to promote 
settlement, whereas litigation and binding arbitration are designed to promote a 
judgment.”  This focus on the outcomes that processes are designed to achieve is 
relevant to the DRS.  For example, it will be necessary to consider whether the 
DRS designed to promote settlement or to promote judgment against a particular 
legal standard in the event that settlement is not reached.   
 
On balance the two-fold categorisation is preferred.  The simple question 
is whether the DRS is an adjudicatory or non-adjudicatory process.   
3 Categorising the DRS 
 
In order to determine which category the DRS falls into, the plain words 
of the DRS policy and relevant contractual and other material need to be 
considered.  The DRS is a mixed model of dispute resolution offering mediation, 
expert determination and an appeal process within a single system.  The 
introduction to the DRS states: “This policy provides an alternative to the Courts 
in situations where two parties are in dispute over who the registrant of a .nz 
domain name should be.” 139   The complainant must agree to submit to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the New Zealand courts in respect to any legal 
proceedings arising out of the decision to suspend or otherwise transfer a name 
and agree that such proceedings will be governed by New Zealand law.140   
 
The DRS includes a mediation step within a wider process of adjudication 
by expert determination and appeal.  There is a clear legal test in the DRS which 
defines unfair registration and the rights in respect of which complaints may be 
made.  Referral to mediation is not possible unless the complaint relates to 
disputed rights.  It is the rights, therefore, which form the backdrop for mediation, 
rather than any relationship between the parties.  
 
Ware’s question, the domain name dispute default process, also needs 
answering. The DRS specifies the effect of court proceedings or proceedings in 
                                                 
139 Domain Name Commission Limited, above n 4, at clause 1.1. 
140 Ibid, cl B2.3.8. 
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any other decision-making body or arbitral tribunal on complaints within the 
DRS.  Where such other proceedings are underway, the DNC, once the 
proceedings are brought to its attention, “will suspend the Dispute Resolution 
Service proceedings, pending the outcome of the legal proceedings.” 141   The 
parties may also request before or during the DRS proceedings, “an interim 
measure of protection from a Court.”142 
 
The DRS process yields to litigation proceedings or proceedings before an 
arbitral tribunal.  But does this make the DRS a non-adjudicatory process?  The 
answer must be no, since the processes of Expert determination and appeal within 
the DRS are adjudicatory.  Looking, as Moffitt and Schnieder do, at the apparent 
objective of the system, the DRS appears designed to promote settlement at the 
mediation stage and to promote adjudication if settlement is not reached.  The 
DRS is not a facilitative or advisory process.  The DRS provides a substantive test 
for domain name rights and dispute resolution processes which appear to have the 
objective of determining those rights.  The objective is not to restore relationships 
nor to provide an entirely consensual process in which the parties alone may 
resolve their dispute.  The DRS is therefore an adjudicative model offering both 
mediation and adjudication. 
 
This simple categorisation is not, however, the end of the matter.  The 
broad category of adjudicative models includes arbitration and Expert 
determination.  Determining if the DRS is arbitration is important because if it is 
arbitration, the Arbitration Act 1996 applies.  If that Act applies, it would 
prescribe how InternetNZ can act in relation to domain name disputes and, in 
doing so, restricted InternetNZ’s power to manage and administer the .nz domain 
name space. 
 
 
 
                                                 
141 Ibid, cl B19. 
142 Ibid, cl B19.3. 
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(a) Is the DRS a form of arbitration? 
 
The Arbitration Act implements the Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration (the Model Law)143  developed by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law.144  The purposes of the Act include: 
 
(i) to encourage the use of arbitration as an agreed method of 
resolving commercial and other disputes;145 and 
(ii) to promote international consistency of arbitral awards;146 and 
(iii) to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of arbitration 
agreements and awards.147 
 
The Act sets out the rules which apply to arbitrations, the disputes which 
are subject to arbitration, and provisions which apply to “consumer arbitration 
agreements” as defined in the Act.148  The Act provides for the powers of arbitral 
tribunals, liability of arbitrators, rules of disclosure and procedure, and 
applications to the Courts in related proceedings.   
 
In relation to consumer arbitration agreements, the Act provides that a 
person enters into a contract as a consumer where that person is an individual and 
enters into the contract otherwise than in trade and the other party to the contract 
enters it in trade.149  Where the contract contains an arbitration agreement, the 
contract must specifically state if certain provisions of the Arbitration Act do not 
apply. 150   The consumer must also certify that, having read the arbitration 
agreement, he or she has agreed to be bound by it.151   Mandatory arbitration 
agreements have caused controversy, particularly in relation to consumer 
                                                 
143 Arbitration Act 1996, s 3. 
144 The Laws of New Zealand, above n 128 at [3(12)]. 
145 Arbitration Act 1996, s 5(a). 
146 Ibid, s 5(b). 
147 Ibid, s 5(e). 
148 Ibid, s 7, s 10 and s 11 respectively. 
149 Ibid, s 11(2)(aa), (a), and (b).  
150 Ibid, s 11(1)(d). 
151 Ibid, s 11(1)(c).   
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contracts where the terms and conditions of service provision may be heavily 
weighted in favour of the service provider, rather than the consumer.152   
 
Arbitration is a contractual substitute for litigation, its nature varies widely 
and it can be tailored depending on the type of dispute and, in theory at least, the 
wishes of the parties. 153  This flexibility brings both advantages and 
disadvantages.  As arbitration is contractually based, the pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement may effectively force parties into a private forum for what is, in some 
cases, a dispute with a strong public element.  The flexibility to design an 
arbitration system, and its administration, may also carry the potential risk that it 
favours one party or is otherwise skewed in some way.  
 
Lon L Fuller comments on the attractions and limits of arbitration 
including the ability to tailor arbitration processes but cautions that “no dispute 
resolution process is appropriate for all disputes all of the time”. 154   Where 
arbitration is compelled Fuller suggests that it is important to ask whether “the 
designer of the arbitration designed it to be on terms more favourable to one 
party”.  Fuller also suggests that the nature of the dispute may be relevant to 
whether arbitration is appropriate: 155 
 
Arbitration is frequently criticized because it typically allows decisions to be 
made privately and thus does not allow public precedents that are important to 
support the development of law and inculcation of societal values.  
 
Turning to the DRS then, is it a form of arbitration?  The DRS itself is not 
explicit on this point and does not state whether or not the Arbitration Act 1996 
applies.  However, the DRS does refer to proceedings before an arbitral tribunal 
in several places.  For example, the fact of mediation may be disclosed to an 
“arbitral tribunal of competent jurisdiction”.156  Where legal proceedings relating 
to a domain name which is subject of a complaint to the DRS are issued before an 
                                                 
152 Menkel Meadow, above n 123, at 545. 
153 The Laws of New Zealand, above n 131, at [3(12)].  
154 Lon L. Fuller “Collective Bargaining and the Arbiter” in Carrie Menkel-Meadow and others 
Dispute Resolution Beyond the Adversarial Model (Aspen Publishers, New York, 2005) 450 at 451 
155 Ibid. 
156 Domain Name Commission Limited, above n 4, at clause B6.4. 
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“arbitral tribunal”, the DRS complaint proceedings will be suspended. 157  In 
addition, neither party is permitted to use information gained in mediation for any 
other purpose or include it in any submission that may be seen by an arbitral 
tribunal.158  
 
There is a strong argument that the DRS is not arbitration within the 
meaning of the Arbitration Act 1996 simply because the reference to deferral to 
an arbitral tribunal in the DRS would make no sense if the DRS was arbitration.  
It might be argued, however, that the DRS is a mandatory consumer arbitration 
agreement because any person who registers a .nz domain name must agree to 
abide by all .nz policies which include, in relation to domain name disputes, the 
DRS.  But this argument is not consistent with the plain wording of the relevant 
registration contracts and the DRS, nor is it clear whom the arbitration contract 
would be between.  The DRS is not a binding contract between the Registrars and 
the DNC as neither of them would use the DRS (only domain name registrants or 
those with rights in names do so), although Registrars do agree to be bound by .nz 
policies and to follow the directions of the DNC made pursuant to the DRS (for 
example to transfer a domain name).159   
 
Turning to whether the contract is between the Registrar and the registrant, 
all Registrars are required to include certain core terms and conditions in their 
contracts with registrants.  The “Registrant Core Terms and Conditions” is a 
standard form contract with minimum terms and conditions which all Registrars 
must agree to use in order to be authorised.  That contract does not refer to the 
DRS at all, although it does refer to .nz policies generally.  In relation to 
registration of domain names, the agreement notes that “the domain name is 
registered in your name [the registrant’s name] only because no other person has 
it according to the records of the register.”160  A registrant agrees to “protect us 
[the Registrar] and everybody we have a business relationship with to provide 
                                                 
157 Ibid, cl B19.1. 
158 Ibid, cl B6.3. 
159 Domain Name Commission Limited “Registrar Authorisation Agreement” and “Registrar 
Connection Agreement” Domain Name Commission <www.dnc.org.nz>. 
160 Domain Name Commission Limited, “Registrant Core Terms and Conditions”, Domain Name 
Commission <www.dnc.org.nz>, at cl 3.2. 
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services to you, from any claim arising out of the domain name being registered 
in your name or as you direct.”161 
 
The agreement does not contain a provision which states that any disputes 
about domain names with other registrants must be referred to the DRS.  The 
agreement is simply to comply with .nz policies and, in the case of a domain 
name dispute, those policies include the optional use of a dispute resolution 
process.  The DRS process is not mandatory.  If a complainant wishes to choose 
litigation in relation to a domain name dispute then he or she remains free to do 
so.  Similarly, the complainant is free to attempt arbitration, although whether the 
respondent would agree is another matter.  Where parties use the DRS they 
simply agree that the substantive terms of the policy are available and applicable 
to the dispute. 
 
The question remains whether the consumer arbitration agreement 
provisions of the Arbitration Act apply because the contract with the registrar is a 
mandatory one upon registering a domain name.  This question cannot be 
answered definitively because the contractual agreement between a registrant and 
a Registrar does not specifically contain an arbitration agreement and because the 
DRS does not state whether it is arbitration or not.  It is clear, however, that many 
persons would register domain names in the course of trade (contrary to the 
consumer test in section 11).  Over 80 per cent of registered .nz domain names are 
registered as co.nz (company names).  It can be assumed that all or most of these 
would be registered by persons “in the course of trade”.  A similar conclusion 
would apply to govt.nz and ac.nz names insofar as the registrations took place 
within the context of offering services to the public.  At the same time, some 
names would be registered by individuals in the course of community or 
charitable or family and private pursuits.  These could not universally be 
categorised as “consumers” and it is highly improbable that a court could find that 
the Arbitration Act applied to some domain name disputes and not others. 
 
                                                 
161 Ibid, cl 3.3. 
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This dissertation concludes that in the absence of specific reference to the 
Arbitration Act and in light of the express wording of the DRS and the nature of 
domain name registrations, the DRS is not arbitration and does not fall within the 
Arbitration Act 1996.  The result is that InternetNZ has retained overall control of 
the DRS process and the DRS is not subject to a statutory dispute resolution 
regime. 
(b) The DRS as expert determination 
 
Expert determination is another category of adjudicative dispute 
resolution.162  Unlike arbitration, no specific statute governs this category.  The 
distinction between expert determination and arbitration has traditionally been 
that the expert decides based on his or her particular subject matter expertise in a 
matter or area of business.  An arbitrator, on the other hand, decides on the basis 
of the requirement to act judicially.163  Expert determinations are generally found 
in contract-based dispute resolution clauses, which are common in a wide variety 
of commercial and other contracts.164   
 
In some areas, for example residential leases, the boundary between expert 
determination and arbitration is not so clear. The effect of the repeal of certain 
provisions of the Arbitration Act 1908 (in the Arbitration Act 1996) means that a 
matter may be referred to an expert valuer for determination without being 
deemed to be arbitration.165  This point is relevant to the DRS in the event of any 
doubt as to the application of the Arbitration Act for two reasons.  First, it may be 
possible for a matter to be referred to expert determination without being deemed 
to be an arbitration.  Second, it supports an argument that the less specific 
deeming provisions of the Arbitration Act may be limited in the face of specific 
wording of contractual provisions and the intention of the parties.   
 
                                                 
162 The Laws of New Zealand, above n 131, at [1]. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Carus-Wilson v Greene (1886) 18 QB 7 per Lord Esher MR at 9 cited with approval in Forestry 
Corporation of New Zealand v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 328 (HC) by Harrison J at 332. 
165 The Laws of New Zealand, above n 52, Landlord and Tenant, at [31(183)]. 
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This point was addressed in Forestry Corporation of New Zealand v 
Attorney-General.166  The Court was asked to consider the issue of the parties’ 
appointment of an umpire to assess land value pursuant to a dispute resolution 
clause in a licence agreement.  The key question was whether a clause specifying 
that “in undertaking this assessment the umpire shall be deemed to be acting as an 
expert and not as an arbitrator” could nonetheless be construed as an agreement to 
submit the dispute to arbitration under the Arbitration Act.167  Harrison J cited 
clause 4.4 of the agreement and stated that “the question of whether clause 4.4 
constitutes an arbitration agreement or alternatively provides for resolution of 
disputes by an expert determination is one of contractual construction.”168   
 
Harrison J concluded that the plain words of the contract should be 
considered and that there was no agreement to arbitrate.  His Honour also 
concluded:169 
 
Like arbitration, expert determination provides for the final resolution of disputes 
by a private tribunal to whom issues are referred for a binding decision (Russell 
on Arbitration, 22nd Ed, para 2-030)….With the increasingly informal nature of 
arbitration and the use of experts in the arbitration context this distinction is 
being increasingly blurred. 
 
The facts of the case can be distinguished because in Forestry 
Corporation the parties themselves appointed the expert, whereas under the DRS 
the parties themselves do not appoint an expert.  However, the general principle 
that arbitration and expert determination are distinct categories of dispute 
resolution is helpful.  The case also supports the proposition that the DRS can be 
categorised as expert determination as a simple matter of contractual construction.  
In this case, the contract in question is the contract with the registrant to use the 
DRS for domain name disputes. 
 
The final consideration is whether special considerations apply because 
the DRS relates to disputes about the Internet. 
                                                 
166 Forestry Corporation of New Zealand v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 328. 
167 Ibid at [1]. 
168 Ibid, para 11. 
169 Ibid, para 11(b). 
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(c) The DRS as on-line dispute resolution? 
 
Online dispute resolution techniques may be used for adjudicatory or non-
adjudicatory dispute resolution processes.  Such techniques allow dispute 
resolution to take different forms.  As Menkel Meadow comments:170 
 
Some of the most innovative forms of dispute resolution are those developed for 
use on the Internet. Variously called EDR (electronic dispute resolution) or ODR 
(online dispute resolution), these online processes vary tremendously.  Some 
ODR directly involved the Internet (such as claims relating to sales made on the 
Internet or relating to rights over Web site addresses).  Other ODR resolves 
disputes having nothing to do with the Internet, such as automobile accidents.  
Sometimes the ODR consists simply of taking conventional forms of mediation 
or arbitration and conducting the process through words and e-mails rather than 
face-to-face. 
 
Many forms of ADR are currently carried out entirely online using a 
variety of technological processes, with these ODR techniques evolving largely in 
response to the rapid evolution of the Internet and a corresponding increase in 
online transactions and conflict. 171   Many ODR services are offered through 
websites acting as referral and information points, while others provide online 
services.172  Arbitration can take place with neither the parties nor the arbitrator 
meeting in person but with evidence and submissions are exchanged online.  As 
Menkel-Meadow observes:173 
 
This form of arbitration is particularly common for disputes arising with respect 
to online activities.  For example, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN) has issued a Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy 
requiring that disputes over [page 470] ownership of a particular domain name be 
heard initially through arbitration, preferably online arbitration.  Some companies 
that sell products over the Internet are now offering online arbitration in the event 
of disputes.   
 
                                                 
170 Menkel Meadow, above n 123, at 628. 
171 Sourdin, above n 120, at 197-198.  
172 Ibid, at 207. 
173 Menkel Meadow, above n 123, at 469 – 470. 
 57
Domain name dispute processes which use arbitration also use some ODR 
techniques:174 
 
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) uses a 
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) that involves arbitration via selected 
providers to settle disputes about internet domain name registration.  Disputants 
choose a dispute service provider, submit a claim, and the service provider then 
contacts the other party about a potential arbitration.  Arbitrators then consider 
the claim and any filed documentation provided and make decisions based on the 
UDRP “bad faith” rules.  According to Gaitenby: “arbitrators and disputants 
utilize an array of communication but never have a physical meeting or session, 
arbitrators make decisions and submit options via their respective service 
provider to ICANN to make them publicly available””.  
 
There are obvious benefits with these techniques such as rapid information 
transfer, a reduction in delays, easy access to disputed documents, lower travel 
costs, shifts in power imbalance and perspectives on the dispute, a reduction in 
emotional content in the dispute, and keeping parties separate.175  Disadvantages 
or risks are that information shared will not remain confidential because it can be 
easily transmitted to third parties and that barriers in accessing the technology 
may limit meaningful participation. 176  Menkel Meadow suggests ODR 
mechanisms raise “unique issues” of both over and under use of the technology.  
Key questions include: “How or why should ODR be regulated when the rest of 
the Web is largely unregulated?”177  “Are there particular issues in ODR that are 
sui generis to technology, or are the issues essentially the same as in other forms 
of dispute resolution?”178   
 
There are widely divergent views among commentators about the answers 
to these questions.  Some suggest that ODR raises unique issues and that 
technology can be used to facilitate or avoid disputes.  For others, critique of 
ODR may be influenced by the nature of the dispute. For example, Sourdin’s 
focus is the impact of ODR on the standard of non-adjudicative dispute resolution 
                                                 
174 Sourdin, above n 120, at 208. 
175 Sourdin, above n 120, at 206 and see also Sturzaker “Dispute Resolution in the New Millennium 
– International Arbitration” (1999) 2(6) ADR Bulletin 60.  
176 Ibid, at 206 and 238-239.   
177 Menkel Meadow, above n 123, at 629. 
178 Ibid. 
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processes and the place and appropriateness of ODR in contrast to “in person 
dispute resolution”. Sourdin considers video conferencing, telephone 
conferencing and email communication and whether these can supplement and 
support face to face ADR approaches, particularly for family law disputes.  Others 
question whether ODR, including technology assisted conferencing processes can 
ever replace “face to face” alternative dispute resolution processes.179 
 
Despite reservations about the effectiveness of ODR for these cases, 
Sourdin goes on to state that180: 
 
… technology also has the capacity to provide globalised dispute resolution 
services.  This is particularly important as business is increasingly being 
conducted across borders and with little reference to domestic dispute resolution 
systems.  The lack of existing internet and global dispute resolution systems 
means that e-business disputes and other disputes (political and social) are more 
likely to be resolved outside traditional court and litigation systems.  
 
Ultimately these new ODR techniques are not, in my view, relevant to 
what kind of dispute resolution system the DRS is.  Instead, these techniques are 
simply tools that may be offered to assist dispute resolution processes.  Such 
processes may, however, give rise to concerns about procedural and other 
safeguards which should be assessed in the practical operation of the DRS. 
(d) Commentary 
 
The DRS is a private contractual dispute resolution process that includes 
mediation, expert determination and appeal.  The DRS is an adjudicatory model 
that does not fall under the Arbitration Act 1996.  The DRS prioritises rights and 
the opportunity to test rights in an adjudicatory manner through determination by 
an expert.  An appeal can be made to a three person expert panel from the expert 
decision.  A further appeal on matters of law can be made to the Courts.  The 
DRS provides for external scrutiny of domain name disputes and independent 
application of substantive rights.  In terms of dispute resolution theory the DRS is 
                                                 
179 Sourdin, above n 120, at 197 – 198 and at 238 – 239.  
180 Ibid, at 239. 
 59
adjudicative and more like the traditional adversarial litigation process than ADR.  
The implications of this are considered at the conclusion of this Chapter. 
C Dispute Resolution Evaluation 
 
If categorisation of dispute resolution is difficult because of its rapid 
development and constant growth, evaluation appears more difficult, perhaps 
even problematic.  Evaluation has bedevilled modern ADR.181   This research 
evaluates a private dispute resolution system.  In order to answer the primary 
research question, to further questions must be answered: what kinds of 
evaluation methods are valid for these systems?; and, where do these methods lie 
within the broader field of dispute resolution evaluation?   
1 Evaluation of ADR and Litigation 
 
Comparisons of litigation and ADR have been difficult, with some 
questioning whether it is possible to compare litigation and ADR at all. For 
example, Menkel Meadow considers the empirical evaluation of ADR and the 
claims made by both proponents and opponents.  The author cites, with approval, 
Professor Lon Fuller, “the jurisprude of ADR” who developed the notion of “ 
‘process integrity’- the evaluation of each dispute resolution process for its own 
logic, function, purpose and morality”.182  In relation to this notion of process 
integrity the authors state: “We maintain that participation, empowerment, 
creativity, and self-determination are important values in the successful and 
satisfying resolution of disputes and conflicts.” 183   Despite the apparent 
importance of process integrity, supporters of evaluation can find this difficult, as 
Menkel Meadow comments:184 
 
Controversies abound about how to collect data, how to categorize inputs and 
outputs, how to evaluate inside processes, how to define program and process 
objectives (cost savings to systems versus party satisfaction or self-determination 
                                                 
181 See Sourdin, above n 120, at 239 and for a commentary against settlement processes generally 
see also Owen Fiss “Against Settlement” (1984), 93 Yale L.J. 107. 
182 Menkel Meadow, above n 123, at xxxiii. 
183 Ibid, at xxxiv. 
184 Ibid, at 890. 
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for individuals), and how to find appropriate baseline comparisons of alternative 
treatments. 
 
There have been demands for evidence that ADR processes are better than 
those they replace.  Unfortunately, as Sourdin notes, “such “proof” has been 
difficult to obtain, partly because there is little empirical evidence about how the 
traditional system works and the costs and benefits of more traditional 
adjudicatory processes.”185 
 
Others consider it is really only possible to compare like with like.  Ware, 
for example, suggests it is possible to compare litigation and arbitration “as if they 
were competing products on a store’s shelf” and to compare mediation and 
negotiation, but cautions that it is not possible to compare litigation and 
arbitration with negotiation and mediation:186 
 
Those who compare mediation to arbitration, for example, must be especially 
careful.  Such comparisons often go awry due to failure to appreciate the basic 
difference between a process that casts the shadow of the law and a process that 
occurs in that shadow. 
 
The generalisation of ADR features for the purposes of comparison may 
also be problematic since “few traits are common to all ADR processes. The only 
thing all ADR processes have in common is that they are not litigation.”187  Ware 
usefully separates the views of various commentators noting that commentators 
“cool” on ADR focus “on the cost of dispute resolution” while those “warm” on 
ADR focus “the quality of dispute resolution” and seeing “little quality in 
litigation”.188  These opposing themes highlight the different views of litigation 
and ADR and, to some extent, the need for caution in using general 
comparators.189   
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There may also be specific “methodological and conceptual difficulties 
in comparing ADR with traditional litigation” 190  as well as evaluating and 
defining processes.  Sourdin, for example, notes that one obvious problem in 
comparing costs and benefits of ADR with civil litigation is that many civil cases 
are settled out of court.  In addition, many evaluations are “unreported” and are 
unavailable for public analysis with the result that many evaluations are useful 
specifically but not generally.191  
 
Evaluation is difficult even between those models which can be compared. 
Arbitration, for example, has been especially difficult to evaluate and compare to 
litigation.  Menkel-Meadow cites several reasons for this including the lack of 
published data on arbitration, problems with assuming an arbitration case would 
be the same as a litigation case, that the choice of arbitration or litigation can also 
affect whether a person can afford a lawyer, whether they might choose to bring 
the claim at all, whether the claim will settle and, if so, for how much.192   
 
Evaluation is further hampered by the broader issue of whether private 
dispute resolution systems raise questions about fundamental principles regarding 
access to justice.  Capelletti, for example, considers evaluation of access to justice 
has three elements: the people reflecting the problem, need, or demand that 
prompts intervention; the legal response or solution; and the results or impact of 
intervention or response to the need for intervention.  Capelletti considers that “in 
modern societies there are new reasons to prefer the elements of conciliation, 
mediation and arbitration” and that “these new reasons include the very fact of the 
access [to justice] movement”. 193  In relation to evaluation, Capelletti considers it 
important to ask who will staff the system and what standards will apply so as to 
ensure there is no:194 
 
“… second class justice because, almost inevitably, the adjudicators in these 
alternative courts and procedures would lack, in part at least, those safeguards of 
                                                 
190 Sourdin above n 120, at 240.  
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independence and training that are present in respect of ordinary judges. And 
those procedures themselves might often lack, in part at least, those formal 
guarantees of procedural fairness which are typical of ordinary litigation. 
 
Evaluation is a contested area and there are significant unanswered 
questions about whether evaluation of litigation and ADR is possible and, if so, 
how that should take place.  Evaluation requires caution and clarity about what is 
being evaluated and compared.  That said, the DRS is an adjudicatory process and 
can therefore be compared to litigation and other forms of adjudicatory processes.   
2 Evaluation of the Dispute Resolution Service 
 
Despite their various reservations about evaluation, commentators have 
developed evaluation indicators or criteria.  This dissertation draws on these for 
quantitative or objective evaluation criteria for the DRS.  The parameters of this 
dissertation do not permit a focus on qualitative or subjective evaluation criteria.  
The primary research question is whether the DRS is operating effectively.  
“Effectively” in this context means the DRS: (a) is appropriate for the nature of 
disputes falling within its scope; (b) has process quality and rigour; (c) is low cost 
and timely.  Based on the material examined in this chapter, the following six 
criteria will be used to evaluate this: 
 
(a) System design 
(b) Policy context 
(c) Process integrity 
(d) Standards  
(e) Cost 
(f) Statistical analyses 
 
(a) System design 
 
There are choices to be made about system design and these choices may 
reveal tensions in decision-making that affect the quality of a system.  For 
example, there may be a tension between the need to regulate for consistency of 
standards (suggesting an adjudicative model) and the desire to design flexible 
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dispute resolution systems (suggesting a non-adjudicatory model). 195   Other 
tensions may relate to speed and ensuring business certainty or to promote 
efficiency. 196   These tensions, and decisions in the light of them, should be 
evaluated.  Consideration of system administration and administrative efficiency 
is also needed. Finally, consideration should be given to the influence of tradition, 
political context, and the role of institutions, power and ideology.197   
 
System design involves choices about the use of ODR techniques.  Such 
technology can create new issues which need to be considered.  Gaitenby notes 
that ODR poses risks and dangers, for example, if service providers are difficult 
to identify, “their facilitators hidden behind the digital veil”. 198   If ODR 
techniques are chosen when a system is designed, assurances of privacy and 
confidentiality may be more important to participants at the same time as 
transparency and openness of process is more important to administrators.  The 
result in practice has been a tendency to draw online practitioners from existing 
dispute resolution areas.199  These matters should be considered in relation to the 
DRS.  For example, why this particular form of dispute resolution process was 
developed and whether the DRS was designed for a particular purpose (and, if so, 
whether it is fit for that purpose). 
 
A feature of good system design is participation of those affected.200  It is 
important to evaluate the policy development process and the extent of 
participation of those affected by, or with an interest in, the development of the 
DRS.  Some assessment should be made of the influences of political context, the 
role of institutions, and ideology in aspects of the DRS system design process.  
The objectives of InternetNZ can be examined to ascertain, for example, whether 
the objective in establishing the DRS was to remedy difficulties with litigation 
(such as cost or the tests that courts were applying) or to protect the DNS and the 
.nz domain name space (such as by avoiding suit against the registry or the DNC 
or some other party).  Participation of those affected may also indicate whether 
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the DRS been designed to favour one party or even the system administrator 
itself. 
 
(b) Policy context 
 
The DRS should be evaluated in light of the broader domain name service 
policy context and the nature of domain name disputes.  Dispute resolution policy 
may also be affected by whether the dispute is jurisdiction specific or must be 
seen in a wider policy or dispute resolution context.  For example, many ADR 
processes are “mainstream” and the use of the Internet is ubiquitous.  This may 
affect the policy context and how dispute resolution processes are perceived, as 
Sourdin notes:201   
 
Already most [Australians] are ‘net-aware’ and a preferred method of 
communicating in the business setting is through the computer.  These and other 
communication trends will have implications for our dispute resolution processes 
and may mean that ADR processes are adapted so that remote ADR 
communication (by net-based activity) becomes more common. 
 
Three aspects of the policy context of the DRS will be considered.  The 
first is whether the nature of domain name disputes was influencing the 
framework for the dispute resolution policy.  If the nature of the disputes was 
influencing the framework, it will be important to consider whether the nature of 
those disputes, and those which were predicted, have in fact been the same as the 
nature of the disputes submitted to the DRS.  The second is whether any other 
InternetNZ policies were influencing the DRS policy.  The third is whether the 
DRS policy was influenced by the growing use of the Internet and whether this, in 
turn, influenced aspects of the proposed policy and procedures and its 
effectiveness in practice (such as a focus on online dispute resolution procedures, 
rather than face to face or in person procedures). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
201 Ibid, at 232. 
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(c) Process Integrity 
 
The underlying values of those developing the DRS will be assessed, 
together with how these affect its operation.  These values can be distilled from a 
variety of source documents including policies, policy reviews, submissions, 
annual reports and other published material.   
 
(d) Standards 
 
Two standards related matters will be evaluated.  First, the standard 
relating to quality of mediators and experts, for example, whether these are 
chosen for subject matter or dispute resolution expertise.  Standards for dealing 
with complaints about mediators and experts should be assessed together with any 
information on how standards reviewed or maintained.  Where mediation takes 
place, some assessment should be made of whether there clear terms of agreement 
with the mediator which set out the standards by which they will mediate.202   
Provisions for confidentiality will be assessed together with processes for dealing 
with conflicts of interest. 203   The different standards required of mediators 
compared to, for example, experts will be assessed and, if there are differences, 
whether those differences directly relate to the different nature of their respective 
roles and processes.204  
 
Second, the quality of the operation of the DRS itself should be assessed 
by looking at matters such as procedural safeguards.   
 
(e) Cost 
 
The cost of the DRS will be compared to the cost of litigation where 
possible.  The DRS timeframes can be compared to litigation.  Process costs to the 
parties will be compared, for example the cost of mediators’ and experts’ services, 
legal fees, filing fees, and how these compare to litigation.   
                                                 
202 Ibid at 179. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid, at 184. 
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Any emphasis on cost and “cost versus benefit analysis” by InternetNZ 
will be examined along with an assessment of where, and on whom, the costs and 
benefits were to fall.  An attempt will be made to assess the cost of the DRS to 
domain name registrants, in this case registrants being the wider “taxpayer” or 
“public funder” of InternetNZ and the operation of the DNS and .nz domain name 
space.   
 
(f) Complaints analysis 
 
Complaints data will be analysed to determine the categories of domain 
name disputes; categories of complainants and respondents (including whether 
legally represented); settlement rates (including cases dropped, disposed of, 
closed or settled); aspects of system administration (such as processing times); 
number of expert decisions; and number of appeals (whether within the DRS to 
the panel, or to the courts).  Empirical evidence supporting the need for a DRS 
will be assessed and estimates of the likely number or nature of disputes will be 
compared to actual number of complaints made.  
D Conclusion  
 
The Internet has brought new elements to both public and private dispute 
resolution.  The DRS, a new legal process, sits within broader dispute resolution 
theory as a private contractual dispute resolution process offering mediation, 
expert determination and an appeals process within an adjudicative model.  The 
DRS can be evaluated objectively.   
 
Together with the findings in Chapter II it is apparent a delicate balancing 
act is taking place in relation to the DRS and its administration by InternetNZ.  
On the one hand, complaints about the rights of domain name registrants logically 
lend themselves to adjudicative models of dispute resolution and the DRS is one 
such model, expert determination.  On the other hand, the determination of those 
rights in an adjudicative model run by those responsible for .nz domain name 
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system management and administration poses the risk of being seen as biased or 
self interested.   
 
Moving to create such a private system might have upset the existing 
arrangements where the .nz DNS was administeredby InternetNZ with the tacit 
approval of government and explicit judicial support provided the administration 
was carried out responsibly.  The next two Chapters look more closely at why 
InternetNZ moved to develop the DRS and how it managed the risks inherent in 
doing so.  
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CHAPTER IV THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICE DEVELOPMENT 
A Introduction 
 
This Chapter analyses the development of the DRS against three criteria:  
system design; policy context; and process integrity.  Several themes emerge that 
are relevant to the primary research questions.  These themes include the lack of 
empirical evidence justifying a service, the values underlying decision-making, 
the nature of disputes shaping discussion of the options, and management of 
tensions between the various criteria for choosing between the options and the 
wider political environment.   
B The Dispute Resolution Service Policy 
1 Overview of DRS Policy Development 
InternetNZ developed the DRS between 2001 and 2006.205  A working 
group was established under its Legal and Regulatory Affairs Committee in early 
2001 with the following terms of reference:206 
 
(a) to investigate whether there is a need for an organised service outside the 
court system, to resolve, or in some way assist in resolution of, disputes relating 
to ownership and/or any other rights associated with domain names in the .nz 
country code top level domain; and 
(b) if such a service is considered necessary or advantageous, to recommend the 
nature, scope, and methods of operation of such a service together with a basic 
plan for implementation of those recommendations. 
 
 The Working Group was to report back to InternetNZ Council with 
recommendations.  There were seven members with a mix of legal and technical 
expertise: a District Court Judge, four lawyers, an InternetNZ Councillor and the 
Secretary of InternetNZ.  The Working Group was initially called a Task Force 
                                                 
205 InternetNZ “Council Motion” (01/19) <www.old.internetnz.net.nz>. The first published 
document from InternetNZ in relation to the DRS development was this Council resolution.  The 
policy became operational on 1 June 2006. 
206 Ibid. 
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and subsequently renamed “the InternetNZ Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Working Group”.207   
 
A set of “trigger questions” was developed and released for public 
discussion. 208   The Working Group met with various individuals including 
representatives of the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Centre. In October 2001 
the Working Group released a preliminary report: Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution in the .nz Space: A Discussion Paper (the 2001 discussion paper).209 
 
These initial steps followed soon after the decisions to create a shared 
registry system and separate policy and technical functions within InternetNZ.  
The Report of the Shared Registry Service Working Group considered “that some 
form of service for the resolution of disputes relating to domain names in the .nz 
space would be a valuable protection for registrants in a competitive shared 
registry system”.210  The 2001 Discussion Paper observed that this suggestion 
“coincided with an increased focus worldwide on alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms in TLD spaces, which was recognised by InternetNZ council.” 211 
 
The 2001 discussion paper canvassed nine options, set out criteria for 
decision making and applied the criteria to the options.  The nine options were:212 
 
(i) Status quo - private negotiation, arbitration and/or litigation 
(ii) Facilitated mediation 
(iii) Internet Commissioner 
(iv) Internet Ombudsman 
(v) Voluntary local dispute resolution procedure 
(vi) Mandatory local dispute resolution procedure 
                                                 
207 The reasons for this are unclear as the discussion paper was released in the name of the Task 
Force but stated in para 1 that it was “the first report of the InternetNZ Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Working Group”. 
208 InternetNZ Domain Name Dispute Resolution Working Group Domain Name Disputes 
Resolution – Trigger Questions (2001) <www.old.internetnz.net.nz>. 
209 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Task Force Domain Name Dispute Resolution in the .nz 
Space: A Discussion Paper (Draft V1.2, 23 October 2001), <www.old.internetnz.net.nz>, at paras 
4-6.  
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Ibid, at paras 16, 17, 26, 31 and 43.  There are some typographical and grammatical errors in 
some of the original InternetNZ documents.  These have been reproduced without correction. 
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(vii) Local dispute resolution procedure (mandatory or voluntary) with 
internal right of appeal 
(viii) Non-local dispute resolution procedure 
(ix) Some combinations of the above (including, for example a mixed model 
of mediation and arbitration). 
 
There were three broad categories of options: the status quo (option (i)), 
some form of local service (options (ii)-(vii)), or a non-local dispute service 
(option (viii)).   
 
In relation to the status quo, 213  the paper outlined the existing Court 
structure.  The paper noted that “All domain name dispute cases heard by New 
Zealand Courts to date have involved interim relief applications to the High 
Court,”214 as under statute and common law “neither the Disputes Tribunal nor 
the District Court have jurisdiction in trade mark and passing off cases.”215   
 
The Working Group noted mediation was already an option for parties to 
disputes.  The Working Group defined “facilitated mediation” to mean a process 
that was “run according to a procedure specified by the ccTLD manager and 
agreed to by a registrant as a condition of obtaining a domain name” and resulting 
in a binding and enforceable resolution.216   
 
The Internet Commissioner proposal was for a review of the rights and 
obligations of registrants by a “semi-inquisitorial body” based on the Privacy 
Commissioner model with an investigation and mediation role.217  The option of 
an Internet Ombudsman role was explored.  It was noted that use of term 
“Ombudsman” required special permission under the Ombudsman Act 1975.  
This option was for an Internet Ombudsman whose “principal powers and duties 
would be to consider, at no cost to the complainant, complaints over domain 
names; and to facilitate the satisfaction, settlement, or withdrawal of complaints” 
whether by agreement, recommendations or making awards.218  
                                                 
213 Ibid, at paras 19-25. 
214 Ibid, at para 23. 
215 Ibid, at paras 19-22. 
216 Ibid, at para 26. 
217 Ibid, at para 27. 
218 Ibid, at para 28. 
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The Working Group signalled that “if some form of ADR is introduced, a 
decision will also need to be taken as to the role of the Courts.”  Options included 
limitation of rights until the alternative process was completed; concurrent 
jurisdiction offering an element of choice of procedure; and appeals to Courts on 
questions of law if “the ADR is more in the nature of an arbitration.”219 
 
In relation to a non-local dispute resolution procedure, the Working Group 
noted the UDRP and that twenty ccTLD managers already had arrangements with 
WIPO to provide dispute resolution procedures for domain name disputes. 220   
Some countries had adopted the UDRP and WIPO procedures “without 
alteration” (such as Tuvalu and Venezuela) while others had adopted these with 
some modifications (such as Mexico).221 
 
The Working Group did not make any firm recommendations or indicate a 
preferred option.  It is not clear if there were any submissions on the discussion 
paper.  No further papers were released by the Working Group between 2002 and 
2004 and the process appeared to stall.   
 
In March 2003 the NZOC, independently of the Working Group process, 
agreed to develop a questionnaire “to get feedback on the extent of the problem, 
and whether a DNDR [a domain name dispute resolution policy] would be useful 
in New Zealand” and proposed to post it on the DNC website.222  In August 2003 
NZOC re-considered the issue and noted:223 
 
7. Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
It was acknowledged by the NZOC Chair and the DNC that the matter was not 
yet at the stage of going public. The DNC briefly summarized the relevant issues 
and stated that the working group (WG) did not yet have an agreed final position 
but that all agreed it was time to advance this matter.  
                                                 
219 Ibid, at para 45. 
220 Ibid, at para 30. 
221 Ibid, at para 30. 
222 NZOC “Minutes of Meeting” (InternetNZ, Wellington 14 March 2003) <www.dnc.org.nz> at 
para 9(b). 
223 NZOC “Minutes of Meeting” (InternetNZ, Wellington 29 August 2003) <www.dnc.org.nz> at 
para 7. 
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A discussion about whether or not .nz needed a DNDR process took place. It was 
agreed that NZOC would suggest to the WG that a way forward, given the 
apparent lack of consensus in the WG (which was reflected in the NZOC) would 
be to attempt to better define the issues that a DNDR would address. The DNC 
Office would offer to assist this process by describing some of the operational 
issues that have come up and reporting these to the WG. The NZOC Chair would 
offer this approach to the Chair of the WG. 
 
Eight months later, in May 2004, the NZOC agreed in principle to proceed 
with the development of a dispute resolution process.  It noted that there were “a 
number of new complaints received” and that “this increase in complaints led to a 
jump in the cost of legal services for the month.”224  The NZOC noted: 
 
6. Local Dispute Resolution Process 
NZOC discussed an example of a recent domain name dispute that is now before 
the courts. It is the type of dispute that may benefit from a local dispute 
resolution process being available for .nz domain names. 
There were a variety of views expressed about the benefits and drawbacks of a 
local dispute resolution process (LDRP) but NZOC approved in principle the 
scoping of a LDRP for the .nz domain name space and agreed to assist the 
existing Dispute Resolution Working Group as required. 
 
In October 2004 the NZOC noted:225 
 
8. Dispute Resolution Working Group Meeting  
The DNC attended a meeting in Auckland on 13 October 2004 regarding a 
Dispute Resolution Process for .nz. As a result of that meeting the DNC will be 
drafting a paper with options for implementing a dispute resolution process 
for .nz. This is expected to focus on systems based on the Nominet UK model 
and the WIPO system. It will be subject to public consultation and the results of 
that consultation period will be presented to the Working Group and to NZOC. 
 
Eight weeks later the DNC released Consultation on establishing a dispute 
resolution process for the .nz domain name space 226  (the 2004 Consultation 
Paper).  Three options were proposed: the status quo, a local service or an 
                                                 
224 NZOC “Minutes of Meeting” (InternetNZ, Wellington 3 May 2003) <www.dnc.org.nz> at para 
2. 
225 NZOC “Minutes of Meeting” (InternetNZ, Wellington 18 October 2003), <www.dnc.org.nz> at 
para 2. 
226 NZOC Consultation on establishing a dispute resolution process for the .nz domain name space 
(InternetNZ, Wellington, 2004). 
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international one modelled on the UDRP.  The local service was based on “the 
Nominet UK model, which essentially has New Zealand looking after and 
controlling its own system”.  The third option was based on the WIPO process 
“with some modifications to reflect the .nz policy environment.”  Advantages and 
disadvantages of each option were listed.227 
 
Eighteen submissions were received. 228   A list of submitters and 
submission number is attached as an Appendix.  In May 2005, the Working 
Group presented its findings to the NZOC and recommended that a new dispute 
resolution service be established.229  InternetNZ Council subsequently endorsed 
the proposal without change and the service began operating on 1 June 2006.  The 
policy was reviewed in 2007.  Three submissions were received and no 
substantive changes were made. 
2 System Design 
(a) Application of system design standards 
 
InternetNZ did not design the DRS from any stated theoretical basis.  No 
objective dispute resolution system design standards are cited in policy 
documents.  There was no reference to such standards in any of the submissions 
in 2005 or the review in 2007.  No specialist dispute resolution organisation made 
submissions, although a number of submitters were qualified dispute resolution 
practitioners and affiliated to professional bodies such as LEADR and AMINZ.230  
In 2004 the criteria for assessing options did not refer to objective standards for 
dispute resolution systems.231  
 
Instead, the approach was a pragmatic one.  First, InternetNZ had a 
majority of lawyers as members of the Working Group. These were practitioners 
with expertise in dispute resolution, intellectual property rights and domain name 
                                                 
227 Ibid, at 1. 
228 See NZOC “Submissions” (Wellington, 2005) <www.dnc.org.nz>.  The Working Group, in its 
final report notes that 17 submissions were received, but 18 are posted on the DNCL website. 
229 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Working Group Implementation of a dispute resolution 
process for .nz domain names (Wellington, 2005) <www.dnc.org.nz>. 
230 NZOC above n 228, Submitters 3 and 16. 
231 NZOC, above n 226, at para 33. 
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disputes.  Second, the Working Group used the UDRP as the starting point, 
considering adaptation for New Zealand conditions.  The UDRP, as with other 
ICANN policies, was developed through a broad consultation process and with 
WIPO, a standards based organisation.  The approach was therefore a sensible, if 
not theoretically pure, way to proceed as it avoided having to reinvent the wheel 
or start completely afresh. 
 
At the time, new systems and related standards were also developing in 
other jurisdictions.  When the 2001 Discussion Paper was released 20 ccTLD 
managers had adopted the UDRP (or a modified version of it).232  By early 2005, 
more than 40 had done so. 233  Other ccTLD managers were developing their own 
dispute resolution systems such as Nominet in the United Kingdom.  
 
InternetNZ’s approach was also a principled one as there were common 
elements in these developing models.  Such elements included the scope of 
justiciable disputes, a hands off approach by the registry manager in relation to 
the substance of the dispute, the exclusion of liability of registry managers, 
finality of decision-making, independent dispute resolution professionals, and, to 
one extent or another, a focus on speed of dispute resolution.  These elements 
were sensibly cited as the basis for decisions by the Working Group in both the 
2001 Discussion Paper and the 2004 Consultation Paper.234  
 
InternetNZ’s approach to system design also revealed a strong desire for 
flexibility.  But there was disagreement about whether this need for flexibility 
meant that a local or an international service was needed.  Submitters did not 
agree on how flexible the UDRP process really was.  One submission noted that 
the process could be adapted entirely to local contexts and that this had worked 
well in Australia in relation to .au domain names.235  Another commented that the 
Consultation Paper “at times appears to assume that the form of the rules adopted 
[by the UDRP] dictates the organization that will run the dispute resolution 
                                                 
232 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Task Force, above n 209, at para 30. 
233 NZOC, above n 228, Submission 1, at 2. 
234 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Task Force, above n 209, at para 14. 
235 NZOC, above n 228, Submission 1, at 2. 
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process.  We believe that greater flexibility exists.”236  Others argued that the 
WIPO model was “designed to handle cybersquatting only”,237 and another that 
“the need to involve an international body to resolve .nz domain name disputes is 
probably not great.” 238   A third view was that either model gave adequate 
flexibility to be adapted to New Zealand conditions.239  
 
The desire for flexibility reflected the tensions in the role of InternetNZ as 
both manager and administrator of the .nz domain name space.  Despite taking a 
pragmatic and principled approach to designing the DRS, InternetNZ no doubt 
wanted to retain ultimate control given that it had ultimate responsibility for the 
operation of the .nz DNS.  Retaining flexibility for both process and possible 
remedies would be one way to ensure this.  The desire for flexibility may also 
have reflected the tension in balancing the different views of those who 
participated.  That can assessed by looking at who participated in the policy 
process. 
(b) Participation of those affected 
 
InternetNZ established a Working Group and the Council published 
information about the Group on its website together with the trigger questions.  It 
seems no submissions were made on the trigger questions.  Two consultation 
papers were released, but no submissions were received on the 2001 Discussion 
Paper.  When the policy was reviewed in 2007, there were three submissions, one 
by a person who had made a submission on the 2004 Consultation Paper in 
another capacity (and who was also former Chair of the Working Group), the 
others from persons who had not previously made submissions.  All were on 
minor matters.  
 
In 2001 the Working Group stated:240 
 
                                                 
236 NZOC, above n 228, Submission 14, at 1. 
237 Ibid, Submission 6, at 3. 
238 Ibid, Submission 4, at 3. 
239 Ibid, Submission 7. 
240 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Task Force, above n 209, at para 10.   
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… it is fair to say that there has been a low level of response to date.  That is not 
surprising but it means that the Working Group does not consider it appropriate 
to make any firm recommendations at this stage. 
 
It is unclear why the low level of response was unsurprising but it may be 
because the issue was being canvassed within InternetNZ membership or there 
was a generally low level of interest in legal issues such as dispute resolution.  It 
may be because there was no particular case that was causing difficulty and 
therefore the issue was not a high priority, particularly in light of other 
restructuring activities that were happening at the time (including the 
development of the shared registry).  Domain name numbers were comparatively 
low.  Whatever the reasons, the lack of response tempered the Working Group’s 
approach since it had no submissions on which to base recommendations.   
 
Each of the submissions on the 2004 Consultation Paper was published on 
the DNCL website at the time it was submitted.  Five were opposed to 
establishing a new policy, twelve were in support, and one submission was from 
Nominet supplementing information it had earlier supplied.241   
 
Several factors may have lead to the increase in submissions.  First, by 
2004 a small number of New Zealanders had been appointed by WIPO as 
arbitrators for the UDRP.  They were making decisions in relation to both gTLD 
and ccTLD domain name disputes that used the UDRP.242  Second, by 2005 some 
submitters had experience of both UDRP and litigation in relation to .nz domain 
name disputes (either as arbitrators or complainants).  The result was more 
detailed consideration of the issues.  In its report on the submissions in 2005, the 
Working Group commented that:243 
 
A wide range of submissions were received with input from registrars, registrants, 
Intellectual Property attorneys, the general legal profession and other 
organisations such as Nominet UK and Emirates Team New Zealand. Of the 17 
submissions, five did not consider a DRP was necessary for .nz domains. The rest 
supported a process being developed with a clear majority preferring something 
based on the Nominet model. 
                                                 
241 NZOC, above n 228.  
242 Ibid, for example, Submissions 3 and 18.   
243 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Working Group, above n 229, at 1. 
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In fact most submissions were brief (some only a few lines or two or three 
paragraphs) and two at least had obviously been prepared in collaboration.  For 
example, the Emirates Team New Zealand submission raised the same points 
almost word for word, as the points raised by another submitter, who was the 
Team’s legal counsel.244  Of the submissions opposed, three were from registrars 
who supported each other and whose submissions were filed in early January 
2005.  Subsequent submissions, including one from the Chair of the Working 
Group in his business capacity, took issue with submissions opposed to the policy 
and specifically refuted them.245 
 
In 2001 the Working Group emphasised “empirical evidence of the need 
for an ADR system.”246  This was because “there have been and continue to be 
situations where domain names have allegedly been obtained for illegitimate 
ulterior motives seemingly in contravention of valid intellectual property rights” 
and a desire “for people to be aware of the possible issues”.247  By 2005 there 
were two views on the issue of empirical evidence.248   
 
The first was that there was no need for a service and litigation remained 
the best option.  Five submissions questioned the need for a new service.  One 
commented that the proposal was “a solution in search of a problem.”249  Others 
argued that there was no clear case for the service, questioned whether there was a 
sufficient need to change the existing situation, and called for this to be 
quantified. 250   A further submission was that “the decision on the basic 
“rightness” of a domain name should be in the public arena.” 251   Another 
expressed concerns about cyberflight252 suggesting that a new process might be 
abused because a person could simply lodge a complaint and then leave the 
jurisdiction.   
                                                 
244 NZOC, above n 228, Submissions 2 and 3. 
245 Ibid, Submissions 9 and 10 compared to Submission 13. 
246 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Task Force, above n 209, at para 11. 
247 Ibid, at para 13. 
248 InternetNZ, Summary of Submissions (round one) – Establishing a Dispute Resolution Process 
for the .nz domain name space (2005) DNCL <www.dnc.org.nz>. 
249 NZOC, above n 228, Submission 17. 
250 Ibid, Submissions 9 and 10. 
251 Ibid, Submission 10. 
252 Ibid, Submission 18. 
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The second, opposite, view was that a service was needed, regardless of 
the empirical evidence.  These submissions were predominantly from lawyers 
with experience of domain name disputes.  One commented that while the number 
of disputes was not large, it was significant.253  Another noted that while the need 
for a dispute resolution policy should be assessed carefully, based on existing 
United Kingdom and New Zealand estimates there would be about 15 new 
disputes annually which could use such a service.  The submission went further 
and commented that information from lawyers and others suggested a higher 
percentage of domain names in New Zealand were in fact the subject of 
disputes.254  Some law firms expressed concerns about the difficulties that small 
and medium-sized businesses were having in protecting their rights under both 
existing Court processes and the UDRP processes.255   
 
In addition, there were several sets of competing interests.  The first was 
the registrars, some of whom argued there was no need for a service and others 
who argued there was.  The second was between two different private legal views 
on the need for a service: one that favoured a New Zealand based option and 
another which favoured either the status quo or the simple adoption (with 
necessary modification) of the UDRP model operated by WIPO.  These different 
views seemed to reflect the different interests of registrars over those acting for 
registrants and reflected different experiences of the UDRP and litigation options. 
 
This analysis is revealing.  InternetNZ relied on the number and quality of 
submissions as an important measure of the integrity and robustness of its policy 
process.  In 2001 it was not willing to proceed given no recommendation view 
from the Working Group. It was not until 2004, when it was apparent that the lack 
of an alternative to litigation was having a financial impact on the office of the 
DNC, that the NZOC revitalised the policy process.256  In 2005, with a much 
stronger, though not overwhelming, case for a new service InternetNZ decided to 
                                                 
253 Ibid, Submissions 4 and 7. 
254 Ibid, Submission 6. 
255 Ibid, Submissions 4 and 5. 
256 NZOC, above notes 222-225. 
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proceed.  The Working Group ultimately found a much clearer mandate for the 
establishment of the service:257  
 
Based on the content of the majority of submissions, the level of disputes being 
referred to the DNC’s office, the experiences of some of the WG members and 
the other information gathered over that period, the WG considers that there is an 
issue regarding registrant disputes in respect of .nz domains and that there are, 
and will likely always be, a sufficient volume of such disputes to justify the 
implementation of a DRP, to enable complainants an alternative to Court. The 
WG considers that the model best suited for the .nz domain name space would be 
one based on the Nominet UK model, adapted for NZ conditions. (emphasis 
added) 
 
While not referenced in the report of the Working Group, the Chair of the 
Working Group, at the NZOC meeting where the report was presented:258 
 
… pointed out that with the growth of the .nz domain name space, the number of 
disputes relating to domain names, for example cybersquatting, were also on the 
rise. He discussed how it might work for .nz domain names. 
 
Despite a desire for empirical evidence, on balance the case was weak.  
There were issues with the reach of existing law into domain name disputes and 
problems with access to the Courts for the increasing number of small and 
medium sized businesses that had domain names.  But no significant doctrinal 
problems were detailed in submissions.   
 
As to the breadth and depth of participation, participants were a small but 
diverse group.  However, domain name registrants, those most affected by the 
proposals, seem to have had very little direct input.  The process took place 
against an organisational background that favoured openness and transparency 
and with a membership that accorded a constitutional style status to the place of 
“rough consensus” in policy development.  In large measure, this provided a 
safety net for registrants since InternetNZ began consideration with an open mind 
and did not move quickly.   
                                                 
257 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Working Group, above n 229, at 1. 
258 NZOC “Minutes of Meeting” (InternetNZ, Wellington 16 May 2005) <www.dnc.org.nz> at para 
6. 
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The process was open and consultative, but participation was limited to 
those who were already aware of either InternetNZ or the domain name system.  
Distribution of information was limited with consultation resulting in a small 
number of submissions from persons directly affected by domain name disputes, 
persons acting for them or from those administering domain name registration 
systems (Registrars).  Submissions did influence the final form of the policy.  
Those who participated appeared to have “their concerns accommodated within 
the design and implementation stage of the dispute system”.259  However, the lack 
of participation by domain name registrants and civil society more generally is a 
concern. 
(c) Political context and role of institutions 
 
If the objective of establishing the DRS was to not correct a problem, then 
what was the objective?  Factors such as “political context, and the role of 
institutions, power and ideology”260 provide answers this question.   
 
InternetNZ’s desire to maintain system control appears to be a significant 
factor, especially control and the power to act to protect the DNS and manage of 
the .nz domain name space.  System control is apparent in the various and 
repeated reference in the policy process to the role of InternetNZ as the institution 
with responsibility for, and system control over, the .nz domain name space.  This 
aspect remains present today and is reflected in the fact that the DRS process 
remains in the control of DNCL.   
 
Ideology is evident in the fact that without a clear consensus (however 
“rough”) and without any empirical evidence of the need for a new service, 
InternetNZ maintained its “hands off” approach to development of the DRS.  
When discussions were reinvigorated in 2004, there were still quite different 
views about whether a dispute resolution was necessary. At its meeting in March 
                                                 
259 Sourdin, above n 120, at 148. 
260 Ibid, at 176. 
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2005 the NZOC noted that the submissions period on the Consultation Paper had 
ended, that the Working Group was to consider the submissions, and that:261 
 
NZOC members agreed that in considering this matter a priority was to ensure 
that the rights of the registrants were protected and that there should be no 
unnecessary costs imposed on registrants as part of the dispute resolution 
process. 
 
The political and ideological differences in various international arenas, 
including ICANN, were also reflected within the range of views of InternetNZ 
members.  InternetNZ sought to anticipate these, for example, the 2001 
Discussion Paper states:262 
 
Although it may not survive into the final agreement, it is also interesting to note 
that those who prepared the first draft Free Trade Area of the Americas 
agreement (see the draft "still under negotiation" Article XX in the Trademark 
section) raise the possibility of the UDRP as a compulsory mechanism for 
signatories to that report. New Zealand should not blindly follow those leads but 
neither can it ignore them (emphasis added). 
 
The various criteria referred to in the decision making processes of the 
Working Group are also evidence of political context, role of institutions, power 
and ideology.  The criteria in the 2001 Discussion Paper were listed as:263  
• Likelihood that outcomes/decisions will adhere to NZ legal principles 
("adherence") 
• Consistency with international/other jurisdictional models 
("harmonisation") 
• Transparency/ability to monitor quality of decisions/outcomes and of 
those involved in assisting or making decisions ("quality control") 
• Consistency of outcomes/decisions ("consistency") 
• Usefulness of outcomes/decisions as precedent ("precedent value") 
• Speed 
• Cost to parties ("parties' costs") 
                                                 
261 NZOC above n 258. 
262 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Task Force, above n 209, at para 14. 
263 Ibid, at para 33. 
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• Cost to system (indirectly to DNS participants other than the parties) 
("DNS cost") 
• Flexibility of remedy (ability to award more than domain name transfer 
or non-transfer to successful party) ("flexibility") 
• Finality of outcomes/decisions (ability to overturn outcomes/decisions 
other than through dispute resolution process) ("finality") 
The Working Group attempted to apply these criteria to each of the 
proposed options and allocate a ranking of 1-5 (1 being a positive ranking and 5 a 
negative ranking).  The Working Group went to some lengths to emphasise that 
the assessments were “entirely subjective and at this stage lack any empirical 
evidence”.264  The purpose was to attempt some categorisation of the advantages 
and disadvantages of the various options, but also to manage the various factors 
that lay behind these criteria.265   
 
In describing the options and criteria in such detail and across such a wide 
range, the Working Group was doing several things.  First, it was attempting to 
provide information about the broader political and ideological context for 
domain name dispute resolution.  Second, it was attempting to position discussion 
about a New Zealand process within that broader context.  Thirdly, it was going to 
some lengths to model itself on a public style policy development process.  
Finally it was taking care not to be seen to be favouring any one option in a way 
that might indicate predetermination of some kind.  This approach in all 
likelihood also reflected the different views of those on the Working Group and 
that they did not agree on the best approach.  The ranking was therefore also a 
way to avoid being explicit about the different views in the Working Group and 
manage the various political and ideological tensions. 
 
These tensions were also caused by the role of InternetNZ as both 
responsible manager and day to day controller of the domain name space.  On the 
one hand, there was a desire for disputes to be resolved quickly ensuring a 
business owner or potential registrant(s) had certainty and that the DRS was seen 
to promote business efficiency.  On the other hand, InternetNZ was a private non-
                                                 
264 Ibid, at para 36. 
265 Ibid, para 41. 
 83
profit organisation with control over the infrastructure of the Domain Name 
Service.  There was a risk it would be, or be seen to be, judge in its own dispute 
forum.  There was a risk that the service would be perceived as self-serving or in 
some way biased and that this would be criticised both internally and externally.  
This was a real risk given the history that lead to InternetNZ separating policy and 
registry services.266 
 
Such criticism might, in turn, have drawn the attention of government or 
courts to the actions of InternetNZ, with the risk of government regulation or 
other actions which would be perceived by InternetNZ as interference.  One way 
to mitigate these risks was for InternetNZ to ensure it was working effectively, to 
consider developing a good quality dispute resolution process, at low cost and in a 
fair, even-handed manner. Such an approach was also consistent with a 
responsible that was commented upon favourably in Oggi.267 
 
The influence of the institutional role is evident in the way in which 
InternetNZ went about the process: devolving the policy task to a working group 
and attempting to ensure a public policy style process.  In carrying out the task in 
this way, InternetNZ was purporting to act transparently as the institution 
responsible for maintaining overall responsibility for the .nz domain name space.   
(d) The rights of registrants 
 
There are repeated references in the policy process to an undefined, yet 
persuasive, concept: “the rights of registrants”.  For example, it was persuasive in 
relation to whether there should be a power to award costs in disputes.  On this 
issue, the Working Group concluded there should be no power to award costs.  In 
setting out its reasons why, it said:268 
 
It was agreed that one of the reasons for establishing a DRP was to protect the 
rights of legitimate registrants. Requiring a fee to be paid ‘up front’ by the 
                                                 
266 See above Chapter II The Domain Name System in New Zealand. 
267 Above n 96. 
268 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Working Group, above n 229, at 3. 
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registrant when a complaint is laid would not be fair or equitable and tends to 
undermine the “first come first served” principle. (emphasis added) 
 
The exact parameters of the concept of the rights of registrants are not 
clear, yet it is persuasive, suggesting a strong ideological influence.  This should 
be considered further and will be briefly discussed in Chapter VI. 
 
In summary, political context, the role of InternetNZ, power and ideology 
all affected development of the DRS.  InternetNZ attempted to steer a middle 
course by taking a principled approach to considering options, using explicit 
criteria, avoiding pre-determination and staying aware of international 
developments.   
(e) Litigation, arbitration or ADR? 
 
The issue of whether the new service was to be arbitration or some other 
form of dispute resolution was not directly addressed in the 2004 Consultation 
Paper, but a number of submissions on the Consultation Paper raised this issue.  
One stated:269   
 
It is important to consider whether this procedure is an arbitration under the 
Arbitration Act 1996.  The definition of ‘Expert’ in the Rules refers to an 
‘arbitrator’.  This is clearly an indication of an arbitration rather than of an expert 
determination…. The distinguishing factor between arbitration and expert 
determination is whether the natural justice safeguards are important to the 
parties. 
 
The submission went on to indicate that “it needs to be thought out very 
clearly whether InternetNZ intends to provide an expert determination or an 
arbitration.” 270  The International Trade Mark Association asserted that in its 
view “the UDRP is not radically different from the Nominet UK model” stating 
that “both are expedited, relatively inexpensive systems in which expert 
arbitrators apply multi-factor tests to assess the presence or absence of bad 
faith.”271 
                                                 
269 NZOC, above n 228, Submission 17 at 2. 
270 Ibid. 
271 Ibid, Submission 14 at 2. 
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The Nominet submission disagreed with the ITMA submission:272 
 
… we would also take issue with their use of the word ‘arbitrator’ to describe the 
DRS Experts.  The DRS is not an arbitration: for example, it does not oust the 
jurisdiction of the courts, and does not allow appeal to the courts on a point of 
law.  To do this would be to lose much of the speed, simplicity, and efficiency 
that benefits the DRS.  Incidentally, our understanding is that WIPO does not see 
the UDRP as being an Arbitration either. 
 
The issue was not referred to in the Working Group’s final report to 
NZOC.  No clear statement was made in the final form of the DRS on whether or 
not it was arbitration for the purpose of the Arbitration Act 1996.  However, 
several changes were made to the draft DRS after submissions in 2005 which 
demonstrate this issue was taken into account.  First, the definition of “expert” 
was amended to state that:  “Expert means a person appointed to resolve a 
Domain Name Dispute under paragraphs B7 or B17 of the procedure.” 273  
References were added to proceedings before “arbitral tribunals”.  A provision 
was added for appeal to a panel of experts on a point of law while a complaint 
was proceeding.  An inference can be made that the DNC was trying to more 
clearly establish the DRS as an expert determination which would defer to an 
arbitration process under the Arbitration Act, just as it would defer to any court 
proceedings that might be commenced.   
 
The attempt to make it clear that the DRS is a process of expert 
determination is consistent with the analysis set out in Chapter III and the 
conclusion that the DRS is not arbitration.  The failure to address the theoretical 
basis for system design (referred to in Chapter III) was therefore picked up by 
submitters with dispute resolution expertise. It does seem peculiar, however, that 
the opportunity was not taken to remove all doubt by being explicit.  The DRS 
preamble states that “this policy provides an alternative to the Courts in situations 
where two parties are in dispute over who the registrant of a .nz domain name 
should be.”  It is recommended, for the avoidance of doubt, that a provision be 
added to the DRS making it clear that the Arbitration Act does not apply. 
                                                 
272 Ibid, Submission 12 at 3. 
273 Domain Name Commission Limited, above n 4, at para 3. 
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(f) Mandatory or voluntary? 
 
The question of whether the DRS should be mandatory was an issue from 
the outset.  The 2001 Discussion Paper noted that:274 
 
The Working Group proposes to look at both a MANDATORY LDRP analogous 
to the UDRP (subject to the above considerations) and a VOLUNTARY 
mechanism. The only difference between the voluntary and mandatory 
alternatives is that under the voluntary one unless both parties agree at the time to 
use the procedure and thereby be bound by the results, it cannot be invoked. 
(emphasis in original) 
 
Clause 2.5 of the DRS provides that: “This policy is one of the .nz policies 
that, as amended from time to time, all .nz registrants agree to be bound by when 
registering or renewing a .nz domain name.”  The result is that the DRS is not 
“mandatory” in that it must be used in all disputes.  Rather, where the DRS is 
used, parties agree that its provisions govern how the dispute is to be dealt with 
and the legal tests to be applied.   To this extent, the DRS is a “mandatory” policy.   
 
The question of a mandatory process was partly influenced by the factor of 
system control.  A mandatory process could be implemented through the use of 
contracts which are entered into by domain name registrants with registrars.  
Registrars would in turn be required to include the clauses in their agreements 
with the NZRS, with failure to do so resulting in the risk of de-authorisation.  In 
addition, if there was disagreement over the contractual provision for referral to 
the DRS, the point could be referred to the Court which could uphold the 
contractual agreement and refer the matter back to the DRS.   
3 Policy context 
(a) Nature of disputes 
 
The policy context has two aspects:  policies related to the DNS (set out in 
Chapter II) and policy debates about intellectual property rights.  The DRS 
provides that, in the absence of substantive proof that a complainant has rights in 
                                                 
274 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Task Force, above n 209, at para 29. 
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a name and that the registration is unfair, the first come first served principle 
prevails and the original registrant will have a strong case for retention of the 
domain name.275 
 
The 2001 Discussion Paper cites domain name disputes relating to trade 
marks and other intellectual property rights.  The more significant case law at that 
time involved intellectual property rights of large corporations which were being 
unscrupulously targeted for exploitation. 276   This perhaps reflected the then 
relatively low numbers of registered domain names, particularly by small and 
medium sized enterprises.277  The nature of these disputes was clearly influencing 
possible dispute resolution options.  For example, the 2001 Discussion Paper 
notes the Disputes Tribunal as an alternative to litigation and states:278 
 
For our purposes however, it is important to note that the Disputes Tribunal does 
not have jurisdiction to hear trade mark claims and therefore is unlikely to be an 
appropriate forum for the hearing of domain name disputes. 
 
Together with the fact that other types of domain name disputes had not 
yet developed, it may have been difficult to justify moving from litigation as an 
option or to understand why a variation of the UDRP might be necessary.  Large 
corporations also, presumably, had the resources for litigation or the UDRP 
process. On the other hand, the proposal for an Internet Commissioner or Internet 
Ombudsman indicates a wider range of disputes may have been anticipated and 
that these might have been better dealt outside litigation or the UDRP.  This also 
suggests there were different opinions about the nature of disputes that it was 
appropriate for InternetNZ to be involved in.  
 
Frankel and McLay, writing in 2002, noted when considering the case law 
in relation to marketing law and internet domain names, that:279 
 
                                                 
275 Domain Name Commission Limited, above n 4, at cl 5. 
276 See Chapter II, New Zealand until 2006. 
277 Domain Name Commission Limited “Statistics” <www.dnc.org.nz>. At 31 July 2001 there were 
98,168 registered .nz domain names.  By 31 May 2006 (just prior to the DRS coming into force) 
there were 230,531. 
278 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Task Force, above n 209, at para 20. 
279 Frankel and McLay above n 24, at 712.  
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In New Zealand, Courts have struggled to manipulate the boundaries of 
registered trade mark law, passing off and the Fair Trading Act 1986 to come to 
what the Court perceives as a “just” result in favour of the “legitimate” domain 
name user. 
 
There is evidence then that during the five years that the DRS was being 
developed difficulties with some aspects of the jurisprudence were emerging and 
that the nature of domain name disputes was changing.  Submissions on the 2005 
Consultation Paper support this finding since only five submissions argued for the 
litigation option to be retained, although none outlined in detail any doctrinal 
problems.  The majority simply favoured a new system and a considerable 
number of those submitters had direct experience of litigation for domain name 
disputes.  The changing nature of disputes also gave rise to questions about the 
scope of registrants protected rights.  This, in turn, affected InternetNZ’s 
consideration of what dispute resolution system might be developed to better 
protect those rights.   
 
The concern to provide for the range of disputes (and the still undefined 
rights of registrants) ultimately influenced selection of the preferred option.  In 
2005 the Working Group considered that the scope of protected rights (which 
could be the subject of a dispute) needed to go “wider than just registered trade 
mark rights.” 280   It was agreed that the scope should include other rights 
enforceable under New Zealand law.  However, disputes were to relate only to 
competing rights in domain names.  The UDRP was much narrower in scope and 
considered inadequate.  Complaints by registrants about registrars were also 
excluded. 281  The Nominet experience of 64% of disputes being resolved at 
mediation was also influential,282 suggesting to the Working Group that the nature 
of disputes were amenable to mediation and an accessible service would be used 
by registrants if one was available. 
 
The Working Group developed a substantive test of “unfair registration”.  
The Nominet policy referred to abusive registration, rather than unfair 
                                                 
280 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Working Group, above n 229, at 2. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Ibid. 
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registration.283  The fairness element in the DRS went beyond the existing legal 
tests.  The “fairness” element in the DRS echoed the “abusive registration” 
language of the Nominet policy, but did not copy it.284  Unfair registration was 
defined to mean either:285 
 
(i) registered or otherwise dealt with in a manner at the time of 
registration that took unfair advantage of or was detrimental to the 
complainants rights; or 
(ii) has been or is likely to be used in a manner which took unfair 
advantage of or was unfairly detrimental to the complaint’s rights. 
 
The question of unfairness is a matter of evidence. The DRS prescribes a 
non-exhaustive list of the matters that will be considered evidence of unfair 
registration including circumstances indicating the respondent has registered the 
domain name primarily:286 
 
(i) for the purpose of selling or otherwise dealing with the name for 
valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s reasonable out of 
pocket expenses in acquiring the name; 
(ii) as a blocking registration against a name or mark in which the 
complainant has rights; or 
(iii) for the purpose of unfairly disrupting the business of the 
complainant. 
 
Other matters which may be evidence of unfair registration are: using the 
name in a way likely to confuse, mislead or deceive, a pattern of unfair 
registrations by the respondent, the provision of false details to a Registrar, or 
where it is clear from a previous relationship between the parties that the 
complainant is the proper holder of the domain name.287  Rights are defined to 
                                                 
283 Nominet “Dispute Resolution Service Procedure” (2008) Nominet, Oxford, 
<www.nominet.org.uk>. 
284 Jacob Grainer “Not abusive, just unfair? Dispute resolution in “.nz” domain namespace and the 
New Zealand Dispute Resolution Service Policy” (2006) NZIPJ 4(8) 186. 
285 Domain Name Commission Limited, above n 4, at clause 3. 
286 Ibid, at clause 5.1.1. 
287 Ibid, at clause 5.1.2 - 5.1.5. 
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include “rights enforceable under New Zealand law” but a complainant “will  be 
unable to rely on rights in a name or term which is wholly descriptive of the 
complainant’s business”.288  
 
In summary, the nature of disputes did influence the design of the DRS 
and the scope of protected rights.  This is evidence that the DRS was designed to 
be fit for purpose.  But the DRS was not tightly prescribed or tailored to only one 
kind of dispute.  By going wider than existing law on trade marks, passing off, 
and consumer protection289 InternetNZ was providing improved protection for 
domain name registrants.  This is further evidence that InternetNZ was acting in a 
responsible manner and in the public good.  The DRS was not designed to be self 
serving or to deal only with a narrow range of cases.   
(b) Influence of other InternetNZ policies 
 
The DRS had to fit with the other 16 policies of InternetNZ as well as the 
restructuring of the Shared Registry Service and related policy developments.290  
The influence of these policies was apparent throughout the DRS development.  
For example, the desire for coherence is reflected in the final form of the DRS.  
Clause 2.5 provides: “This policy is one of the .nz policies that, as amended from 
time to time, all .nz registrants agree to be bound by when registering or renewing 
a .nz domain name.”  
 
The “hands off” administration policy of InternetNZ influenced the 
Working Group in its decision not to impose filing fees.  The charging of 
administrative costs was considered to be revenue generating for the DNC and, it 
was concluded, likely to affect the perception of its independence, even if those 
costs were reasonable.  It was noted that under the domain name fee funding 
model “all registrants were contributing to the cost of having a service available if 
it was required” and that this was:291 
 
                                                 
288 Ibid, at clause 3. 
289 See Chapter II, New Zealand until 2006. 
290 See Chapter II, Domain Name Service Policies. 
291 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Working Group, above n 229 at 3. 
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… also consistent with InternetNZ’s “trusteeship” of the .nz space that it (and 
consequently all registrants ultimately) should bear the expense of any system 
which improves the overall operation of that space. Such a system potentially 
benefits all registrants, and potential registrants, any of whom who may be faced 
with a dispute. It also balances any potential exploitation of the “first come first 
served” principle, without undermining it in any way. 
 
There was support for the fee model adopted by Nominet because this 
enabled InternetNZ to “be seen to be completely unbiased as to the lodging of 
disputes and their progress.”292   
 
This influence is reflected in the final wording of the DRS policy.  For 
example, clause 2.4 of the DRS provides that: “Neither registrars nor the DNC get 
involved in disputes regarding who the true registrant of a domain name should 
be, but will undertake actions as directed either by the Courts or by the Experts 
under this policy.”  Clause B21 deals with exclusions of liability and purports to 
protect the DNC, its officers and staff, as well as mediators and Experts, acting 
under the DRS from negligent acts or omissions, unless bad faith can be shown 
and clause B2.3.9 which is a further exclusion of liability. 293 
 
The policy of first-come first-served registration influenced the Working 
Group in deciding not to recommend there be a power for Experts to impose 
orders for costs.294   
 
Evidence of the inter-relationship of the policies is also apparent in the 
fact that the DRS Policy has been taken into account in other InternetNZ policy 
reviews.  For example, in the 2007 policy review of the Registering, Managing 
And Cancelling A Domain Name Policy, the State Services Commission 
proposed a policy change that would allow the cancelling of domain names based 
on their use, for example, for spam and phishing.  NZOC opposed such a policy 
on the basis that “the current position of not getting involved in the use of a 
                                                 
292 Ibid. 
293 Domain Name Commission Limited, above n 4, at Clause 2.4. 
294 See above, Analysis of System Design. 
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domain name” prevailed and should simply be reiterated in a new clause for that 
policy.295 
 
Policy coherence was a feature of the DRS system design.  Policy 
developments in intellectual property law and the law related to domain name 
disputes were considered.  The DRS drew heavily from, but did not exactly copy, 
the Nominet policy. 
(c) The influence of ODR techniques 
 
The growing use of ODR techniques was influential.  The 2004 
Consultation Paper set out the technical aspects of the Nominet process in some 
detail, with an emphasis placed on the case management system “which models 
the DRS Procedure precisely and provides a highly automated support to their 
staff.”  The Paper emphasised that the service was conducted by way of a “refined 
process of telephone based, facilitative mediation”296 (rather than face to face 
mediation), email as a key form of communication, particularly helpful across 
time zones, and that “the parties do not talk to one another directly.”297   
 
These advantages translated to reduced costs and administrative ease.  The 
system was estimated to require the equivalent of 1 FTE to operate,298 the use of a 
database system, and low administrative overhead.  This meant easy monitoring 
and an ability to control process time frames.299  ODR techniques were listed as 
useful for administrative simplicity and lower cost, rather than other reasons.   
4 Process integrity 
 
Three values appear to underlie the development of the DRS: protection 
(of InternetNZ’s .nz management role), process quality and administrative 
efficiency.   
                                                 
295 Domain Name Commission Limited “Minutes of meeting” (InternetNZ, Wellington, 29 
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InternetNZ’s technical role was a key factor in the 2001 Discussion 
Paper:300 
MANDATE: InternetNZ has responsibility for maintaining the domain name 
space or system ("DNS") in the .nz country code top level domain ("ccTLD"). In 
doing so, under the various applicable RFCs (in particular RFC 1591) and its 
own rules, InternetNZ is charged with enhancing the use of the internet. To do so, 
from time to time, InternetNZ sets policy governing use of the internet in New 
Zealand following public consultation with affected participants or potential 
participants. Examples of such policies can be found on this site (eg that 
governing the creation of new second level domains ).  
This paragraph was adopted almost without amendment in the final form 
of the DRS.301   It might be argued that InternetNZ placed greater weight on 
protection of this role over the concerns about domain name disputes.  
InternetNZ’s primary focus was that the Internet functioned without interruption: 
how people used it was irrelevant.  Such an approach was consistent with the 
hands off approach which InternetNZ was espousing and may also explain the 
carefully constructed neutrality of the 2001 Discussion Paper. 
 
The 2001 Working Group’s criteria for assessing the options also reveal 
values relating to quality process (adherence, speed, finality, flexibility, decision-
making quality) and administrative efficiency (cost to system, cost to parties, and 
precedent value).  The 2001 Discussion Paper stated:302 
 
It is considered by the Working Group that the primary driver as to whether a 
multi-tiered system is required will be one of cost vs benefit. Empirical evidence 
of the size of the domain name dispute problem in New Zealand and whether it 
appears to be growing or not will be important in considering this. We also need 
to make educated guesses (for that is all they can be at this early stage), based on 
relevant factors (including overseas experience), as to how the introduction of an 
shared registry system into the .nz space will impact on the level of domain name 
disputes, if at all. 
 
                                                 
300 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Task Force, above n 209, at para 2. 
301 Domain Name Commission Limited, above n 4, at the Introduction and in parts A and B. 
302 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Task Force, above n 209, at para 44. 
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The 2004 Consultation Paper did not list these criteria.  However, the 
factors cited in relation to the advantages and disadvantages of each option echo 
some of the criteria of 2001.  For example, the need for possible administrative 
changes is referred to (raising concerns about criteria of cost to system and 
flexibility) and whether there will be clarity about how to handle the disputes and 
complaints (concerns about consistency and precedent).  Cost risks (both to 
parties and the administration of the service) were outlined for each option.  Three 
criteria were no longer listed but can be implied, namely: adherence, 
harmonisation, and finality.   
 
The Working Group was attempting to develop meaningful proposals with 
transparent criteria.  It was clear that if a DRS was to be developed, InternetNZ 
wanted to be sure it was of good quality and administratively efficient.  While the 
policy development process was not without tensions, the way in which these 
tensions were dealt with also provides insights into process integrity.  In 2001 
these tensions resulted in a lack of consensus and, in the absence of a consensus 
there were no firm recommendations.  InternetNZ was clearly concerned to ensure 
that there was a rough consensus before taking final decisions.   
 
A policy development that had the “look and feel” of a public policy 
development process is also evidence of process integrity.  There were executive 
decisions by InternetNZ Council whether to proceed.  A working group was 
established.  There were public announcements of consultation.  Trigger questions 
and a discussion paper were issued.  A further consultation paper was issued and 
submissions received and published.  InternetNZ was attempting to consult those 
likely to be affected and imbuing its processes with public policy elements.  This 
was also happening in relation to other policies.  For example, it developed 
policies for complaints and was explicit about consultation on any policy changes.  
While participation in those processes was weak, the steps were transparent. 
 
In summary, InternetNZ took a principled approach to development of the 
DRS policy. There were strong values underpinning that approach.  The more 
significant values related to protection of InternetNZ’s technical role and 
oversight of the .nz domain name space coupled with an emphasis on consensus 
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in decision-making.  But there was also a desire to use, and be seen to use, a 
transparent policy processes. 
C Conclusion 
 
The development of the DRS has been analysed in light of its system 
design, policy context, and process integrity.  Several themes emerge: the lack of 
empirical evidence justifying a service, the mixed values underlying decision-
making, the public process InternetNZ used to develop the policy and the careful 
management of tensions between the various criteria for choosing between the 
options.   
 
InternetNZ took a pragmatic but principled approach, anticipating 
international developments and the nature of domain name disputes and 
considered the DRS before there was evidence it was needed.  Questions were 
being asked about whether existing law adequately protected the rights of 
registrants, although these rights were not defined.  By 2005, concern about this 
aspect of the nature of disputes was influencing the design of the DRS.  The result 
was a test of unfair registration that was broader than existing law.  Several 
conclusions can be drawn 
 
First, the policy development process did reflect the principles of a system 
of mutual recognition and co-operation.  The special nature of the DNS outlined 
in Chapter II infused the policy development process with transparency and a 
consultative approach.  When there were no submissions (as in 2001) or there was 
no consensus, the proposal did not proceed.  These principles did give rise to 
tensions in the development of the DRS policy but were also a safety net for 
domain name registrants, given how few people participated in the policy process 
over five years.  The principles of mutual recognition and cooperation were a 
counterweight to rapid changes and the risk of capture of the process by a single 
voice or a narrow range of participants.  They were also relied on by decision-
makers when there were no submissions or when submissions needed to be 
assessed. 
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Second, InternetNZ exercised its policy function rationally, drawing on 
the best of overseas knowledge, on local legal and technical expertise, and 
developing its position over time in light of the nature of disputes.  However, the 
Working Group ceased to function some time in 2002 (or perhaps had reached a 
stalemate).  The push for change came from the Domain Name Commissioner and 
NZOC, driven by the changing nature of disputes at the shop front, and the cost 
implications for InternetNZ of being involved in litigation to protect the DNS.   
 
Third, there were tensions between the public function and the private 
nature of the way it was carried out.  InternetNZ managed these tensions in a 
principled way, skilfully navigating a middle course through both the differing 
views and the wider risks, for example, of government intervention or adverse 
judicial scrutiny.  InternetNZ was interested in retaining system control, power 
and its own role in relation to the DNS.  The DRS development process would 
have benefitted from being tested by having more participation by more diverse 
people.  But InternetNZ acted fairly and was not self-serving.   
 
Fourth, InternetNZ is operating a dispute resolution system in which rights 
are contested, rather than one in which the focus is settlement.  InternetNZ is not 
free to operate the .nz domain name space however it chooses.  Yet the DRS was 
not designed to be a closed system.  The risks of intervention by government or 
the Courts appear to have been managed by having an adjudicative dispute 
resolution process.  This would counter, for example, any possible perception of 
bias or self interest in the outcome of particular disputes and appear to reflect a 
“hands off” approach to management of the .nz domain name space.  It can also 
be said that the DRS was designed to promote justice, rather than settlement.   
 
The Working Group recommended “that InternetNZ should proceed to 
implement a Nominet style DRP for the .nz domain name space”. 303   This 
recommendation was accepted and subsequently approved by the InternetNZ 
Council without change. The Chair of the Working Group commented:304 
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The growth in the .nz name space has meant that disputes caused by such issues 
as cybersquatting and reverse domain name hijacking have continued unabated.  
However resolving such issues in Court is a massive investment in time, cost and 
people’s patience – the committee established that there was definitely a need for 
a better route to conflict resolution. We looked at a number of well established 
systems from around the world and eventually decided that we should model 
ourselves on the UK Nominet process.   
The NZOC representative also commented:305 
InternetNZ already has a good name for its stewardship of the .nz domain. This 
new dispute resolution model will further improve the way the .nz name space is 
administered, for the benefit of all .nz registrants and the New Zealand local 
Internet community. 
Implementation began in earnest and the DRS became operational on 1 
June 2006, five years after the original Working Group had been established.   
                                                 
305 InternetNZ “Domain name dispute process to be implemented” (18 May 2005) Press Release. 
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CHAPTER V THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICE IN PRACTICE 
A Introduction 
 
This Chapter turns to the final aspect of the primary research questions 
and examines what has happened in practice with the administration of the DRS 
and the domain name disputes that it has been used for.  Drawing on the criteria in 
Chapter II this Chapter evaluates the DRS in light of system standards (of dispute 
resolution personnel and procedures), the cost of the service to parties (including 
the time that proceedings take) and provides a statistical analysis of complaints.   
B Evaluation of DRS 
1 Standards 
 
Mediation is mandatory if a response is made to a complaint.306  There is 
no fee for the mediation process.307  The DNC appoints a mediator within three 
days of receiving a reply with appointment made “on a rotational basis from its 
list of Mediators.” 308   The list of mediators, and their qualifications, is 
published.309  Negotiations in mediation are “confidential as between the parties, 
the mediator and the DNC” 310  with mediation being conducted in “a manner 
which the DNC, in its sole discretion, considers appropriate.”311   
 
It appears, by inference from this clause, that the DNC is somehow 
engaged in the process beyond simply administration.  The definition of “party” 
in clause 3 of the DRS states that “party” “means a Complainant or Respondent 
and Parties has a corresponding meaning.”  Clause B6.3 states that the mediation 
shall be confidential “as between the Parties, the mediator and the DNC.”  It is not 
clear that the DNC is a party, as defined, but there does appear to be some 
engagement beyond administration. 
                                                 
306 Ibid, cl B6.1. 
307 Ibid, cl B20.2. 
308 Ibid, cl B6.1. 
309 Ibid, cl B6.2. 
310 Ibid, cl B6.3. 
311 Ibid, cl B6.1. 
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The engagement of the DNC in the mediation is unusual.  In practice it 
appears that the DNC does not actually take part in the mediation, but is able to 
view notes of the mediator and the mediation outcome, including any 
settlement.312   The only apparent reason for this would be to ensure that any 
settlement was in accordance with InternetNZ and DNCL policies. It is unclear 
what would happen, for example, if the parties reached a settlement which the 
DNC did not approve of (or refused to enforce) and this was subsequently 
challenged by one or both of the parties. 
(a) Practitioners 
The standard of dispute resolution service providers was an issue 
throughout the development of the DRS.  The trigger questions asked:313 
 
9. What sort of qualifications/experience should arbitrators/mediators have? How 
should they be appointed to the pool of available people? Who appoints them? 
Are they employed by ISOCNZ or whatever agency runs the service or are they 
contracted as and when needed from the pool? 
12. Should arbitrations/mediations be confidential? Should any 
decision/settlement be confidential? If not, should decisions be reported and 
therefore be available as some form of precedent?  
13. What form of quality control should be maintained in respect of decisions 
and/or decision makers, if any? 
The 2001 Discussion Paper noted “facilitated mediation” means mediation 
in which “the ccTLD manager would provide skilled mediators (either from its 
own personnel or through externally approved suppliers) and appropriate 
assistance in terms of resolving logistics for the mediation.” 314   The 2004 
Consultation Paper suggested that mediators or arbitrators be approved and noted 
that: “The Nominet mediators are trained and accredited and undergo a 
programme of continuing professional development.”315  The WIPO system of 
“approved panellists” was also noted. 
                                                 
312 Domain Name Commissioner “Notes” to author regarding draft dissertation (23 March 2010). 
313 InternetNZ Domain Name Dispute Resolution Working Group, above n 208. 
314 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Task Force, above n 209, at para 26. 
315 NZOC, above n 226, at 2. 
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InternetNZ’s changed its views about the relevant standards during the 
development of the DRS according to the scope of the DRS and the disputes that 
would come before it.  There was express reference in the 2004 Consultation 
Paper to the possibility of non-lawyers and non-trademark law experts being 
Experts or mediators.  Expertise in both dispute resolution and subject matter 
(intellectual property law) subsequently became criteria for appointment.316   
(i) Mediators  
 Mediator appointments are published.317 The DNCL states that:318 
Mediators working with us are members of either or both of the following 
professional bodies: Arbitrators’ and Mediators’ Institute of New Zealand 
(AMINZ) - either Associate (AAMINZ) or Fellow (FAMINZ); Leading Edge 
Alternative Dispute Resolvers New Zealand (LEADR NZ). 
These professional bodies establish certain criteria for membership 
including affiliate and associate, with the latter requiring specific dispute 
resolution qualifications.  Members agree to abide by professional rules and 
standards, including codes of conduct and on-going professional development.  
There are 10 mediators.  Eight have “advanced panel” membership of LEADR 
(NZ), one is a Board member and Treasurer of AMINZ, and one is a member of 
LEADR (NZ).  All appear to be of a very high quality. 
(ii) Experts 
 
There are eight Experts.319  Three are former Judges of the High Court of 
New Zealand and four are Queen’s Counsel.  There is one non-lawyer. Six are 
Fellows of the Arbitrators’ and Mediators’ Institute of New Zealand (AMINZ) 
and five are or have been authorised WIPO panellists or otherwise involved in 
international domain name dispute resolution processes.  Two made submissions 
                                                 
316 Ibid, at 2. 
317 Domain Name Commission Limited, above n 4. 
318 Ibid. 
319 Domain Name Commission Limited “Dispute Resolution Service” <www.dnc.org.nz>. 
 101
on the 2005 Consultation Paper. 320   There is a combination of both dispute 
resolution and domain name dispute resolution skills among the group.   
(b) Procedural and other safeguards 
 
Procedural standards include rules protecting privilege, confidentiality and 
other safeguards. There was little comment on these matters in the DRS policy 
development process.  Reference is made by Nominet in its submission about the 
details of its process.  The DNCL provides induction and training and has signed 
agreements with each mediator and Expert.321 
 
The DRS contains provisions on mediator appointment, liability and 
confidentiality.  Settlements and mediation proceedings are confidential and 
privileged.  Mediators acting in good faith are protected from liability, except in 
the case of bad faith. 322   Mediation is not face to face.  Complaints and 
submissions to Experts must be in writing, filed with the DNC, and comply with 
prescribed word limits.  Submissions are forwarded by the DNC to the respective 
parties within prescribed time limits.  Failure to meet time limits will result in the 
complaint lapsing or moving to the next stage of the process by default. No 
hearings in person have been held by Experts (although there is provision for this 
in a particular case).323   
 
In relation to impartiality, Experts make a declaration of conflict of 
interests in their decisions, although this is not expressly required in the DRS 
policy.  The DRS has adequate confidentiality, privilege and immunity provisions 
in Part A and Part B.  The mediator role is clear and includes the requirement to 
act independently and disclose possible conflicts of interest.  The process for 
dealing with complaints against mediators or Experts is not clear and it is not 
known if any such complaints have been received. There are no published 
                                                 
320 NZOC, above n 228, Submitters 3 and 18. 
321 Domain Name Commissioner, above n 312. 
322 Domain Name Commission Limited, above n 4, at paras B6.2 (publication of Mediator 
qualifications and limitation on challenge to appointment), B6.3, B6.5 (confidentiality) and B21.1 
(exclusion of liability). 
323 This conclusion is based on an assessment of the published Expert decisions, none of which 
notes that a hearing in person was held. 
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guidelines for parties to the mediation, although some information is available on 
the DNC website.324 
 
The principles of natural justice are a further procedural safeguard.  The 
DRS provides that in addition to the right of appeal, parties can request a re-
hearing.  The non-exhaustive list of examples which might justify a re-hearing 
are:325 
 
(i) serious misconduct by an Expert; 
(ii) false evidence having been offered to the Expert; 
(iii) the discovery of new evidence; and 
(iv) a breach of natural justice. 
 
The right to be heard is provided for, with the DRS setting out procedures 
for written evidence and a right of reply to a complaint.  There is an emphasis on 
written rather than oral presentation of evidence to Experts while mediation takes 
place via telephone.  There are word limits on complaints and responses which 
may limit the right to be heard in some circumstances although no information 
about that is available.  Time limits are tight and may cause difficulties in some 
cases (see further below).  The DNC manages complaints through the process, 
however, and retains the discretion to take into account individual circumstances 
in particular cases. 
 
One area of concern is the requirement for a complaint to be referred to an 
Expert for determination even if a response to the complaint has not been filed.  
Referral to an Expert incurs a fee of $1800 plus GST.  There is potential for abuse 
of this system, for example, by a person who wishes to annoy a complainant by 
registering names in which the complainant has rights and then simply ignoring a 
complaint.  The complainant is still required to obtain an Expert decision and that 
may be unfair in some cases, especially where the registration is plainly unfair.  
Improvements should be considered for example automatic transfer of the name 
                                                 
324 Domain Name Commission Limited, “Make a Complaint” <www.dnc.org.nz>. 
325 Domain Name Commission Limited, above n 4, at clause 12.7. 
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after the period for a response or introducing a discretion for the DNC to transfer 
the name after proof of “final notice” to the respondent by the complainant. 
 
On balance, the procedures are clear, fair and further safeguarded in both 
the criteria for appointment and the quality of those appointed as mediators and 
Experts.  The process is rigorous with the parties required to contest rights in 
domain names through an adjudicative process based on clear legal tests.  
Improvements could be made to the process for handling complaints where no 
response is filed. 
2 Costs 
(a) Time 
 
“Time” includes the overall dispute resolution process and each step.  
There is no purposive provision requiring the DNC to deal with complaints “in 
good faith”, “promptly” or any similar duty based clause.  The time for each step 
is (with the running total in square brackets): 
 
Initial (valid) complaint received and proceedings commenced - sent to 
respondent within three days [3] 
Response – within 15 days [18] 
Right of reply – within 5 days [23] 
Informal mediation – arranged within 3 days of reply [26] 
No resolution within 10 days - notification of referral to expert [36] 
Complainant pays Expert fee – within 10 days of notice of referral [46]  
Expert appointed – within 5 days from payment of fee [51] 
Expert has ten days to render a decision [61] 
Communication of decision to parties – within 3 days of receipt [64] 
Implementation within 10 days of communication unless appeal filed [74] 
Appeal statement – must filed within 15 days of notice of appeal [89] 
Notice of appeal forwarded to other party within 3 days [92] 
Appeal response within a further 10 days [102] 
Appeal decisions within 30 days of appointment of last panellist with option for 
further 10 days by agreement with DNC [142] 
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The maximum possible time is 142 days.326  Complaints are managed and 
may proceed more quickly.  For example, if there is no response to the complaint 
and it proceeds to an Expert for determination, the maximum time is 56 days.  
The DNCL does not publish information on the average time taken for a 
complaint to be resolved.  The DNCL has noted that “On average, disputes take 
around 90 days to process from submission to the receipt of the Expert 
determination.”327  On average there are eight cases in the DRS system at any 
given time.328 
 
To compare this with litigation is somewhat difficult.  The High Court 
Rules provide an allocation of time 5.9 days for counsel to prepare an 
interlocutory application for an interim injunction.329  That is not to say that an 
injunction would be granted within approximately six days, but does give an 
indication of the time that might be recoverable when costs are awarded.   
 
An effective dispute resolution system will be timely and efficient, so that 
parties are not left waiting for administrators to respond and so that the disputes is 
resolved as quickly as practicable.  The DRS clearly provides timely dispute 
resolution compared to litigation.  A purposive provision could usefully be added 
to the DRS to make clear the duty of the DNCL to manage cases in a timely 
manner. 
(b) Fees 
There is no fee for filing a DRS complaint or for re-submitting a 
complaint.  Mediation is free to the parties.  Mediators are paid directly by the 
DNCL on a set fee basis.  The first fee payable by either party is the filing fee for 
an Expert decision, which is $1800 plus GST for disputes involving 1-5 domain 
names.  Fees are determined “on a cost-recovery basis and are passed on in their 
entirety to the Expert(s).  The DNC does not charge for its mediation or 
administration services in respect of the Dispute Resolution Service.”330  Fees are 
                                                 
326 The DRS defines “days” in clause 3 to mean calendar days excluding Saturday, Sunday and 
public holidays. 
327 Domain Name Commission Annual Report 2006-2007 (InternetNZ, Wellington, 2007). 
328 Domain Name Commission Annual Report 2008-2009 (InternetNZ, Wellington, 2009) at 9. 
329 See also the next section in the Chapter, (b) Fees, where this is explained in more detail.   
330 Dispute Resolution Service Policy, cl B20.1. 
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only payable if mediation is unsuccessful and an Expert is to be appointed.331  
The DNC reserves the right to charge higher fees for more complicated cases and 
in the event that an in-person hearing is held.332  It is not clear whether these 
higher fees have ever been charged.  Fees for appeals are $6600 plus GST.  There 
is no power to award costs. 
 
In comparison, the fee for a complaint to a single WIPO panellist for a 
ccTLD dispute under the UDRP is $USD1500 of which the Panellist receives 
$1000 and WIPO $500.  For some ccTLDs the fee is greater (for example, for .au 
disputes the fee is $USD 2000).333  This equates to a filing fee of $1950 which is 
close to the New Zealand fee for the equivalent part of the process ($1800).  
However, under the DRS the Expert receives the full amount of the fee.   
 
Comparison with High Court filing fees requires some assumptions as the 
High Court Rules allocate costs across both experience of counsel and case 
complexity.334  Assuming a mid-level of complexity and counsel seniority, a fair 
comparison would be 5.9 days at $1600 per day resulting in a costs award (if 
successful) of $9440.335  Other disbursements are also recoverable,336 including 
interim injunction filing fees of $15,080. 337   The DRS fees are much lower 
compared to litigation.   
 
Parties can represent themselves or have legal representation. The DNC 
encourages parties to take legal advice. 338   Assuming, for the purposes of 
comparison, that a complainant has taken legal advice and the cost of that advice 
                                                 
331 Ibid, cl B20.2. 
332 Ibid, cl B20.1 and B20.3 
333 World Intellectual Property Organisation “Schedule of Fees” <www.wipo.int>. 
334 See High Court Rules.  
335 Ibid. the assumption is that a domain name dispute would be a straightforward civil proceedings 
application dealt with under the Rules as an interim injunction, with Category B time allocated (a 
comparatively large amount of time for an interim injunction step) and experienced (category 2 
$1600 per day), rather than highly skilled counsel (category 3 $2370 per day).  On this basis, the 
minimum costs (and time) to the complainant would be: commencement of proceedings (3 days), 
preparation of interlocutory application for injunction (0.7 days), preparation for and attendance at 
a defended application (2.2 days): 5.9 days in total. 
336 Ibid, High Court Rules, r 14.2. 
337 Ibid.  Fees cover filing proceedings, interlocutory application, a half day hearing and sealing of 
the judgment). 
338 Domain Name Commission Limited, above n 324. 
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would be the same for litigation, the DRS process is clearly cheaper than 
litigation.   
(c) Costs of running the DRS 
 
InternetNZ emphasised a “cost versus benefit analysis” throughout the 
development of the DRS and was concerned to minimise the costs to name 
registrants who, in paying domain name registration fees, are the wider 
“taxpayer” or “public funder” of InternetNZ. 339  But it is difficult to determine 
the cost of the DRS from published data.  The DRS is not a separate line item in 
the annual reports of either InternetNZ or the DNCL between 2006 and 2009.  
The only published figure is the overall cost of the DNCL, which in the 2008-
2009 financial year is listed as $659,618.340  That will not represent the actual 
costs of running the DRS. 
 
The domain name registration fee is $15 per annum per domain name.  
The DRS is a very small part of InternetNZ’s overall system for managing the .nz 
domain name system.  My conclusion is that the DRS is paid for and provided to 
domain name registrants and that they are receiving a value for money, low cost 
and timely service.  This supports Glover’s assessment that the DRS “is generally 
functioning well and is attractive for complainants compared with litigation in the 
High Court”.341   
3 Analysis of Complaints 
 
The DNCL categorises complaints as “valid” or “deemed invalid”.  A 
complaint will as deemed invalid if: the complaint does not concern a .nz domain 
name, the complaint does not fall within the scope of the DRS, or the complainant 
did not comply with formalities (for example, did not send a signed copy of the 
complaint). 342   Valid complaints are categorised as: proceeded to mediation; 
proceeded to Expert determination; withdrawn; or continuing through the process.  
                                                 
339 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Task Force, above n 209. 
340 InternetNZ InternetNZ Annual Report 2008-2009 Advocating for the Next Generation 
(InternetNZ, Wellington, 2009). 
341 Glover, above n 32, at 40. 
342 Domain Name Commission Limited, above n 15. 
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Complaints are also categorised according to outcomes: settlement (“pre-
mediated” or “mediated”), name ordered transferred or cancelled, dispute 
dismissed, or dispute withdrawn.   
 
Using this data has been difficult for two reasons.  First, because it is not 
possible analyse across categories: for example to determine how many 
mediations resulted in transfer or cancellation of a domain name.  Second, the 
published data is not presented consistently.343  For this reason this analysis uses 
only the data published in annual reports.  This research also draws on published 
Expert decisions and a comment is needed as these are not published in 
accordance with any particular publication style guide. 344   As these are 
adjudicative decisions, publication should be consistent with the New Zealand 
Law Style Guide.345 
(a) The empirical evidence 
 
Estimates varied on the likely number of disputes.  Nominet estimated 1 
dispute per 5,000 registrations per year or about one per 2,000 over the life of its 
registrations.346  The New Zealand Law Society estimated “about 15 new disputes 
would arise annually” and noted that the DNC was receiving about 12 enquiries 
each month.347  Two submissions anticipated the number of disputes would not be 
large.348  One registrar noted receiving only one dispute in the previous two years, 
which was resolved without going to court.349   
                                                 
343 For example, the annual report data is supplemented by summary data for calendar years 2006-
2008, which is published on the DNCL website.  However, the summary data does not use a 
consistent calendar, with the “calendar” for 2009 being October 2008 to September 2009.  This 
overlaps with the summary data for 2008 (1 January to 31 December).  By calendar year there are 
154 valid complaints to 31 December, but there are 170 such complaints based on the annual 
reports.   
344 For example, some Experts have paragraph numbers in their decisions, some do not.  Some use 
key words to assist with searching across all decisions, some do not.  The case numbers are not 
consecutive and decisions are not expressly listed by consecutive, last in time, date order.  No hard 
copy publication appears to have been produced.  An examination of the cases shows that the most 
recent decisions are in fact posted at the top of the website list.  While decisions currently on appeal 
are highlighted, appeal decisions are not separately identified, but are instead noted under the 
“Decision” field in the table of decisions.   
345 Geoff McLay and Christopher Murray and Jonathan Orpin New Zealand Law Style Guide 
(Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2009). 
346 NZOC, above n 228, Submission 12 at 1. 
347 Ibid, Submission 6 at 1. 
348 Ibid, Submission 4 at 3. 
349 Ibid, Submission 16. 
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Between 1 June 2006 and March 2009 DNCL received 272 complaints.350  
There were 170 valid complaints,351 an average of 5 valid complaints per month 
over a 34 month period and an average of 56 per year.  This is much higher than 
any of the estimates.  The overall average number of complaints was 1 per 2079 
domain names, almost exactly what Nominet predicted.352   
 
Disputes therefore represent a fraction of total registered domain names.  
The domain name registration system works well and in the vast majority of cases 
there are no difficulties.  But there have been more complaints received than were 
estimated and the number of complaints is evidence there was a need for the DRS. 
 
This does not mean that all cases going to the DRS are ones that would 
otherwise have gone to court or which, conversely, might never have gone to 
court.  The DRS statistics could simply reflect the fact that the dispute resolution 
system was established and implemented after the early significant case law.  
Precedents had been established and all that was needed was a cheap alternative 
to ensure their application.  If so, this would mean that the DRS is dealing only 
with complaints that would otherwise have gone to litigation.  This point can be 
better assessed by considering the nature of the disputes the DRS is dealing with 
compared to those which were predicted at the time it was established and the 
scope of the test of unfair registration. 
 
This high number of invalid complaints is a concern.  Over a third (102) of 
all complaints are invalid.  It is difficult to ascertain what percentage of invalid 
complaints, if any, were subsequently resubmitted as valid complaints.  
Publication of the reasons for the various grounds of invalidity (not within 
jurisdiction of the DRS, inadequate information, failure to comply with DRS form 
or other requirements) would assist assessment of possible improvements.  
Several Experts comment on the quality of complaints and point, for example, to 
                                                 
350 Summary total from each annual report: 84 + 73 + 116 = 272.  The DNCL annual report for 
2009-2010 has not yet been published. 
351 The statistics appear to have been rounded for reporting purposes as the percentage of valid and 
invalid complaints cited in the Annual Reports do not correlate to whole numbers.   
352 At 31 March 2009 there were 353,430 registered .nz domain names.  Divided by the 170 valid 
complaints, this represents one dispute per 2079 registrations. 
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the requirements for complaints that are highlighted on the DNC website where 
complaints forms are available.  The 2007 policy review noted the issue of the 
quality of complaints, stating that “this issue is one of education.”353 
(b) Nature of the disputes  
 
Submissions on the DRS predicted that disputes would relate to trade 
marks, intellectual property disputes and cybersquatting.  Information about the 
nature of disputes that go to mediation is confidential.  But responses were filed in 
42 per cent of all cases in 2007-2008 and 36 per cent in 2008-2009.  This suggests 
that disputes were not simple cybersquatting but involved substantive rights in 
many cases. 
 
This dissertation considers 65 Expert decisions published between 13 
September 2006 and 31 January 2010.  All but one involve .co.nz domain names, 
the other involving .org.nz.  Ten complaints were dismissed, one ordering transfer 
was subsequently overturned on appeal, and one was cancelled.  Name transfer 
was ordered in 53 cases (81.5 per cent).  
 
The types of domain name disputes354  in the DRS cases fall into five 
broad groups:355 
 
Cybersquatting    17/65 (26%) 
Business or other prior relationship  14/65 (21.5%) 
First come first served   10/65 (15%) 
Business competition    14/65 (21.5%) 
Blocking registration    10/65 (15%) 
 
Seven of the cybersquatting cases involved the same respondent and 
different complainants.  In these cases well known registered trade marks were 
deliberately misspelled (or represented as phonetically similar to such marks or 
typographical errors of them) and registered as .nz domain names.  In one of these 
                                                 
353 Domain Name Commission Limited “.nz dispute Resolution Service – Policy Review” 
<www.dnc.org.nz>. 
354 See also Chapter II Domain Name Disputes. 
355 Total percentage is 99 due to rounding down. 
 110
cases, YPG IP Limited v E-Promote, 356  the Expert, Hon Robert Fisher QC, 
determined there was “undisputed evidence that Respondent has been repeatedly 
involved in similar cases and has been the subject of adverse decisions for the 
transfer of disputed Domain Names.”357  The Expert declared the Respondent to 
be in breach of the DRS policy provisions which relate to unfair registrations and 
evidence of a pattern of registrations relating to well known names or trade marks.  
The respondent, E-Promote, was involved in six other cases (Cases 235, 206, 203, 
283, and 263) and was clearly cybersquatting.   
 
 A much larger group of cases (43%) involved persons who were known to 
each other.  This included people who had been in a contractual relationship 
(employer/employee, franchisor/franchisee) or who were former or prospective 
business partners with the domain name registration being one aspect of a wider 
dispute.   
 
 A small but significant number of cases appear to be genuine instances of 
first come first served.  In these cases a person has for legitimate reasons, and 
with related rights, registered a domain name in which another person also has 
rights, but where the registrant is unaware of the rights of the other party.  In these 
cases the complainant was less likely to succeed in obtaining transfer (transfer 
was declined in four cases) and was only granted in another where it was clear the 
domain name had been allowed to expire inadvertently.  
 
 Reasons for blocking registrations varied.  In some cases the registration is 
made in an attempt to persuade the other party to transfer a domain name that the 
registrant actually wants,358 while in others it is simply to frustrate or annoy the 
would-be registrant.359  In some cases the blocking registration may be more like 
cybersquatting.  For example, at least three cases involved an opportunistic 
registrant hoping to sell the domain name back to a person or company with 
legitimate rights who had not yet registered the domain name or registered other 
                                                 
356 YPG IP Limited v E-Promote Case 434, 20 October 2009, Hon Robert Fisher QC. 
357 YPG IP Limited v E-Promote Case 434, 20 October 2009, Hon Robert Fisher QC, at Para 10.3. 
358 Carlton Haulage Ltd v John Burrill Case 340 Dunedin, 17 December 2008, Dr Clive Trotman. 
359 The Animal Welfare Institute of New Zealand v Animal Welfare in New Zealand Case 399 
Auckland, 11 August 2009, Mr Clive Elliott. 
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rights in New Zealand.360  These cases are included in the blocking category, 
rather than cybersquatting, because the registrant responded to the complaint and 
asserted rights or had some functional website which purported to be legitimate.  
However, the two categories can overlap. 
 
 Two major conclusions can be drawn.  First, domain name disputes arise 
for a wider variety of reasons than was anticipated by submitters in 2005.  
Disputes have involved trade marks and intellectual property rights. There is also 
a broad diversity of disputes, more varied than earlier litigation and with different 
sorts of cases than under the UDRP.  There have been cybersquatting cases, but 
these were mostly in 2006 and 2007 and are only a quarter of all cases.  
Cyberflight has not been a significant problem because domain names are locked 
as soon as a complaint is received.   
 
 Second, the volume of complaints has been almost double the highest 
estimate.  InternetNZ decided to have a New Zealand based dispute resolution 
service and it is being used in all likelihood because it is a local service.  More 
often than not, the parties know each other and are able to have the dispute dealt 
with quickly by an easily accessed New Zealand service.   
 
(c) Categories of complainants and respondents 
 
Disputes were expected to be by New Zealanders and relate to New 
Zealand registrants.  In fact, a higher than expected proportion of cases relate to 
overseas complainants and respondents.   
 
Complainants: 
New Zealand  46 
Overseas 19 (USA 5, United Kingdom 5, Australia 6, France 
1, England and Ireland (as co-complainants) 1. 
Uruguay 1). 
                                                 
360 Capital Conservator Group v Giordan Samuels Case 458 Dunedin 25 January 2010 Dr Clive 
Trotman; Insure & Go Insurance Services Limited v 1 cover NZ Limited Case 453, 25 January 2010, 
Mr Andrew Brown QC; and Wicked Campers v Escape Rentals Case 353, Auckland, 17 February 
2009, Hon Robert Fisher QC. 
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Respondents: 
New Zealand  41 
Overseas 24 (USA 12, Australia 6, United Kingdom 3, 
Canada 1, Malaysia 1, Belarus 1) 
 
One group of these cases relates to overseas registrants attempting to 
cybersquat on .co.nz registrations contrary to the rights of international companies 
with known and registered trade marks.  Another relates to Australian and New 
Zealand companies and individuals who are in competition for domain names or 
in contractual or other business conflicts over their registration.  A third group are 
competing but unknown to each other New Zealand companies and individuals 
(including the genuine cases of first come first served).  The result is a greater 
diversity of persons using the DRS than was anticipated.   
 
Given the number of overseas parties, further research on their experience 
of the DRS would be worthwhile.  A number of these parties are companies 
which are likely to have experience of cybersquatting in other jurisdictions and 
are also likely to have experience of complaints in relation to gTLDs under the 
UDRP.  Some may also have experience of the cost of litigation.  Given that the 
UDRP and WIPO administration were an option for New Zealand, it would be 
interesting to know how those overseas parties with experience of both compared 
the processes.  More research would also be useful with those New Zealand 
parties who may have experience of UDRP processes in relation to gTLDs and 
how the DRS process compares.   
(d) Settlement rates 
 
In 41 cases (24 per cent) the complaints were withdrawn.361  The reasons 
for withdrawal are not clear but include non-payment of the Expert fee.362  The 
Domain Name Commissioner has indicated that “all the withdrawn complaints are 
                                                 
361 Calculated by adding (22.2% of 54 in 2006-07 =) 12 + (26% of 48 in 07-08= ) 12  + (26% of 68 
in 08-09 = ) 17 = 41 out of 170 withdrawn. 
362 Domain Name Commission Annual Report 2007-2008 (InternetNZ, Wellington, 2008) at 11. 
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essentially unresolved with the complainant choosing not to pay the Expert 
fee”.363  This suggests the fee is a barrier. 
 
As regards disputes settled, “settlement” means that the complaint has 
been finally determined or otherwise dealt with.  The settlement rate is 
determined by subtracting the number of on-going (5) and withdrawn (41) 
cases364 from the total across the period: 170 – 46 = 124.  Of the remaining 124 
cases, 57 (46 per cent) settled at or before informal mediation,365 47 cases (28 per 
cent) were settled by Expert determination, 366  and one case was settled on 
appeal.367 In summary: 
 
24% of cases withdrawn or on-going 
46% settled at or before mediation 
28% settled by Expert decision 
1% settled by Appeal Panel decision 
 
Settlement is achieved in 3 out of 4 or approximately 75 per cent of cases.   
 
 The high rate of settlement suggests that the DRS is effective in getting a 
final determination.  Experts dismiss very few cases and a high proportion result 
in a mediated outcome.  The process produces actual outcomes with very few 
disputes left waiting for resolution.  There is a significant issue with the 
withdrawn category: if these are complainants who can not or do not pay the 
Expert determination fee, and it is clear that the Expert determinations are 
overwhelmingly in favour of complainants, it suggests that cost is a barrier.  This 
underscores the need to consider whether, where no response is filed to a 
complaint, some simpler process for name transfer could be developed in 
appropriate cases. 
 
 
                                                 
363 Debbie Monahan, Domain Name Commissioner, notes to the author on draft (23 March 2009). 
364 Calculated off the annual reports of which on the 08-09 year includes “ongoing”: period (7% of 
68 in 08-09 = 5+41=46) 
365 21 (06-07), + 21% of 48 = 10 (07-08) + 39% of 68 (08-09) = 26 = 57 total. 
366 10 (06-07) + 39% of 48 = 19 (07-08) + 27% of 68 (08-09) = 18 = 47 total. 
367 Totals add to 99 per cent (including the appeal) due to rounding. 
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(e) Expert decisions and appeals  
 
Experts ordered name transfer in 53 cases (81.5 per cent), dismissed ten 
complaints, and cancelled one domain name.  There has been only one appeal 
from an order for transfer.  On appeal the order for transfer cancelled, 
 
This transfer rate is high, suggesting that where an Expert is appointed 
there is usually a substantive issue of unfair registration.  The transfer rate also 
suggests that this part of the process is being used for substantive complaints, 
rather than frivolous or vexatious ones.  This in turn suggests that the dispute 
resolution process is being used for the right sorts of cases, namely, those where 
there is a legitimate dispute. This finding is verified by an analysis of those cases 
in which transfer was refused.  Four are in the category of genuine case of first 
come first served.  Transfer was still ordered in 6 of these cases including one 
case where the domain name had inadvertently expired.  But this category has the 
highest dismissed rate compared to all other cases. 
 
Glover assesses just the Expert decisions and concludes there is a name 
transfer rate of 82 per cent in 2008.  This compares to an 80 per cent transfer rate 
in cases that went to adjudication under the Nominet system in the United 
Kingdom.368 
 
 The one appeal was The Country Channel Ltd v The Country Channel 
Limited.369 The complaint was from a United Kingdom television company that 
was using the name “The Country Channel” for a channel offering programmes 
about rural life.  The complainant claimed that a New Zealand television channel 
offering the same service was in breach of its rights and likely to cause confusion.  
The Expert found for the complainant and transferred the .nz domain name.  The 
Panel overturned the Expert decision and ordered the name returned to the New 
Zealand registrant.  The Panel held the likelihood of confusion was small and that 
the complainant did not have rights in the name in New Zealand justifying the 
name transfer. 
                                                 
368 Glover, above n 32, at 37. 
369 The Country Channel Ltd v The Country Channel Limited (2009) DRS 334 Peterson QC. 
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The dearth of appeals indicates parties are abiding by the generally good 
quality decisions of Experts.  In a small number of cases, as with the withdrawn 
complaints, it might be that the $6,600 plus GST fee for this stage is a barrier. 
 
The lack of appeals may reflect the fact that the case law in New Zealand 
is well settled and the legal principles to be applied are clear.  Glover notes “that 
there have been no domain name dispute cases listed in Linxplus as having been 
decided since the DRS came into effect.” 370   In fact there have been some 
unreported cases relating to domain names, but these have been in contractual 
disputes where other legal issues were the primary causes of action371 or where 
domain name registration is adduced as evidence to support other legal claims.372  
In addition, jurisprudence on domain name disputes has developed under the DRS 
and its scope is wider than statute and common law based causes of action.  There 
have been no appeals to the Courts or appeals on a point of law during a 
complaint process. 
C Conclusion 
 
InternetNZ took more than five years to develop the DRS, yet complaint 
numbers have exceeded all estimates.  Very quickly the DRS became the first port 
of call for domain name disputes and High Court litigation has all but 
disappeared.   
 
Just as the special nature of the operation of the DNS infused the DRS 
policy development process with principles of transparency and a consultative 
approach so, too, is the administration of the DRS.  The DNCL draws on dispute 
resolution and subject matter experts and does not decide disputes itself.  All 
Expert decisions are published along with the names and qualifications of 
mediators and experts.   
                                                 
370 Ibid 37. 
371 Queenstown Management Services Ltd v St James Body Corporate 21507 & Ors (HC 
Invercargill CIV-2007-425-000347 10 August 2007). 
372 IMAX Corporation v Village Roadshow Corporation Ltd HC, Auckland, CIV-2005-404-003248 
29 March 2006. 
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While InternetNZ took a hands off approach to the management of the 
domain name space and the content of dispute resolution, the DNCL took a very 
hands on approach to dispute management.  This means that most complaints are 
resolved quickly (within 90 days of being received) and with a clear outcome.  
Administration of the DRS carries an inherent tension between the public good 
function of providing a complaints system and the private delivery of this by the 
organisation responsible for management of the .nz domain name space.  The 
DNCL has managed these tensions in a principled way by delivering the service 
in an fair, open, transparent and efficient manner.  Doing so is likely to have 
countered any risk of judicial or other intervention.   
 
The DRS is appropriate for the nature of disputes falling within its scope.  
While domain name disputes represent a fraction of total registered domain 
names, there have been more complaints than estimated.  The DRS is not flooded 
with complaints, but neither is it so tightly tailored that it captures only a subset of 
domain name disputes.  Intellectual property rights holders are not unfairly 
advantaged or disadvantaged by the DRS nor are the interests of rights holders are 
advancing over the interests of users.  Genuine cases of first come first served are 
generally upheld.  The conclusions support Williams’ comment that the DRS is 
attractive given the problems with litigation (particularly for overseas registrants), 
the difficulties in registering all possible domain name variations, and the 
deleterious effect of needing litigation in each case.373 
 
While there is evidence of system clog with the UDRP (to the extent of 
27,000 cases and 70 per cent being undefended),374 there is no evidence of this 
problem with the DRS.  This may reflect that it was better designed for purpose 
and that cybersquatting happens more often in relation to gTLD rather than 
ccTLD domain names.  But there is room for improvement in cases where no 
response is filed to a complaint, particularly if the filing fee for Expert 
determination is a barrier to seeking transfer in genuine cases.  More research 
                                                 
373 The Laws of New Zealand Intellectual Property (on line ed) at [322]. 
374 Joo, above n 38. 
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would also be useful with those New Zealand parties who may have experience of 
UDRP processes in relation to gTLDs and how the DRS process compares.   
 
The DRS offers a low cost alternative to litigation for domain name 
disputes.  Parties do not sacrifice quality and the service is cheaper and faster than 
litigation.   Improvements could be made, however, particularly in relation to the 
publication of complaints data and Expert decisions.  Some drafting 
improvements could be made to the provisions of the DRS and there are areas 
where further research would be desirable.  The next Chapter returns to the 
primary research questions and considers the implications of the dissertation 
findings. 
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CHAPTER VI  CONCLUSION 
 
A Introduction 
 
The Internet has transformed life as we know it.  The DNS is critical to the 
operation of the Internet, affecting why and how domain name disputes arise.  
New legal processes, such as the DRS have been created to deal with these 
disputes.  As certainty about rights in domain names has become more important, 
questions have been asked about the efficacy of these new processes and the 
integrity of those responsible for them.  This dissertation has taken a closer look 
at one aspect of Internet infrastructure in New Zealand.  This Chapter returns to 
the primary research questions, summarises the answers, and concludes with 
what, if any, wider implications there might be. 
B The Primary Research Questions 
 
The two primary research questions were: (a) is the DRS operating 
effectively? and (b) is InternetNZ is acting responsibly in the exercise of its DRS 
functions?  This dissertation developed criteria for assessing effectiveness in light 
of the special considerations that apply to domain name disputes and the fact that 
the DRS is a private adjudicative model of dispute resolution.  Criteria were 
developed and applied to both the development of the DRS by InternetNZ and its 
subsequent operation.   
1 The DRS is Operating Effectively 
 
The DRS is a high quality, value for money alternative to litigation for 
domain name disputes.  InternetNZ and DNCL take a hands off approach to the 
substance of disputes and a hands on approach to administration of the DRS.  The 
result is an efficient process that is transparent and based on high standards.  The 
DRS is appropriate for the nature of disputes falling within its scope, has process 
quality and rigour and is low cost and timely.  Many more people have used the 
DRS than was anticipated and for a wider range of cases.   
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2 InternetNZ is Acting Responsibly 
 
InternetNZ has responsibility for the management of the .nz domain name 
space.  That responsibility is carried out within a wider international system for 
operation of the DNS and policies must be coherent across that wider system.  
InternetNZ’s responsibility includes operating an asset that generates $6 million 
revenue per annum.  The DRS was set up, in part, to manage the risks for 
InternetNZ of managing the .nz domain name space.  But InternetNZ developed 
the DRS in a pragmatic and principled way. 
 
InternetNZ drew on the principles which underpin the DNS, namely 
developing policies by rough consensus, prioritising the rights of registrants, and 
emphasising transparency.  These principles, drawn from the international system, 
guided InternetNZ into a policy development process that was open and included 
a working group, discussion papers, and submissions. 
 
InternetNZ was also pragmatic, initially developing the DRS to stay ahead 
of international developments, rather than in response to them or because of 
difficulties in particular cases.  InternetNZ looked at existing dispute systems and 
whether these should, or could, be adapted to New Zealand.  Gradually the nature 
of disputes began to change. InternetNZ anticipated these changes well, 
developing a test of unfair registration which has ultimately enabled a much wider 
range of complaints to come before it than had previously gone to the Courts.   
3 Contribution to the Review of the DRS 
 
While the DRS operates effectively, there is room for some improvements.  
This dissertation has revealed several amendments that could usefully be made to 
the DRS.  The most significant of these is to consider improvements where no 
response is filed to a complaint.  Improvements could also be made to aspects of 
the DRS administration, for example, to publication of DRS information so that 
its effectiveness can continue to be monitored.  Expert decisions should be 
published in line with the New Zealand Law Style Guide.  More research could be 
done in some areas.  Recommendations in relation to these matters are attached in 
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an Appendix and will be submitted to the DRS review when it takes place in 
2010.  
C New Legal Processes 
 
The DRS is a new legal process.  Chapter II noted that dispute resolution 
theorists rightly raise questions over the private provision of justice on matters of 
public importance and whether this interferes with access to justice and the rule of 
law. 
 
This dissertation has shown that rather than moving away from legal 
principles, the development of a private dispute resolution system was 
strengthened by the public good nature of InternetNZ’s role and the manner in 
which InternetNZ carried out that role.  InternetNZ took its role seriously and was 
cautious, not moving unless there was a rough consensus on how best to proceed. 
The nature of the disputes led to a substantive test of unfair registration that went 
beyond existing law.  Such a shift could only be implemented credibly if this was 
done fairly and effectively.  The result, to paraphrase Sander and Goldberg,375 
was that InternetNZ created a forum that fitted the fuss.   
 
A well functioning DRS also lowers the risks of domain name fees being 
raised to cover costs, of liability being passed down the chain to registrars or 
registrants, and of stepping away from the principle of first-come first-served 
registration.  An effective dispute resolution system is therefore one 
counterweight in the system of mutual recognition and cooperation on which the 
.nz domain name space operates. 
D Wider Implications  
 
InternetNZ placed a great deal of emphasis on consensus and an open 
process.  In fact, the depth and breadth of participation was generally poor.  The 
process stalled when a small group of people assigned to carry out preliminary 
work failed to agree on whether and, if so, how to proceed.  The issue was later 
                                                 
375 Sander and Goldberg, above n 127. 
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picked by the Domain Name Commissioner who reinvigorated the process in light 
“shop front” issues with domain name disputes.  While the outcome was an 
effective system, concerns linger about the participatory nature of these processes.  
This dissertation highlights the risks inherent in such processes.   
 
InternetNZ is a membership organisation and, as such, its emphasis on 
rough consensus could change.  A failure to resist one particular set of interests or 
an actual or perceived lack of fairness could tip the delicate balance and lead to 
capture by particular interests.  Low levels of participation also creates a risk of 
the same individuals and organisations continuing to shape policy decisions and 
inevitably becoming invested in keeping the status quo.  Conversely new 
members could see an opportunity to generate revenue by increasing domain 
name fees.  There could be a disruption to the DNS causing the Internet to stop 
operating, bringing InternetNZ and its processes into sudden sharp relief, and 
leading to adverse public reaction or even intervention by government.  There are 
two implications.   
1 Human Rights 
 
The first implication is that the administration of the Internet is not a 
technical matter far removed from human rights considerations.  On the contrary, 
human rights lie at the very heart of these arrangements and there are new 
developments that will raise more human right issues.  For example, the 
introduction of non-Latin scripts for domain names gives effect to the right to 
freedom of expression and the right to language and it also raises the question of 
whether English will remain the main language of the Internet.376  The rights of 
sexual, religious, cultural and other minorities and wider political interests will be 
tested by ICANN proposals to authorise a wider range of gTLDs (for example, 
will .tibet be permitted and how will that be decided?).377  Policies adopted by 
ccTLD or gTLD managers for dealing with law enforcement requests (for example 
to block domain names or search WHOIS information) have implications for the 
right to be free from unlawful search and seizure.  My experience is that, despite 
                                                 
376 ICANN “Internationalised Domain Names (2009) <www.icann.org>. 
377 ICANN “New gTLDs: Draft Application Handbook” (2010) <www.icann.org>. 
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these implications, human rights advocates in New Zealand are still largely absent 
from such “technical” discussions.   
 
Instead, legal debates in New Zealand have largely been about what is on 
the Internet rather than who runs it.  But there are signs that this is changing.378  
Concerns about the Internet and child pornography, intellectual property rights 
violations, and enforcement of Court suppression orders have been raising new 
legal issues. 379   Increasingly these concerns are converging with concerns 
previously viewed as “technical”, namely how the Internet operates and who 
decides.  At the same time, public policy makers are increasingly looking to 
regulate content by using technology to regulate the use of technology.  
 
For example, proposals to prevent access to child pornography resulted in 
a system whereby ISPs can volunteer to filter the content of material that their 
clients can access when they use their ISP accounts to go online. 380   The 
proposals raised significant human rights issues.  Such voluntary systems are 
viewed by the State as one way to prevent the distribution of child 
pornography. 381   At the same time, action by the State to filter content is a 
troubling development, regardless of the objectionable nature of that content.382   
 
The proposal also raises questions about the use of filtering mechanisms 
by the State when these have not been authorised by an Act of Parliament and 
therefore subjected to wider public scrutiny.383  At the same time, the proposal 
that the State pass laws to regulate Internet content raises concerns given, as 
Menkel Meadow notes, the Internet is an otherwise unregulated environment.384  
Despite these clear human rights implications, the proposals received relatively 
little comment outside the Internet community. 
                                                 
378 Joy Liddicoat and Dr Judy McGregor Internet Section of draft Chapter on the Right to Freedom 
of Expression (Human Rights Commission, Wellington, publication forthcoming in 2010). 
379  See, for example, presentations by Professor Tony Smith, Steven Price and Robert Lithgow QC 
“R v The Internet” (2009) InternetNZ (Seminar Proceedings) <www.internetnz.net.nz>. 
380 Department of Internal Affairs Digital Child Exploitation Filtering System Code of Practice 
(2010). 
381 InternetNZ “InternetNZ: Child porn filter ‘not the answer’” (28 January 2010, Press Release). 
382 Tech Liberty New Zealand “Internet Filtering” (2010) <www.techliberty.org.nz>. 
383 Ibid. 
384 Menkel Meadow, above n 177. 
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 There are also new conversations about whether access to the Internet 
should be a human right.385  The Victoria University of Wellington InternetNZ 
CyberLaw Fellow for 2009-2010 is focussing on this very topic.386  While beyond 
the scope of this dissertation, the second area of implication arising from it may be 
relevant to those new conversations.   
2 The State and Internet Administration 
 
The second implication relates to administration of the Internet.  A key 
question is whether the role of InternetNZ and its responsibility for .nz domain 
name system should be formally, rather than informally, recognised by 
government.  The benefits and risks for all involved need careful consideration 
including: whether the State should have a role in .nz domain name management; 
whether, if so, it would do a better job than InternetNZ; and whether formal 
recognition would protect or erode the current transparency, accountability and 
quality of InternetNZ processes (however narrow their participatory base). 
 
In Oggi the Court observed that InternetNZ is serving a major public 
interest and acting in the public good.387  Baragwanath J went further:388 
 
It appears that the international scientific community has engaged in a 
disinterested fashion in furnishing to the world community an invaluable facility 
which has, to an extraordinary extent, the effect of promoting a major principle 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 to which New 
Zealand and many other states are party.  Article 19(2) provides: 
 
(2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall 
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or 
through any other media of his choice. 
                                                 
385 Best, above n 41. 
386 Jonathon Penney, InternetNZ Senior Research Fellow in Cyberlaw, Victoria University of 
Wellington. 
387 Above n 96. 
388 Ibid, at 635. 
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His Honour then stated that “Those values have received statutory 
expression in section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990”.  A further 
question arises, namely, whether the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 also 
applies to InternetNZ itself?  Section 3(b) provides that the Bill of Rights applies 
only to acts done “by any person or body in the performance of any public 
function, power or duty conferred or imposed on that person by or pursuant to 
law”.  This highlights whether the international system of mutual recognition and 
cooperation on which the DNS operates could be described as a function, power 
or duty conferred or imposed on InternetNZ by or pursuant to law.  More research 
is needed on this question and the implications need careful consideration. 
 
In the meantime, the accountability of InternetNZ rests on its integrity in 
managing the .nz domain name space in a manner which is consistent with the 
public good nature of its functions.  This dissertation has shown that InternetNZ is 
acting responsibly.  My own view is that more support for the role of InternetNZ 
is needed both so that InternetNZ remains accountable and to avoid unnecessary 
intervention with the management of the .nz domain name space. 
 
But a move to formal recognition by the State or State involvement in 
Internet administration does raise interesting questions.  For example, if access to 
the Internet is to be a human right, what are the State’s obligations to protect 
administration of the Internet and management of the .nz domain name system?  In 
light of the convergence of regulation of content and technical matters, is the State 
to be trusted with the day to day management of the DNS?  If international human 
rights standards do not apply to the technical operation of the Internet, then how is 
the State to be accountable for breaches of human rights in such administrative 
activities?  Just as significantly, how is InternetNZ to be accountable? 
 
Perhaps the answer lies, in the meantime, in the system of Internet 
administration remaining dependent on the collection of individuals and 
organisations and the system of mutual recognition and cooperation which have, 
so far, enabled the Internet to function without significant problems.  Such a 
system provides a compelling framework within which contests for control have 
sufficient counterweights to ensure no single person or organisation has total 
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autonomy.  There should not be any changes to this system unless the 
implications are clearly thought through. 
 
At the same time, this dissertation has revealed that the concept of the 
rights of registrants has a persuasive, if not constitutional, status among the 
collection of individuals and organisations responsible for the DRS and wider 
Internet administration.  Yet the parameters of this concept are not clear.  More 
research is needed on, for example, whether the State would consider the concept 
of the rights of registrants  as binding or even persuasive.  Parallels and links to the 
international human rights framework need to be explored.   
 
The United Nations responded to concerns about the Internet by 
establishing the Internet Governance Forum. The Forum supports the United 
Nations Secretary-General in carrying out the mandate of the World Summit on 
the Information Society, which is to promote discussion about the Internet and 
monitors Internet administration by ICANN and related organisations. 389   The 
Forum includes a Dynamic Coalition on the Internet Bill of Rights which:390 
 
… aims at understanding how traditional human rights can be adapted and 
expanded in the new online environment, and how they could be formalized in 
one or more documents that could act as a reference and be adopted as a code of 
conduct on an opt-in basis. 
 
The proposal for a Charter of Internet Rights or an Internet Bill of Rights 
should be explored.  In the meantime, more people need to understand how the 
Internet functions and participate in processes that affect it, including the .nz 
domain name system.  Risks of poor decision-making by InternetNZ, inappropriate 
intervention by government and breaches of human rights can be mitigated if more 
people know about and participate in Internet administration. 
 
 
                                                 
389 The Internet Governance Forum (2010) <www.intgovforum.org>. 
390 Ibid, at “Dynamic Coalition on the Internet Bill of Rights”. 
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APPENDIX 1 DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICE POLICY 
 
Ref:  DRS 
Title:  Dispute Resolution Service Policy 
Date Issued:  1 May 2008  
Status:  Current  
Version:  2.0  
  
This policy is issued by Domain Name Commission Limited (DNC or Domain Name 
Commission)  
on behalf of InternetNZ, Internet New Zealand Incorporated.  
DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICE POLICY 
1. Statement of Purpose 
1.1. This policy provides an alternative to the Courts in situations where two parties are in 
dispute over who the registrant of a .nz domain name should be. Part A defines the policy 
and Part B the procedure supporting the policy. 
 
2. Background  
2.1 InternetNZ has the ultimate responsibility within New Zealand for the .nz domain name 
space, and maintains a shared registry system (SRS) for the management of .nz domain 
name registrations. InternetNZ has appointed the Domain Name Commission ("DNC") to 
manage and administer the .nz domain name space on behalf of InternetNZ.  
2.2 A SRS establishes a single register for registering domain names and associated 
technical and administrative information. .nz Registry Services (NZRS) operates the 
register.  
2.3 The registration of domain names and modification of information associated with that 
name on the register can be effected only by authorised registrars. Registrars are 
responsible for the information they collect.  
2.4 Neither registrars nor the DNC get involved in disputes regarding who the true 
registrant of a domain name should be, but will undertake actions as directed either by the 
Courts or by the Experts under this policy.  
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2.5 This policy is one of the .nz policies that, as amended from time to time, all .nz 
registrants agree to be bound by when registering or renewing a .nz domain name.  
2.6 Thanks go to Nominet UK for their assistance in establishing the .nz Dispute 
Resolution Service.  
 
3. Definitions  
Appeal Panel means a panel appointed by the DNC under paragraph B17.7;  
Complainant means a third party who asserts to the DNC the elements set out in 
paragraph 4 of this Policy and according to the Procedure, or, if there are multiple 
complainants, the 'Lead Complainant' (see Procedure, paragraph B2.2);  
Complaint means a complaint submitted to the DNC by a Complainant under paragraph 
B2;  
Commencement of Dispute Resolution Service proceedings means the earliest date 
upon which the Complaint is deemed to have been received by the Respondent in 
accordance with paragraph B1.5;  
Conclusion of Dispute Resolution Service proceedings means the date on which the 
Parties are notified of a Decision or the date on which the parties settle the dispute;  
Days means, unless otherwise stated, any calendar day other than Saturday, Sunday or 
any public holiday in New Zealand;  
Decision means the decision reached by an Expert and where applicable includes 
decisions of an appeal panel;  
Dispute Resolution Service means the service provided by the DNC according to this 
Policy and the Procedure;  
Domain Name means a domain name directly registered in any second level domain of 
the .nz system;  
Domain Name Commission means Domain Name Commission Limited, a company 
wholly-owned by InternetNZ, responsible for the day to day oversight of the .nz domain 
name registration and management system;  
Domain Name Hijacking means using the Policy in bad faith in an attempt to deprive a 
registered domain-name holder of a domain name;  
DNC means the Domain Name Commission;  
Expert means a person appointed to resolve a Domain Name Dispute under paragraphs 
B7 or B17 of the Procedure;  
Informal Mediation means impartial mediation which is conducted under paragraph B6 to 
facilitate an acceptable resolution to the dispute;  
ISP means an internet service provider;  
InternetNZ means Internet New Zealand Incorporated, the organisation ultimately 
responsible for the .nz domain name space;  
NZRS means New Zealand Domain Name Registry Limited, trading as .nz Registry 
Services, the body which operates and manages the Register;  
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Party means a Complainant or Respondent and Parties has a corresponding meaning;  
Policy means this Policy;  
Procedure means the Procedure under this Policy for the conduct of proceedings under 
the Dispute Resolution Service;  
Register means the authoritative database and record of .nz domain names managed 
and operated by NZRS;  
Registrant means the entity entered in the Register as registrant in respect of the domain 
name;  
Registrar means the entity entered in the Register as registrar in respect of the domain 
name;  
Reply means a submission made to the DNC by a Complainant under paragraph B5;  
Respondent means the entity in whose name or on whose behalf a Domain Name is 
registered and against whom the Complainant makes a Complaint;  
Response means a submission made to the DNC by a Respondent under paragraph B4;  
Rights includes, but is not limited to, rights enforceable under New Zealand law. However, 
a Complainant will be unable to rely on rights in a name or term which is wholly descriptive 
of the Complainant's business;  
Unfair Registration means a Domain Name which either:  
i) was registered or otherwise acquired in a manner which, at the time when the 
registration or acquisition took place, took unfair advantage of or was unfairly detrimental 
to the Complainant's Rights; OR  
ii) has been, or is likely to be, used in a manner which took unfair advantage of or was 
unfairly detrimental to the Complainant's Rights; 
 
 
PART A - POLICY  
 
4. Dispute Resolution Service  
4.1 This Policy and Procedure applies to Respondents when a Complainant asserts to the 
DNC according to the Procedure, that: 
4.1.1 The Complainant has Rights in respect of a name or mark which is identical or 
similar to the Domain Name; and  
4.1.2 The Domain Name, in the hands of the Respondent, is an Unfair Registration. 
4.2 The Complainant is required to prove to the Expert that both elements are present on 
the balance of probabilities.  
4.3 The DNC recommends that both Parties use the guidance and help information, which 
can be found on the DNC website. 
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5. Evidence of Unfair Registration  
5.1. A non-exhaustive list of factors which may be evidence that the Domain Name is an 
Unfair Registration is set out in paragraphs 5.1.1 - 5.1.5:  
5.1.1. Circumstances indicating that the Respondent has registered or otherwise acquired 
the Domain Name primarily:  
(a) for the purposes of selling, renting or otherwise transferring the Domain Name to the 
Complainant or to a competitor of the Complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of 
the Respondent's documented out-of-pocket costs directly associated with acquiring or 
using the Domain Name;  
(b) as a blocking registration against a name or mark in which the Complainant has Rights; 
or  
(c) for the purpose of unfairly disrupting the business of the Complainant; or  
5.1.2. Circumstances demonstrating that the Respondent is using the Domain Name in a 
way which is likely to confuse, mislead or deceive people or businesses into believing that 
the Domain Name is registered to, operated or authorised by, or otherwise connected with 
the Complainant;  
5.1.3. The Complainant can demonstrate that the Respondent is engaged in a pattern of 
registrations where the Respondent is the registrant of domain names (under .nz or 
otherwise) which correspond to well known names or trade marks in which the 
Respondent has no apparent rights, and the Domain Name is part of that pattern;  
5.1.4. The Complainant can demonstrate that the Respondent has knowingly given false 
contact details to a Registrar and/or to the DNC; or  
5.1.5. The Domain Name was registered arising out of a relationship between the 
Complainant and the Respondent, and the circumstances indicate that it was intended by 
both the Complainant and the Respondent that the Complainant would be entered in the 
Register as the Registrant of the Domain Name;  
5.2. Failure on the Respondent's part to use the Domain Name for the purposes of e-mail 
or a web-site is not in itself evidence that the Domain Name is an Unfair Registration. 
5.3. There shall be a presumption of Unfair Registration if the Complainant proves that the 
Respondent has been found to have made an Unfair Registration in three (3) or more 
Dispute Resolution Service cases in the two (2) years before the Complaint was filed. This 
presumption can be rebutted (see paragraph 6.3).  
5.4. In making their decision, the Expert shall not take into account any evidence of acts or 
omissions amounting to unfair registration or use which occurred more than three (3) 
years before the date of the Complaint.  
 
6. How the Respondent may demonstrate in its Response that the Domain Name is 
not an Unfair Registration  
6.1. A non-exhaustive list of factors which may be evidence that the Domain Name is not 
an Unfair Registration is set out in paragraphs 6.1.1 - 6.1.4:  
6.1.1. Before being aware of the Complainant's cause for complaint (not necessarily the 
Complaint itself), the Respondent has:  
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(a) used or made demonstrable preparations to use the Domain Name or a Domain Name 
which is similar to the Domain Name in connection with a genuine offering of goods or 
services;  
(b) been commonly known by the name or legitimately connected with a mark which is 
identical or similar to the Domain Name;  
(c) made legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the Domain Name; or  
6.1.2. The Domain Name is generic or descriptive and the Respondent is making fair use 
of it in a way which is consistent with its generic or descriptive character;  
6.1.3. In relation to paragraph 5.1.5; that the Registrant's holding of the Domain Name is 
consistent with an express term of a written agreement entered into by the Parties; or  
6.1.4. In relation to paragraphs 5.1.3 and/or 5.3; that the Domain Name is not part of a 
wider pattern or series of registrations because the Domain Name is of a significantly 
different type or character to the other domain names registered by the Respondent.  
6.2. Fair use may include sites operated solely in tribute to or in criticism of a person or 
business.  
6.3. If paragraph 5.3 applies, to succeed the Respondent must rebut the presumption by 
proving in the Response that the registration of the Domain Name is not an Unfair 
Registration. 
 
7. Informal Mediation  
7.1. After the DNC has received the Parties' submissions under the Procedure (Part B), it 
will initiate and conduct a period of Informal Mediation under paragraph B6 of the 
Procedure.  
 
8. Without Prejudice  
8.1. Documents and information which are 'without prejudice' (or are marked as being 
'without prejudice') may be used in submissions and may be considered by the Expert 
except that the Expert will not consider such materials if:  
8.1.1. they are generated within Informal Mediation; or  
8.1.2. the Expert believes that it is in the interests of justice that the document or 
information be excluded from consideration. 
 
9. Appointment of Expert  
9.1. If an acceptable resolution cannot be achieved by Informal Mediation the DNC will 
notify the Parties that it will appoint an Expert when the Complainant has paid the 
applicable fees set out in paragraph B20.1 and within the time specified in paragraph B7.1. 
The Expert will come to a written Decision. 
 
10. Notification and Publication  
10.1. A Decision will be communicated to the Parties according to paragraph B16 and all 
Decisions will be published in full on the DNC website.  
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10.2. Fees are payable by the Complainant or otherwise according to paragraph B20 only 
if an acceptable resolution has not been achieved by Informal Mediation and once the 
DNC has notified the Parties that an Expert is to be appointed.  
10.3. Decisions may contain personal information, including the contact details of the 
Parties, and the Parties consent to personal information being displayed in this way.  
 
11. Exclusion of Liability  
11.1 None of InternetNZ, the DNC, NZRS, any Registrar, Expert or Mediator, nor any of 
those entities' councillors, officers, employees or servants (as applicable) shall be liable to 
a party for anything done or omitted, whether negligently or otherwise, in connection with 
any proceedings under the Dispute Resolution Service unless the act or omission is 
shown to have been in bad faith.  
 
12. Appeal, Repeat Complaints and Availability of Court Proceedings  
12.1. Either Party will have the right under paragraph B17 to appeal a Decision. The 
Appeal Panel will consider appeals on the basis of a full review of the matter and may 
review procedural matters.  
12.2. The DNC may refer questions of interpretation of the Policy and Procedure to the 
Appeal Panel. Any decision rendered as a result of this referral will not affect any Decision 
in any other previous proceedings under the Dispute Resolution Service.  
12.3. The DNC will publish Decisions of the Appeal Panel. Appeal Decisions will not be 
binding precedents, but will be of persuasive value to Experts in future decisions.  
12.4. The operation of the Dispute Resolution Service will not prevent either the 
Complainant or the Respondent from submitting the dispute to a New Zealand court or 
decision-making body of competent jurisdiction or to an arbitral tribunal of competent 
jurisdiction.  
12.5. If a Complainant has obtained a Decision in previous Dispute Resolution Service 
proceedings it will not be reconsidered by an Expert (but there may be rights of appeal, 
see paragraph 12.1 and paragraph B17). If the Expert finds that the Complaint is a 
resubmission of an earlier Complaint which has been resolved he or she shall reject the 
Complaint without a consideration of its merits.  
12.6. In determining whether a Complaint is a resubmission of an earlier Complaint, or 
contains a material difference that justifies the Complaint being heard the Expert shall 
consider the following questions:  
12.6.1. Are the Complainant, the Respondent and the Domain Name at issue the same as 
in the earlier case?  
12.6.2. Does the substance of the Complaint relate to acts that occurred prior to or 
subsequent to the close of submissions in the earlier case?  
12.6.3. If the substance of the Complaint relates to acts that occurred prior to the close of 
submissions in the earlier case, are there any exceptional grounds for the rehearing or 
reconsideration, bearing in mind the need to protect the integrity and smooth operation of 
the Policy and Procedure?  
12.6.4. Does the substance of the Complaint relate to acts that occurred subsequent to 
the close of submissions in the earlier Decision? (Acts on which the re-filed Complaint is 
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based should not be, in substance, the same as the acts on which the previous Complaint 
was based).  
12.7. A non-exhaustive list of examples which may be exceptional enough to justify a re-
hearing under paragraph 12.6.3 include:  
12.7.1. serious misconduct on the part of the Expert, a party, witness or lawyer;  
12.7.2. false evidence having been offered to the Expert;  
12.7.3. the discovery of credible and material evidence which could not have been 
reasonably foreseen or known for the Complainant to have included it in the evidence in 
support of the earlier Complaint;  
12.7.4. a breach of natural justice.  
 
13. Implementation of Expert Decisions  
13.1. The Expert's powers, as part of a Decision, include powers to direct that a domain 
name should be cancelled, transferred, suspended or otherwise amended. The Expert 
may not, however, make any orders directing a party to pay costs of the Dispute 
Resolution Service proceedings.  
13.2. If the Expert makes a Decision that a Domain Name registration should be cancelled, 
suspended, transferred or otherwise amended, the DNC will implement that Decision by 
causing any necessary changes to the Register to take place according to the process set 
out in paragraph B16. The details set out in the Complaint form will be used unless the 
Complainant specifies other details in good time.  
 
14. Other action  
14.1. The DNC will not cause any Domain Name registration to be cancelled transferred, 
activated, deactivated or otherwise changed except as set out in paragraphs 13 and B3.4 
and in accordance with the .nz policies, which are available on the DNC website.  
 
15. Transfers During a Dispute  
15.1. A Domain Name registration may not be transferred:  
15.1.1. if the electronic form of a Complaint has been received by the DNC Dispute 
Resolution Service staff and the matter is pending the receipt of a valid paper copy to 
confirm the Complaint (to a maximum of five (5) Days); or  
15.1.2. whilst Dispute Resolution Service proceedings are ongoing in relation to the 
Domain Name or for a period of ten (10) Days after the conclusion of Dispute Resolution 
Service proceedings, unless to the Complainant as a result of a settlement reached 
between the Parties whether or not pursuant to Informal Mediation; or  
15.1.3. whilst a court proceeding, other dispute resolution hearing or arbitration in respect 
of the Domain Name registration is ongoing in a New Zealand court or decision-making 
body of competent jurisdiction or arbitral tribunal of competent jurisdiction.  
15.2. The DNC may reverse any transfer of a Domain Name registration which does not 
comply with paragraph 15.1.  
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15.3. A Respondent may not without the Complainant's consent (which the Complainant 
will not unreasonably withhold) transfer the Domain Name to another Registrar whilst 
proceedings under the Dispute Resolution Service are ongoing in relation to the Domain 
Name or for a period of ten (10) Days after the conclusion of Dispute Resolution Service 
proceedings.  
 
16. Modifications to the Policy and Procedure of the Dispute Resolution Service  
16.1. The Internet is an emerging and evolving medium and the regulatory and 
administrative framework under which it operates is constantly developing. For these 
reasons the DNC reserves the right to make reasonable modifications to the Policy and 
Procedure at any time. Except where the DNC is acting in pursuance of a statutory 
requirement or a court order, substantive changes will be implemented following a process 
of open public consultation. Each such change will be published in advance (where 
practicable, 30 calendar days in advance) on the DNC web site: 
http://www.dnc.org.nz/policies and will become binding and effective upon the date 
specified therein.  
16.2. In any Dispute Resolution Service proceedings, the Parties will be bound by the 
Policy and Procedure which are current at the commencement of Dispute Resolution 
Service proceedings, until the conclusion of the Dispute Resolution Service proceedings.  
 
17. General Information  
17.1. If anyone has any questions regarding this document they should email 
policies@dnc.org.nz  
 
 
PART B - PROCEDURE  
 
B1. Communication  
B1.1. The DNC will send a Complaint (see paragraph B2) to the Respondent by:  
B1.1.1. sending the Complaint by post, fax or e-mail to the Respondent at the contact 
details shown as the registrant or other contacts in the Register for the Domain Name in 
dispute;  
The DNC may also, at its discretion use any or all of the following means:  
B1.1.2. sending the Complaint in electronic form (including attachments to the extent 
available in that form) by e-mail to:  
a) postmaster@<the Domain Name in dispute>;  
b) if the Domain Name resolves to an active web page (other than a generic page which 
the DNC concludes is maintained by an ISP for parking Domain Names), to any e-mail 
address shown or e-mail links on that web page so far as this is practicable; or  
B1.1.3. sending the Complaint to any addresses provided to the DNC by the Complainant 
under paragraph B2.3.3 so far as this is practicable.  
B1.2. Except as set out in paragraph B1.1 above, all written communication to a Party or a 
Party's representative under the Policy or this Procedure shall be made by fax, post or e-
mail.  
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B1.3. Communication shall be made in English. E-mail communications should be sent in 
plain text so far as this is practicable.  
B1.4. During the course of proceedings under the Dispute Resolution Service, if either 
Party wishes to change its contact details it must notify the DNC of all changes.  
B1.5. Except as otherwise provided in this Procedure or as otherwise decided by the DNC 
or if appointed, the Expert, all communications provided for under this Procedure shall be 
deemed to have been received:  
B1.5.1. if sent by facsimile, on the date transmitted; or  
B1.5.2. if sent by post, on the second Day after posting;  
B1.5.3. if sent via the Internet, on the date that the communication was transmitted;  
B1.5.4. and, unless otherwise provided in this Procedure, the time periods provided for 
under the Policy and this Procedure shall be calculated accordingly.  
B1.6. Any communication (except for communications relating to Informal Mediation) 
between:  
B1.6.1. the DNC and any Party shall be copied by the DNC to the other Party and if 
appointed, the Expert, subject to paragraph B12; and  
B1.6.2. a Party to another Party shall be copied by the sender to the DNC and the DNC 
will copy such correspondence to the Expert, if appointed.  
 
B2. The Complaint  
B2.1. Any person or entity may submit a Complaint to the DNC in accordance with the 
Policy and this Procedure. In exceptional circumstances, the ability to accept complaints 
may have to be suspended. If so, a message will be posted to that effect on the DNC 
website which will indicate when the suspension is likely to be lifted.  
B2.2. More than one person or entity may jointly make a Complaint. Where this occurs the 
joint Complainants must:  
B2.2.1. all sign the hard copy of the Complaint (or have it signed on their behalf);  
B2.2.2. specify one of the Complainants, or a single representative, who will be the 'Lead 
Complainant' who will receive correspondence on behalf of all the Complainants and is 
entitled to act on behalf of them all (e.g. in Informal Mediation); and  
B2.2.3. specify which Complainant the Complainants wish to become the sole registrant of 
each Domain Name(s) which are the subject of the Complaint if the Complainants are 
successful (this does not bind the Expert).  
B2.3. The Complainant must send the Complaint to the DNC in hard copy and (except to 
the extent not available for attachments) in electronic form. The Complaint shall:  
B2.3.1. not exceed 2000 words (not including the text set out in paragraph B2.3.9 and 
annexes);  
B2.3.2. specify whether the Complainant wishes to be contacted direct or through an 
authorised representative, and set out the e-mail address, telephone number, fax number 
and postal address which should be used;  
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B2.3.3. set out any of the Respondent's contact details which are known to the 
Complainant;  
B2.3.4. specify the Domain Name(s) which is the subject of the dispute and the name or 
mark which is identical or similar to the Domain Name and in which the Complainant 
asserts it has Rights;  
B2.3.5. describe in accordance with the Policy the grounds on which the Complaint is 
made including in particular: what Rights the Complainant asserts in the name or mark; 
why the Domain Name should be considered to be an Unfair Registration in the hands of 
the Respondent; and any applicable aspects of paragraph 5 of the Policy above, as well 
as any other grounds which support the Complainant's assertion;  
B2.3.6. specify whether the Complainant is seeking to have the Domain Name transferred, 
suspended, cancelled or otherwise amended;  
B2.3.7. tell the DNC whether any legal proceedings have been commenced or terminated 
in connection with the Domain Name which is the subject of the Complaint;  
B2.3.8. state that the Complainant will submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the New 
Zealand courts with respect to any legal proceedings seeking to reverse the effect of a 
Decision requiring the suspension, cancellation, transfer or other amendment to a Domain 
Name registration, and that the Complainant agrees that any such legal proceedings will 
be governed by New Zealand law;  
B2.3.9. conclude with the following statement followed by the signature of the 
Complainant or its authorised representative:  
"I, the Complainant agree that my claims and remedies concerning the registration of the 
Domain Name, the dispute, or the dispute's resolution shall be solely against the 
Respondent and that none of InternetNZ , the DNC, NZRS, any Registrar, Expert or 
Mediator, nor any of those entities' councillors, officers, employees or servants (as 
applicable) shall be liable for anything done or omitted in connection with any proceedings 
under the Dispute Resolution Service unless the act or omission is shown to have been in 
bad faith.";  
"The information contained in this complaint is to the best of my knowledge true and 
complete. This complaint is not being presented in bad faith, including not being for a 
dominant purpose other than resolving the issue of who the proper registrant of a Domain 
Name is, and the matters stated in this complaint comply with the Policy and Procedure 
and applicable law.";  
"I agree to the terms of the Dispute Resolution Services Policy and Procedure, and agree 
to be bound by any resulting Decision, subject to any rights of review or appeal."  
and  
"I acknowledge that if the Expert orders a transfer of the domain name(s) to me or at my 
request, I will need to select an Authorised .nz Registrar to provide me with the 
necessary .nz registry and other services in respect of domain name(s). I will advise the 
DNC of my decision on request." 
B2.3.10. attach four (4) copies of any evidence on which the Complainant relies including 
correspondence and any trade mark registration and/or evidence of use of or reputation in 
a name or mark, together with an index of the material attached.  
B2.4. The Complaint may relate to more than one Domain Name, provided that those 
Domain Names are registered in the name of the Respondent.  
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B3. Notification of Complaint  
B3.1. The DNC will check that the Complaint sufficiently complies with the Policy and, if 
satisfied, this Procedure and, if so, will forward it to the Respondent together with an 
explanatory coversheet within three (3) Days of the receipt of the hard copy of the 
Complaint.  
B3.2. If the DNC considers that the Complaint does not sufficiently comply with the Policy 
and this Procedure, the Complainant will be promptly notified of the deficiencies identified. 
The Complainant shall have three (3) Days from receipt of notification within which to 
correct the deficiencies and return the Complaint, failing which the DNC will deem the 
Complaint to be withdrawn. This will not prevent the Complainant submitting a different 
Complaint.  
B3.3. The DNC will promptly notify the Parties of the date of Commencement of Dispute 
Resolution Service proceedings.  
B3.4. On receipt of the complaint the DNC will cause the domain name to be locked until 
the conclusion of the proceedings, at which time the domain name will be unlocked.  
 
B4. The Response  
B4.1. Within fifteen (15) Days of the date of commencement of Dispute Resolution Service 
proceedings, the Respondent shall submit a Response, if they choose to do so.  
B4.2. The Respondent must send the Response to the DNC signed, and in hard copy and 
(except to the extent not available for attachments) in electronic form at the addresses set 
out in the explanatory coversheet. The Response shall:  
B4.2.1. not exceed 2000 words (not including the text set out in paragraph B4.2.5 and 
annexes);  
B4.2.2. include any grounds that the Respondent wishes to rely upon to rebut the 
Complainant's assertions under paragraph B2.3.5 including any relevant factors set out in 
paragraph 6 as well as any other factors which rebut the Complainant's assertions  
B4.2.3. specify whether the Respondent wishes to be contacted direct or through an 
authorised representative, and set out the e-mail address, telephone number, fax number 
and postal address which should be used;  
B4.2.4. tell the DNC whether any legal proceedings have been commenced or terminated 
in connection with the Domain Name(s) which is the subject of the Complaint;  
B4.2.5. conclude with the following statement followed by the signature of the Respondent 
or its authorised representative:-  
"The information contained in this response is to the best of the Respondent's knowledge 
true and complete and the matters stated in this response comply with the Policy and 
Procedure and applicable law."; and  
B4.2.6. attach four (4) copies of any evidence on which the Respondent relies including 
correspondence and any trade mark registration and/or evidence of use of or reputation in 
a name or mark together with an index of the material attached.  
B4.3. Within three (3) Days following the receipt of the signed copy of the Response, the 
DNC will forward the Response to the Complainant.  
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B4.4. If the Respondent does not submit a Response, the Parties will be notified that an 
Expert will be appointed on receipt from the Complainant of the applicable fees according 
to paragraph B20 and in the absence of exceptional circumstances.  
 
B5. Reply by the Complainant  
B5.1. Within five (5) Days of receiving the Response from the DNC, the Complainant may 
submit a Reply to the Respondent's Response, which shall not exceed 2000 words (not 
including annexes). The Reply should be confined to answering any new points raised in 
the Response and not previously dealt with in the Complaint. The expert will not be 
obliged to consider any other material included in the Reply.  
B5.2. If a Reply is submitted it must be submitted in signed, hard copy (including four (4) 
copies of all annexes) and as far as possible in electronic form. If the Complainant does 
not submit a Reply within five (5) Days the DNC will proceed to Informal Mediation.  
 
B6. Informal Mediation  
B6.1. No Informal Mediation will occur if the Respondent does not file a Response. Within 
three (3) Days of the receipt of the Complainant's Reply (or the expiry of the deadline to 
do so), the DNC will arrange for Informal Mediation to be conducted. Informal Mediation 
will be conducted in a manner which the DNC, at its sole discretion, considers appropriate. 
The DNC will appoint a Mediator on a rotational basis from its list of Mediators.  
B6.2. A Mediator may only be a person named in the list of Mediators which the DNC will 
maintain and publish along with the Mediators' qualifications. No Mediators' appointment 
will be challenged on the grounds that they are insufficiently qualified. Once the DNC has 
appointed the Mediator, the Parties will be notified of the name of the Mediator appointed.  
B6.3. Negotiations conducted between the Parties during Informal Mediation (including 
any information obtained from or in connection to negotiations) shall be confidential as 
between the Parties, the mediator and the DNC. Any such information will not be shown to 
the Expert. Neither the DNC nor the Mediator nor any Party may reveal details of such 
negotiations to any third parties unless a court or decision-making body of competent 
jurisdiction orders disclosure, or the DNC, the Mediator or either Party are otherwise 
required to do so by applicable laws or regulations. Neither Party shall use any information 
gained during mediation for any ulterior or collateral purpose or include it in any 
submission likely to be seen by any court or decision-making body of competent 
jurisdiction or arbitral tribunal of competent jurisdiction in this dispute or any later dispute 
or litigation.  
B6.4. Notwithstanding paragraph B6.3, the Parties may refer to the fact of Informal 
Mediation in subsequent proceedings before any New Zealand court or decision-making 
body of competent jurisdiction or arbitral tribunal of competent jurisdiction in this dispute or 
any later dispute or litigation.  
B6.5. If the Parties reach a settlement during Informal Mediation then the existence, 
nature and terms of the settlement shall be confidential as between the Parties, the 
mediator and the DNC, unless the Parties specifically agree otherwise, a court or 
decision-making body of competent jurisdiction orders otherwise, or applicable laws or 
regulations require it.  
B6.6. No binding verbal agreements can be reached as part of the Informal Mediation: any 
settlement reached by the Parties must be in writing to be enforceable.  
B6.7. The DNC will notify the Registrar of a settlement reached in accordance with B6.5 
where that settlement requires the Registrar to take action to give effect to that settlement.  
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B6.8. Any action to be taken by the Registrar will be completed by it as soon as possible, 
and no later than three days, after receiving notice from the DNC.  
B6.9. Where the settlement requires a change of registrant, the new registrant is deemed 
to have accepted the Registrar's standard terms and conditions.  
B6.10. If the Parties do not achieve an acceptable resolution through Informal Mediation 
within ten (10) Days, the DNC will send notice to the Parties that it will appoint an Expert 
when the Complainant has paid the applicable fees set out under paragraph B20.1 within 
the time limit specified in paragraph B7.1. The Expert will be told whether or not Informal 
Mediation occurred, but will not be told what happened during Informal Mediation or why it 
failed to resolve the dispute.  
B6.11. No Party may ask the DNC (including its officers, employees, contractors, agents 
and any Expert or Mediator) to reveal information or materials gained as a result of any 
Informal Mediation under the Dispute Resolution Service unless such disclosure has been 
ordered by a court or decision-making body of competent jurisdiction. Neither Party shall 
call the Expert, Mediator or the DNC (including its officers, employees, contractors, or 
agents) as a witness (either in person or to produce documents or other materials) in any 
proceedings which arise from, or are in connection with, the matters discussed in the 
mediation.  
 
B7. Appointment of the Expert and Timing of Decision  
B7.1. If the DNC does not receive the Complainant's request to refer the matter to an 
Expert together with the applicable fees within ten (10) Days of the Complainant's receipt 
of the notice referred to in paragraph B6.10, the Complaint will be deemed to have been 
withdrawn. This will not prevent the Complainant submitting a different Complaint.  
B7.2. Within five (5) Days of the receipt of the applicable fees from the Complainant the 
DNC will appoint an Expert on a rotational basis from its list of Experts.  
B7.3. An Expert may only be a person named in the list of Experts which the DNC will 
maintain and publish along with the Experts' qualifications. No Expert's appointment will 
be challenged on the grounds that they are insufficiently qualified. Once the Expert has 
been appointed, the Parties will be notified of the name of the Expert appointed and the 
date by which, except in exceptional circumstances, the Expert will forward his or her 
Decision to the DNC.  
 
B8. Impartiality and Independence  
B8.1. The Mediator and/or Expert shall be impartial and independent and both before 
accepting the appointment and during the proceedings will disclose to the DNC any 
circumstances giving rise to justifiable doubt as to their impartiality or independence. The 
DNC will have the discretion to appoint a substitute Mediator or Expert if necessary in 
which case the timetable will be adjusted accordingly.  
 
B9. Communication Between Parties and the Expert  
B9.1. A Party and the Expert must not communicate directly. All communication between 
a Party and the Expert must be made through the DNC.  
 
B10. Transmission of the File to the Expert  
B10.1. The DNC will forward the file except for documents relating to Informal Mediation to 
the Expert as soon as the Expert is appointed.  
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B11. General Powers of the DNC and the Expert  
B11.1. The DNC, or the Expert if appointed, may in exceptional cases extend any period 
of time in proceedings under the Dispute Resolution Service.  
B11.2. The Expert shall determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of 
the evidence.  
B11.3. The DNC shall decide a request by a Party to consolidate multiple Domain Name 
disputes in accordance with the Policy and this Procedure.  
 
B12. Further Statement  
B12.1. In addition to the Complaint, the Response and if applicable the Reply, any appeal 
notice and appeal notice response, the Expert may request further statements or 
documents from the Parties. The Expert will not be obliged to consider any statements or 
documents from the Parties which he or she has not received according to the Policy or 
this Procedure or which he or she has not requested. The Expert may request that a 
further statement be limited to a defined topic, and the Expert will not be obliged to 
consider any material beyond that requested.  
B12.2. Any communication with the DNC intended to be passed to the Expert which is not 
part of the standard process (e.g. other than a Complaint, Response, Reply, submissions 
requested by the Expert, appeal notice or appeal notice response) is a 'non-standard 
submission'. Any non-standard submission must contain as a separate, first paragraph, a 
brief explanation of why there is an exceptional need for the non-standard submission. 
The DNC will pass this explanation to the Expert and the Respondent, and the remainder 
will only be passed to the Expert and the Respondent at the Expert's sole discretion. If 
there is no explanation, the DNC may not pass on the document or information.  
 
B13. In Person Hearings  
B13.1. No in person hearings (including hearings by conference call, video conference 
and web conference) will be held unless the Expert determines in his or her sole discretion 
and in exceptional cases, that such a hearing is necessary to enable him or her to come to 
a Decision.  
 
B14. Default  
B14.1. If the DNC finds that a submission by a Party exceeds the word limit, the 
submission will be returned to that Party who will within three (3) Days return a submission 
which complies with the word limits. If the DNC does not receive the submission back 
within the deadline from:  
B14.1.1. the Complainant, the Complaint will be deemed to have been withdrawn, which 
will not stop the Complainant from submitting a different Complaint; or  
B14.1.2. the Respondent, the Parties will be notified that the Expert will be appointed 
when the Complainant has paid the applicable fees set out in paragraph B20 and in the 
absence of exceptional circumstances. Once appointed the Expert will decide the dispute 
based upon the Complaint and evidence attached to it.  
B14.2. If, once the Expert has been appointed, and in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances, a Party does not comply with any time period laid down in the Policy or 
this Procedure, the Expert will proceed to a Decision on the Complaint. If the Expert has 
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not been appointed the DNC shall take any action which it deems appropriate in its sole 
discretion, unless prescribed by this Procedure.  
B14.3. If, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, a Party does not comply with any 
provision in the Policy or this Procedure or any request by the DNC or the Expert, the 
Expert will draw such inferences from the Party's non compliance as he or she considers 
appropriate.  
 
B15. Expert Decision  
B15.1. The Expert will decide a Complaint on the basis of the Parties' submissions, the 
Policy and the Procedure.  
B15.2. Unless exceptional circumstances apply, an Expert shall forward his or her 
Decision to the DNC within ten (10) Days of his or her appointment pursuant to paragraph 
B7.  
B15.3. The Decision shall be in writing and signed by the Expert, provide the reasons on 
which it is based, indicate the date on which it was made, the place the Decision was 
made and identify the name of the Expert.  
B15.4. If the Expert concludes that the dispute is not within the scope of paragraph 4, he 
or she shall state that this is the case. If, after considering the submissions, the Expert 
finds that the Complaint was brought in bad faith, for example in an attempt at Domain 
Name Hijacking, the Expert shall state this finding in the Decision. If the Complainant is 
found on three separate occasions within a 2-year period to have brought a Complaint in 
bad faith, the DNC will not accept any further Complaints from that Complainant for a 
period of 2 years from the date of the third such Decision.  
 
B16. Communication of Decision to Parties and Implementation of Decision  
B16.1. Within three (3) Days of the receipt of a Decision from the Expert, the DNC will 
communicate the full text of the Decision to each Party and the date for the 
implementation of the Decision in accordance with the Policy.  
B16.2. The DNC will publish the full Decision and the date that any action which the 
Decision requires will be taken, on the DNC website.  
B16.3. If the Expert makes a Decision that a Domain Name registration should be 
cancelled, suspended, transferred or otherwise amended, the DNC will implement that 
Decision by causing the necessary changes to be made to the Register after ten (10) 
Days of the date that the parties were notified, unless, during the ten (10) Days following 
the date that the parties were notified the DNC receives from either Party:  
B16.3.1. an appeal or statement of intention to appeal complying with paragraph B17, in 
which case the DNC will take no further action in respect of the Domain Name until the 
appeal is concluded; or  
B16.3.2. official documentation showing that the Party has issued and served legal 
proceedings before a New Zealand Court or decision-making body of competent 
jurisdiction, or an arbitral tribunal of competent jurisdiction against the other Party in 
respect of the domain name. In this case, the DNC will take no further action in respect of 
the Domain Name unless it receives:  
a). evidence which satisfies it that the Parties have reached a settlement; or  
b). evidence which satisfies it that such proceedings have been disposed of  
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B16.3.3. In the event of the DNC being satisfied that a judgment, decision or award has 
been made directing or requiring that a Domain Name be cancelled, suspended, 
transferred or otherwise amended, the DNC will implement that Decision by causing any 
necessary changes to the Register to take place and the dispute resolution service 
proceeding will be terminated.  
 
B17. Appeal  
B17.1. Either Party shall have the right to appeal a Decision by submitting either:  
B17.1.1. a statement of the intention to appeal (see paragraph B17.2), plus the non-
refundable deposit (see paragraph B20.4), which must be followed within fifteen (15) Days 
by an appeal notice (see paragraph B17.3) and the balance of the fee (see paragraph 
B20.4); or  
B17.1.2. an appeal notice (see paragraph B17.3) and the whole fee (see paragraph 
B20.4).  
B17.2. A statement of intention to appeal should only contain sufficient information to 
make it clear that an appeal is requested. The statement of intention to appeal should not 
contain the actual grounds or reasons for appeal, and the panel of Experts will not be 
obliged to consider any such grounds or reasons.  
B17.3. An appeal notice should not exceed 1000 words, should set out detailed grounds 
and reasons for the appeal, but shall contain no new evidence or annexes.  
B17.4. Within three (3) Days of the receipt of the:  
B17.4.1. statement of the intention to appeal and deposit; or  
B17.4.2. appeal notice and the full fee,  
the statement of intention to appeal or appeal notice (as the case may be) will be 
forwarded to the other Party.  
B17.5. Within ten (10) Days of receiving the appeal notice from the DNC, the other Party 
may submit an appeal notice response (paragraph B17.6).  
B17.6. An appeal notice response must not exceed 1000 words, should set out detailed 
grounds and reasons why the appeal should be rejected but should contain no new 
evidence or annexes.  
B17.7. Following the filing of an appeal notice response (or the expiry of the deadline to 
do so) an appeal panel of three Experts will be appointed. The test of impartiality shall 
apply to each appeal Expert. Subject to that qualification the appeal panel shall consist of:  
B17.7.1. the Chair of the group of Experts, or at his or her discretion, an Expert of his or 
her choice; and  
B17.7.2. the next available two Independent Experts appointed by rotation from the list.  
B17.8. The appeal panel should not normally take into consideration any new evidence 
presented in an appeal notice or appeal notice response unless they believe that it is in 
the interests of justice to do so.  
B17.9. So far as is appropriate in the circumstances paragraphs B15 and B16 apply 
equally to appeal Decisions, except that:  
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B17.9.1. appeal Decisions should be returned by the appeal panel to the DNC within thirty 
(30) Days of the appointment of the last panellist, but this deadline may be extended by up 
to ten (10) Days by agreement with the DNC; and  
B17.9.2. appeal Decisions cannot be subject to any appeal within the Dispute Resolution 
Service.  
 
B18. Settlement or Other Grounds for Termination  
B18.1. If, before a Decision is made the Parties agree and notify the DNC of a settlement, 
whether or not pursuant to Informal Mediation, proceedings under the Dispute Resolution 
Service will terminate.  
B18.2. If, before a Decision is made, it becomes unnecessary or impossible to continue 
proceedings under the Dispute Resolution Service for any reason, the DNC will terminate 
proceedings under the Dispute Resolution Service unless a Party raises justifiable 
grounds for objection within a period of time which the DNC will determine and notify the 
Parties of.  
 
B19. Effect of Court Proceedings  
B19.1. If the DNC is satisfied that legal proceedings relating to a Domain Name which is 
the subject of a Complaint are issued before a New Zealand court or decision-making 
body of competent jurisdiction or an arbitral tribunal of competent jurisdiction, before or 
during the course of proceedings under the Dispute Resolution Service and are brought to 
its attention, it will suspend the Dispute Resolution Service proceedings, pending the 
outcome of the legal proceedings.  
B19.2. A Party must promptly notify the DNC if it initiates or becomes aware of legal 
proceedings in a court or decision-making body of competent jurisdiction or arbitral 
tribunal of competent jurisdiction relating to a Domain Name which is the subject of a 
Complaint during the course of proceedings under the Dispute Resolution Service.  
B19.3. Either party may request, before or during the Dispute Resolution Service, an 
interim measure of protection from a Court.  
 
B20. Fees  
B20.1. The applicable fees in respect of the referral of proceedings under the Dispute 
Resolution Service to an Expert are $1,800 plus GST for disputes involving 1-5 Domain 
Names and only one Complainant. For disputes involving 6 or more Domain Names, 
and/or more than one Complainant, the DNC will set a fee in consultation with the 
Complainant. Fees are calculated on a cost-recovery basis, and are passed on in their 
entirety to the Expert(s). The DNC does not charge for its mediation or administration 
services in respect of the Dispute Resolution Service.  
B20.2. Fees are payable by the Complainant only if an acceptable resolution has not been 
achieved after Informal Mediation and the DNC notifies the Parties that an Expert is to be 
appointed.  
B20.3. In exceptional circumstances, for example if an in-person hearing is held, the DNC 
will request that the Parties pay additional fees to be agreed between it, the Parties and 
the Expert.  
B20.4. The applicable fees for the submission of an appeal are $6,600 + GST. If the 
option is used to pay a deposit and the balance, the deposit is $700 + GST and non-
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refundable, and the balance is $5,900 + GST. If the deposit is paid, and the balance of the 
fee and/or appeal notice are not filed in time, that appeal is deemed withdrawn and the 
case will be closed.  
 
B21. Exclusion of Liability  
B21.1. None of InternetNZ , the DNC, NZRS, any Registrar, Expert or Mediator, nor any of 
those entities' councillors, officers, employees or servants (as applicable) shall be liable to 
a party for anything done or omitted, whether negligently or otherwise, in connection with 
any proceedings under the Dispute Resolution Service unless the act or omission is 
shown to have been in bad faith.  
 
B22. Modifications to the Policy and Procedure of the Dispute Resolution Service  
B22.1. The Internet is an emerging and evolving medium and the regulatory and 
administrative framework under which the DNC operates is constantly developing. For 
these reasons the DNC reserves the right to make reasonable modifications to the Policy 
and Procedure at any time. Except where the DNC is acting in pursuance of a statutory 
requirement or a court order, substantive changes will be implemented following a process 
of open public consultation. Each such change will be published in advance (where 
practicable, 30 calendar days in advance) on the DNC web 
site: http://www.dnc.org.nz/policies and will become binding and effective upon the date 
specified therein.  
B22.2. The Parties will be bound by the Policy and Procedure which are current at the 
commencement of the Dispute Resolution Service proceedings until the conclusion of the 
Dispute Resolution Service proceedings.  
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APPENDIX 2 SUBMISSIONS ON 2004 CONSULTATION PAPER 
 
Number Name 
1 Domainz Limited 
2 Emirates Team New Zealand 
3 Andrew Brown QC 
4 Baldwins 
5 Bell Gully 
6 New Zealand Law Society, Electronic Commerce Committee 
7 New Zealand Institute of Patent Attorneys 
8 BengeWeb Services 
9 WebAdress 
10 AA Guides 
11 Garth Piesse 
12 Nominet UK 
13 Free Parking 
14 The International Trademark Association 
15 Brendan McNeill 
16 Maxnet 
17 Peter Belt 
18 Sir Ian Barker QC 
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APPENDIX 3 RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE REVIEW OF THE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION SERVICE POLICY 
 
The DRS is to be reviewed in 2010.  This dissertation makes the following 
recommendations on matters to be taken into account in that review: 
 
(a) Where no response is filed to a complaint consideration should be 
given to automatic transfer of the name after the period for a response 
has expired.  Alternatively the DNC should have the discretion to 
transfer the domain name after proof of “final notice” to the 
respondent by the complainant 
(b) A purposive provision could usefully be added to the DRS to make 
clear the duty of the DNCL to deal with complaints promptly and 
manage cases in a timely manner. 
(c) The DRS data should be published in a consistent style, with the raw 
data on the number of actual cases, not only percentages. 
(d) The summary data published on the DNC website should have a 
consistent style so that years can be compared. 
(e) A small but significant proportion of cases are withdrawn.  The 
reasons for withdrawal should be monitored and may warrant further 
research. 
(f) Expert decisions should be published according to The New Zealand 
Law Style Guide. 
(g) The role of the DNC in mediations should be clarified. 
(h) The reasons for invalidity (such as not within jurisdiction of the DRS, 
inadequate information, failure to comply with DRS form or other 
requirements) should be published.   
(i) The DRS should be amended to clarify, for the avoidance of doubt, 
that the Arbitration Act does not apply. 
(j) More research would be useful to examine New Zealand registrants 
with experience of UDRP processes in relation to gTLDs and how the 
DRS process compares. 
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APPENDIX 4 TABLE OF INTERNETNZ POLICIES, AGREEMENTS AND 
FORMS 
 
Policies 
 
Reference Title Version Date issued 
PDP Policy Development 
Process 
V2.1 1/4/08 
OLD Outline Document V1.8 22/12/08 
 
2LD Second Level Domains V2.3 30/7/09 
AOR Authorisation of 
Registrars Process 
V2.0 28/7/08 
CON Connection Process V1.3 10/6/08 
COR Change of Registrant V1.2 1/4/08 
DCP Dispute and Complaints 
Process 
V2.0 22/12/08 
DRS Dispute Resolution 
Service 
V2.0 1/5/08 
IDN-Sun IDN Sunrise Registration 
Policy 
V0.4 6/4/10 
IIP Investigations and 
Inquiries Process 
V2.0 22/12/08 
PRI Privacy Policy V2.0 14/5/09 
POD Process on De-
Authorisation of a 
Registrar 
V2.1 1/4/08 
RAR Roles and Responsibilities V2.2 1/4/08 
RMC Registering, Managing 
and Cancelling Domain 
Names 
V2.0 3/6/08 
TAR Transfer to Another 
Registrar 
V2.1 1/4/08 
WSP WHOIS Server Policy V2.1 1/4/08 
ZTP Zone Transfer Policy V2.1 1/4/08 
 
Agreements 
 
Title Version Date issued 
Registrar Authorisation 
Agreement 
V4.0 1/4/08 
Registrar Connection 
Agreement 
V3.0 1/4/08 
Registrant Agreement 
Core Terms and 
Conditions 
V1.1 1/4/08 
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Forms 
 
Reference Title Version  Date issued 
AOR1 Application for 
Authorisation as a 
Registrar 
V1.2 1/4/08 
CON1 Application for 
Connection to the 
SRS 
V1.2 1/4/08 
COR1 Change of 
Registrant 
V1.2 1/4/08 
DCP1 Complaints form V1.2 1/4/08 
NUD1 Application for 
Unmoderated 
Second Level 
Domain 
V2.1 1/4/08 
NMD1 Application for 
Moderated Second 
Level Domain  
V2.1 1/4/08 
NMD2 Moderation 
Application  
V2.1 1/4/08 
ZTP1 Application for 
Release of Zone 
File 
V1.2 1/4/08 
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APPENDIX 5 TABLE OF EXPERT DECISIONS 2006 – JANUARY 2010 
 
Case 
Number Complainant Respondent Domain Names Decision 
101 
InterCity 
Group (NZ) 
Limited 
Traction 
Group 
Limited intercity.co.nz Transfer 
     
108 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.O.P. 
Memorials 
Jones & 
Company 
Funeral 
Services bopmemorials.co.nz Transfer 
     
109
Harcourts 
Group Ltd Petrov Sergei 
www.harcourts.co.nz 
wwwharcourts.co.nz Dismissed 
     
113
Barfoot & 
Thompson 
Domain 
Admin wwwbarfoot.co.nz Transfer 
     
137 Seek Limited 
Domain 
Admin wwwseek.co.nz Transfer 
     
145
Pacific 
Bereavement 
Solutions 
(NZ) Ltd 
Clive Cooper 
- admin geeandhickton.co.nz Transfer 
     
149
Fleet & 
Partners Ltd 
Fleet Partners 
Pty Ltd fleetpartnersnz.co.nz Dismissed 
     
150
Skype 
Technologies, 
S.A. 
Bellamy Price 
Mansfield, 
Ltd. 
skypestore.co.nz 
skypeshop.co.nz Transfer 
     
156
TeachNZ, 
Ministry of 
Education David Powell teachnz.co.nz Cancel 
     
168
Financial 
Services 
Insurance 
Agent atlasins.co.nz Transfer 
     
172 
NZ Aerial 
Mapping 
Limited 
Terralink 
International 
Limited 
aerialmapping.co.nz 
nzaerialmapping.co.nz Transfer 
     
186 
Mountain 
Buggy 
Trademarks 
Limited 
Campbell 
Gower 
mountainbuggy.co.n
z Dismissed 
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Case 
Number Complainant Respondent Domain Names Decision 
     
188 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kiwispy 
limited Everlast kiwispy.co.nz Transfer 
     
198
Monarch 
Natural 
Health 
DLE 
Investments 
monarchnaturalhealt
h.co.nz Transfer 
     
202
TradeFree 
Ltd. Adnet tradefree.co.nz Dismissed 
     
203
Thai Airways 
International 
Public 
Company 
Limited E-Promote thaiairways.co.nz Transfer 
     
204
KBB Music 
Ltd 
Bonfire 
Development kbb.co.nz Transfer 
     
206
TELECOM IP 
LIMITED E-Promote wwwferrit.co.nz Transfer 
   tellecom.co.nz  
     
208
YPG IP 
Limited E-Promote 
yelllowpages.co.nz 
witepages.co.nz 
whitpages.co.nz Transfer 
     
223 Pet Mania Petmania petmania.co.nz Transfer 
     
228
McIntyre 
Dick & 
Partners 
Alpro New 
Zealand Ltd 
basecampwanaka.co.
nz Transfer 
     
229
Active Travel 
Ltd 
Frontier 
Travel activetravel.co.nz Transfer 
     
235
Melbourne IT 
CBS E-Promote umbro.co.nz Dismissed 
     
236
Retail 
Distribution 
Limited Sarah Perkins adman.co.nz Transfer 
     
241
Lincoln 
Archer 
Daddios 
Developments 
(Struck Off) daddios.co.nz Transfer 
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Case 
Number Complainant Respondent Domain Names Decision 
     
244 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cine Craft 
Limited Vixen private.co.nz Transfer 
     
250
Apollo 
Marketing 
Apollo 
Marketing 
and 
Advertising 
apollomarketing.co.n
z Transfer 
     
252
Inland 
Revenue 
Department 
Portfolio 
Brains, LLC inlandrevenue.co.nz Transfer 
     
255
UMBRO 
International 
Ltd E-promote umbro.co.nz Transfer 
     
256
Harvey 
Norman 
Retailing Pty 
Limited 
Woosh 
Domains 
Limited harveynormans.co.nz Transfer 
     
257
COMPAGNI
E GERVAIS 
DANONE 
Triple Eight 
Holdings 
Limited danone.co.nz Transfer 
     
260
Magic Pulse 
Limited 
(trading as 
Kitomba) Gregg Nelson kitomba.co.nz Transfer 
     
263
Kimberly-
Clark 
Worldwide, 
Inc. E-Promote huggies.co.nz Transfer 
     
281
Facebook, 
Inc. Sanjay Dalal 
facebook.co.nz 
facebook.net.nz Transfer 
     
283
Telstra 
Corporation 
Limited E-Promote 
telstaclear.co.nz 
telsraclear.co.nz 
telstarclear.co.nz Transfer 
     
290
Fiji Water 
Company 
LLC 
James 
Robinson and 
Mel Daly fijiwater.co.nz Transfer 
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Case 
Number Complainant Respondent Domain Names Decision 
     
291 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Auckland 
Airport 
Dave 
Burghardt 
aucklandairport.co.n
z Dismissed 
     
302
Sato New 
Zealand 
Limited 
Ansutek 
Commercial 
Ltd sato.co.nz Transfer 
     
311
Transformer 
Winding 
Sevices Ltd 
Marcus 
Maraldo 
transformerwindings
ervices.co.nz Dismissed 
     
313
Budget Rent 
A Car System, 
Inc. Ian Willis 
budgetrentalcars.co.n
z Transfer 
     
323
A1 Radiator 
& Air 
Conditioning 
Specialists 
Limited 
Heat 
Exchanger 
Services 
a1radiator.co.nz 
a1rad.co.nz 
a1rads.co.nz Transfer 
     
     
325
Hot Water 
Heat Pumps 
Ltd 
Richard 
Hayes 
hotwaterheatpumps.c
o.nz Dismissed 
     
334
The Country 
Channel Ltd 
The Country 
Channel 
Limited 
thecountrychannel.co
.nz 
Appeal: no 
action 
     
338
1. A1 
Radiators & 
Airconditioni
ng Specialists 
Limi RegistryWeb a1radiators.co.nz Transfer 
     
340
Carlton 
Haulage 
Limited John Burrill carltonhaulage.co.nz Transfer 
     
341 eLuggage 
CRW Group 
Ltd eluggage.co.nz Dismissed 
     
343
Pacific Brands 
Holdings NZ 
Ltd 
Visitec (NZ) 
Limited 
totallyworkwear.co.n
z Transfer 
 152
Case 
Number Complainant Respondent Domain Names Decision 
     
344 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sabco 
Australia Pty 
Ltd 
HARCO 
(Harkness & 
Young Ltd) sabco.co.nz Transfer 
     
346
Trade Me 
Limited 
thought box 
ltd trademetender.co.nz Transfer 
     
353
Wicked 
Campers 
Escape 
Rentals 
wickedcampers.co.n
z Transfer 
     
372
Metrotest.Co
m Ltd David Rohani metrotest.co.nz Transfer 
     
377
Law Staff 
International 
Limited 
Law Staff 
Australia Pty. 
Limited 
lawstaffinternational.
co.nz Transfer 
     
399
The Animal 
Welfare 
Institute of 
New Zealand 
animal 
welfare in 
new zealand awinz.org.nz Transfer 
     
402
Profile Boats 
(2008) 
Limited 
jan 
mccutcheon profileboats.co.nz Transfer 
     
409
Frucor 
Beverages 
Ltd. 
Clark R F 
Mills v.co.nz Transfer 
     
417
Macnaught 
Pty Limited Neville Stuart macnaught.co.nz Transfer 
     
420
First Direct 
Limited 
Eva 
Romanowska ecocabs.co.nz Dismissed 
     
423
G.J. Gardner 
Homes SpecName gjgardener.co.nz Transfer 
     
425
Stainless 
Bending 
Limited Paul Granich 
stainlessbending.co.n
z Transfer 
     
426
Toshiba 
(Australia) 
Pty Ltd 
Leigh 
Brotherston mytoshiba.co.nz Transfer 
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Case 
Number Complainant Respondent Domain Names Decision 
     
434 
YPG IP 
Limited E-Promote yellowpagers.co.nz Transfer 
   yelloepages.co.nz  
   whitepagers.co.nz  
   yellopages.co.nz  
     
438 
First Mobile 
New Zealand 
Limited 
The TEC 
Group 
Limited 
1stmobile.co.nz 
1stmobile.net.nz Transfer 
     
441 
Senator Boats 
Limited 
Firmans 
Marine Centre 
1998 Limited senatorboats.co.nz Transfer 
     
443 
Insure and Go 
Insurance 
Services 
Limited  
1 cover NZ 
Limited Insureandgo.co.nz Transfer 
     
458 
Capital 
Conservator 
Group 
Giordan 
Samuels 
capitalconservator.co
.nz Transfer 
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